Four Essays on Imperfections in Energy Markets by Weiser, Florian
FOUR ESSAYS ON IMPERFECTIONS
IN ENERGY MARKETS
Inauguraldissertation
zur
Erlangung des Doktorgrades
der
Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftlichen Fakultät
der
Universität zu Köln
2018
vorgelegt
von
Dipl.-Phys. Florian Weiser
aus
Sinsheim

Referent: Prof. Dr. Marc Oliver Bettzüge
Korreferent: Prof. Dr. Felix Höffler
Tag der Promotion: 12.07.2018
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
First, I would like to thank my supervisor Prof. Dr. Marc Oliver Bettzüge. His
ideas and feedback always inspired my research. I also want to thank Prof. Dr. Felix
Höffler for co-refereeing my thesis and for his helpful comments. In addition, I am
thankful to Prof. Dr. Oliver Gürtler for chairing the examination committee for this
thesis.
I am extremly grateful for the opportunity to participate in the Ph.D. program at
the Institute of Energy Economics at the University of Cologne. Among the academic
staff at the Faculty of Management, Economics and Social Sciences at the University
of Cologne, I am thankful to PD Dr. Dietmar Lindenberger and Prof. Van Anh Vuong,
Ph.D., for providing feedback to my research. Furthermore, I would like to thank all
colleagues at ewi Energy Research & Scenarios (ewi ER&S) for creating an inspiring
atmosphere for pursuing my Ph.D. project. In particular, I am thankful to my co-
authors Dr. Andreas Knaut, Dr. Frank Obermüller and Simon Schulte. While many
people at ewi ER&S helped me in my research, I would like to mention Dr. Harald
Hecking, Broghan Helgeson and Dr. Martin Paschmann by name. In addition, I am
thankful to the administration team and the IT team of ewi ER&S.
Parts of this thesis benefited from the project "Turkey’s Potential as Future En-
ergy Hub – Economic Developments and Political Options" funded by the Mercator
Foundation. This financial support is greatly acknowledged.
Furthermore, I am thankful to the German Academic Exchange Service for sup-
porting my participation in the 40th IAEE International Conference in Singapore.
Finally, I want to thank Katharina, my friends and my family for supporting me
during my Ph.D. project. Especially, I am grateful to my parents for their endless
support.
Florian Weiser Cologne, April 2018
Contents
List of Figures viii
List of Tables xi
1 Introduction 1
1.1 Motivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.2 Outline of the Thesis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.2.1 LNG Import Quotas in Lithuania – Economic Effects of Break-
ing Gazprom’s Natural Gas Monopoly . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.2.2 Non-physical Barriers to Natural Gas Trade – Gas Price Differ-
ences between Germany and Italy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.2.3 Natural Gas Transits and Market Power - The Case of Turkey . 4
1.2.4 Tender Frequency and Market Concentration in Balancing Power
Markets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.3 Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2 LNG Import Quotas in Lithuania  Economic Eﬀects of Breaking
Gazprom's Natural Gas Monopoly 9
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.2 Literature Review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.3 Theoretical Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.3.1 General Model Setup . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.3.2 Optimal Quota for Linear Inverse Demand and Cost Functions 16
2.4 Application to the Lithuanian Natural Gas Market . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2.4.1 Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2.4.2 Initial Monopoly Situation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
2.4.3 The Effects of a minimum LNG Import Quota . . . . . . . . . . 20
2.4.4 Discussion of Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
2.5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
2.6 Appendix: Welfare Implications of a Quota . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
v
3 Non-physical Barriers to Natural Gas Trade  Gas Price Diﬀer-
ences between Germany and Italy 29
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
3.2 Literature Review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
3.3 Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
3.4 Theoretical Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
3.5 Application of the theoretical Model to the historical Gas Market Sit-
uation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
3.5.1 Model Parameterization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
3.5.2 Model Results for the Second Half of 2014 . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
3.6 Discussion of Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
3.6.1 Welfare Effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
3.6.2 Potential Swiss Incentives for Inefficient Regulation . . . . . . 46
3.6.3 Countermeasures against Market Power . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
3.7 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
3.8 Appendix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
3.8.1 Formal Model Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
3.8.2 Discussion of Flexibility Constraint Supplies to the Italian Gas
Market . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
3.8.3 Comparison of modeled and historical Flows . . . . . . . . . . . 52
3.8.4 Robustness Checks: Parameter Variations . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
4 Natural Gas Transits and Market Power  The Case of Turkey 59
4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
4.2 Literature Review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
4.3 Stylized Theoretical Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
4.4 Methodology: The Global Gas Market Model COLUMBUS . . . . . . . 66
4.4.1 Model Description & Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
4.4.2 Input Data and Assumptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
4.4.3 Model Calibration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
4.5 Simulation Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
4.5.1 Turkish Transit Market Power in an oligopolistic European Gas
Market . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
4.5.2 Turkish Transit Market Power in a competitive European Gas
Market . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
4.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
4.7 Appendix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
vi
4.7.1 Model Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
4.7.2 Model Extensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
4.7.3 Data Sources and Scenarios . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
4.7.4 Sensitivity Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
5 Tender Frequency and Market Concentration in Balancing Power
Markets 91
5.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
5.2 Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
5.2.1 On the Functioning of the Balancing Power Market . . . . . . . 94
5.2.2 Market Concentration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
5.3 Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
5.3.1 Modeling Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
5.3.2 Input Data and Assumptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
5.4 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
5.4.1 System Costs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
5.4.2 Provision of Balancing Power . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
5.4.3 Market Concentration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
5.4.4 Influence of additional Demand Response on the Market Con-
centration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
5.5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
5.6 Appendix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
5.6.1 Input Data for Modeling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
5.6.2 Robustness Checks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
5.6.3 Balancing Power Provision by Technologies and Operators . . 124
5.6.4 RSI Concentration Index for Secondary Balancing Power . . . 127
Bibliography 129
Curriculum Vitae 143
vii
List of Figures
2.1 Market without a quota (left hand side) and with a quota (right hand
side) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2.2 LNG imports (left hand side) and Russian gas imports (right hand
side) in dependence on C
′
F . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
2.3 Lithuanian gas price in dependence on C
′
F . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
2.4 Lithuanian adjusted consumer surplus in dependence on C
′
F . . . . . . 23
2.5 Welfare in dependence on C
′
F . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
2.6 Historical development of the Lithuanian weighted average import
gas price . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
3.1 Daily gas price spreads between Germany and Italy in comparison to
the regulated tariff on the Austrian route in 2013, 2014 and 2015 . . 34
3.2 Daily utilization of pipeline connections between Germany and Italy
in the second half of 2014 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
3.3 Scatter plot of daily Swiss pipeline utilizations and daily gas price
differences between Germany and Italy in the second half of 2014 . . 35
3.4 Schematic illustration of the model for the trade between market M2
and market M1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
3.5 Physical gas flows from Austria to Slovakia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
3.6 Historical spreads in comparison to modeled spreads in the second
half of 2014 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
3.7 Effect of additional Austrian capacity on the mean of the modeled
spreads in the second half of 2014 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
3.8 Development of R2 for the spreads in the market power model in de-
pendence on Swiss transmission costs TI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
4.1 Illustration of the stylized model describing a multi-source transit
country . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
4.2 Definition of the two clusters NWE & SEE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
4.3 Comparison of historical imports to model results for 2014 and 2016 71
viii
4.4 Comparison of historical prices to model results for 2014 and 2016 . 71
4.5 EU supply mix per source in dependence on Turkish behavior in 2030 73
4.6 Natural gas prices in dependence on Turkish behavior in 2030 . . . . 74
4.7 Development of profits and consumer surplus if Turkey exerts market
power in 2030 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
4.8 Turkish gas transits into the EU per source in dependence on Turkish
behavior in 2030 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
4.9 Turkish gas transits into the EU per source in dependence on Turkish
behavior in 2030 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
4.10 Natural gas prices in SEE and NWE in dependence on Turkish behav-
ior in 2030 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
4.11 Turkish gas transits into the EU per source and Turkish profits in de-
pendence on Caspian supply options in 2030 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
5.1 Capacity bidding behavior for balancing power markets is theoreti-
cally based on an opportunity cost strategy to the spot market (here:
positive balancing power) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
5.2 Schematic illustration of the portfolio effect . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
5.3 Merit order in Germany colored as to the operators . . . . . . . . . . . 100
5.4 Demand, residual demand, solar feed-in and wind feed-in . . . . . . . 105
5.5 Costs of primary and secondary balancing power (compared to no
provision) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
5.6 Comparison of the technologies (left) and operators (right) providing
positive secondary balancing power for the weekly, daily and hourly
provision duration in the winter week (model results) . . . . . . . . . 113
5.7 Histogram of the hourly HHI values for primary balancing power in
winter week (left) and summer week (right) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
5.8 Histogram of the hourly concentration index RSI−1 for primary bal-
ancing power in winter week (left) and summer week (right) . . . . . 116
5.9 Histogram of the hourly HHI values for positive secondary balancing
power in winter week (left) and summer week (right) . . . . . . . . . 117
5.10 Histogram of the hourly HHI values for negative secondary balancing
power in winter week (left) and summer week (right) . . . . . . . . . 118
5.11 Costs of primary and secondary balancing power (compared to no
provision) in scenario with doubled renewable feed-in . . . . . . . . . 123
ix
5.12 Comparison of the technologies (left) and operators (right) providing
primary balancing power for the weekly, daily and hourly provision
duration in the summer week (model results) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
5.13 Comparison of the technologies (left) and operators (right) providing
primary balancing power for the weekly, daily and hourly provision
duration in the winter week (model results) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
5.14 Comparison of the technologies (left) and operators (right) providing
positive secondary balancing power for the weekly, daily and hourly
provision duration in the summer week (model results) . . . . . . . . 125
5.15 Comparison of the technologies (left) and operators (right) providing
negative secondary balancing power for the weekly, daily and hourly
provision duration in the summer week (model results) . . . . . . . . 126
5.16 Comparison of the technologies (left) and operators (right) providing
negative secondary balancing power for the weekly, daily and hourly
provision duration in the winter week (model results) . . . . . . . . . 126
5.17 Histogram of the hourly concentration index RSI−1 for positive sec-
ondary balancing power in winter week (left) and summer week (right)127
5.18 Histogram of the hourly concentration index RSI−1 for negative sec-
ondary balancing power in winter week (left) and summer week (right)127
x
List of Tables
2.1 Characteristics of the Lithuanian gas market in 2014 . . . . . . . . . . 20
3.1 Overview of model parameterization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
3.2 Arithmetic mean and standard deviation of spreads in historical data
and in different model configurations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
3.3 R2 and NMB for spreads from market power model and high trans-
mission costs model in the second half of 2014 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
3.4 Regression results for the prices in the market power model and the
high transmission costs model in the second half of 2014 . . . . . . . 45
3.5 Arithmetic mean and standard deviation of flows in historical data
and in different model configurations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
3.6 R2 and NMB for the flows in the market power model and high trans-
mission costs model in the second half of 2014 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
3.7 Regression results for the flows in the market power model and the
high transmission costs model in the second half of 2014 . . . . . . . 53
3.8 Regression results for the prices with different LTC driven must-run
flows . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
3.9 Regression results for the prices with different elasticities . . . . . . . 55
3.10 Regression results for the flows with different LTC driven must-run
flows . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
3.11 Regression results for the flows with different elasticities . . . . . . . . 57
4.1 Sets in the COLUMBUS model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
4.2 Primal variables in the COLUMBUS model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
4.3 Dual variables in the COLUMBUS model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
4.4 Parameters in the COLUMBUS model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
4.5 Data and Sources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
4.6 Scenario overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
5.1 Overview of sets, parameters and variables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
5.2 Share of total capacity that can be used for balancing power provision 107
xi
5.3 Total system cost in reference scenario in million Euros . . . . . . . . . 109
5.4 Model inputs: Installed capacity in Germany for 2014, fuel costs, costs
for CO2 emissions certificates, and CO2 emission coefficients . . . . . 121
5.5 Techno-economic parameters for conventional power plants . . . . . . 122
5.6 Total system cost in scenario with doubled renewable feed-in in mil-
lion Euros . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
xii
1 Introduction
1.1 Motivation
According to the First Fundamental Theorem of Welfare Economics, an allocation of
a perfectly competitive equilibrium is Pareto optimal (Mas-Colell et al., 1995). The
concept of a perfectly competitive equilibrium is connected to certain conditions. In
particular, all market participants are assumed to be price takers, externalities should
be absent and markets should be complete "in the sense that there is a market for every
relevant commodity".1 If market imperfections, i.e. deviations from the conditions
of a perfectly competitive equilibrium, occur in a market, the resulting market out-
come is not Pareto optimal anymore. Market imperfections include market power,
transaction costs and missing markets. Given that hardly any real market outcome
fulfills the theoretical standards of a perfectly competitive equilibrium, market im-
perfections are rather the norm than the exception (Joskow, 2010a). As long as the
resulting inefficiencies are small compared to the welfare of the perfectly competi-
tive equilibrium, this may be acceptable from a regulatory point of view. However,
market imperfections can also lead to significant inefficiencies potentially justify-
ing market interventions. Therefore, research that identifies market imperfections,
quantifies the inefficiencies caused by them and finds potential countermeasures to
them has a high practical relevance.
If market imperfections are present in energy markets, this can have a negative im-
pact on the macroeconomic performance of countries because energy is an important
production factor for all sectors of modern economies (for an overview of literature
that considers energy as a production factor cf. Kümmel et al. (2015)). In addition,
affordable energy is essential for household consumers because energy is required to
fulfill basic human needs such as heating, lighting and cooking. Therefore, political
decision makers and regulators aim to incentivize competition in energy markets.
Given this high importance of competitive energy markets, the European Union
(EU) liberalized its energy markets starting with first directives in 1996 (for electric-
ity) and 1998 (for natural gas) formulating the goal of a single European market.
1Page 327 in Mas-Colell et al. (1995)
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Previously, the markets were organized as regional monopolies leading to high elec-
tricity and natural gas prices. Second energy directives advanced the liberalization
in and after 2003, whereas finally the Third Energy Package came into force in 2009
requiring ownership unbundling, i.e. the separation of transmission systems from
the production and trading, and the creation of national regulatory bodies that in-
ter alia determine transmission tariffs (European Commission, 2018b). Due to this
regulatory framework, competitive and liquid natural gas and electricity markets
existed in many EU member states in 2016 (ACER (2017a) and ACER (2017b)).
Nevertheless, as also discussed in this thesis, in specific energy markets of certain
countries, competition is still restricted, e.g. by regulations in countries that are not
part of the EU. Therefore, the single European market for natural gas and electricity
is not fully realized yet. Against this backdrop, this thesis analyzes market imperfec-
tions in European energy markets that have already been resolved, are still existing
and could potentially emerge in the future.
Three chapters of this thesis focus on market imperfections in natural gas markets:
Chapter 2 analyzes the Lithuanian gas market in which a state funded import ter-
minal for liquefied natural gas (LNG) was built in 2014 breaking the gas monopoly
of Russia’s Gazprom. Chapter 3 investigates potential reasons underlying price pre-
miums of the Italian wholesale gas market Punto di Scambio Virtuale (PSV) to the
German wholesale gas market NetConnect Germany (NCG). Whereas Chapter 2 and
Chapter 3 have a historical and current focus, Chapter 4 investigates whether Turkey
could exert market power with gas transits through the Southern Gas Corridor in
2030.
Finally, Chapter 5 focuses on the missing market for hourly balancing power prod-
ucts in the German balancing power market design in 2014. Impacts of shorter pro-
vision durations on the market efficiency and market concentration are investigated.
Each chapter of this thesis is based on an article to which all authors contributed
equally:
• LNG Import Quotas in Lithuania – Economic Effects of Breaking Gazprom’s
Natural Gas Monopoly (joint work with Simon Schulte)
• Non-physical Barriers to Natural Gas Trade – Gas Price Differences between
Germany and Italy
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• Natural Gas Transits and Market Power – The Case of Turkey (joint work with
Simon Schulte, based on Schulte and Weiser (2017))
• Tender Frequency and Market Concentration in Balancing Power Markets (joint
work with Andreas Knaut and Frank Obermüller, based on Knaut et al. (2017))
The research questions and key findings of each chapter are discussed in more de-
tail in the following. Afterwards, the methodology and the assumptions underlying
the applied models are introduced.
1.2 Outline of the Thesis
1.2.1 LNG Import Quotas in Lithuania – Economic Effects of Breaking
Gazprom’s Natural Gas Monopoly
Chapter 2 assesses the decision of the Lithuanian state to finance an LNG import
terminal and to require yearly minimum LNG imports by signing a long-term con-
tract (LTC) for LNG. Those measures taken in 2014 broke Gazprom’s gas monopoly
in Lithuania. LNG is competitively priced, but has higher marginal supply costs than
Russian gas. It is shown in general that there is an economic rationale to incen-
tivize imports from a competitive fringe having high marginal supply costs into a
market up until then supplied by a dominant firm with low marginal supply costs.
A minimum import volume quota can be found that optimizes the consumer surplus
adjusted by compensation payments to the competitive fringe. The developed model
is parameterized for the Lithuanian gas market. We infer that the decision to build
the regasification terminal and to sign a LTC for LNG was a feasible way to address
Gazprom’s market power.
1.2.2 Non-physical Barriers to Natural Gas Trade – Gas Price
Differences between Germany and Italy
In Chapter 3 price premiums of the Italian wholesale gas market PSV compared to the
German wholesale gas market NCG are investigated. The price spreads between the
markets in the second half of 2014 exceeded the regulated transmission tariff on the
Austrian pipeline system connecting the markets significantly. Despite the high price
spreads, the Transitgas pipeline in Switzerland that also connects the markets was
not used to the full extent pointing to non-physical barriers to trade in Switzerland.
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High transmission costs, potentially caused by transaction costs in the market for
Swiss transmission rights, and market power, i.e. withholding of Swiss gas flows in
order to increase the Italian gas price, are considered as two relevant explanation
approaches for the Italian gas price premium. A parameterized model for the trade
between the markets is developed in which a model configuration for the market
power explanation as well as a model configuration for the high transmission costs
explanation are considered. Based on different statistical indicators and tests for
comparing the outcomes of the two different model configurations, it is found that
market power in the Italian gas market is a better explanation for the historical
Italian gas prices than high transmission costs. In addition, different measures to
mitigate the market power are discussed. As a policy implication, an application of
EU rules for capacity trading in the non-EU country Switzerland is recommended.
1.2.3 Natural Gas Transits and Market Power - The Case of Turkey
Chapter 4 focuses on the role of Turkey in the Southern Gas Corridor that consists of
planned pipeline projects connecting the natural gas producers in the Caspian region
and the Middle East with the European natural gas markets. Turkey has a key role
in realizing those projects due to its geographical location. Instead of taking a pure
transit role, BOTAS¸, the Turkish national oil and gas company, has the perception to
buy gas arriving at the Eastern borders of Turkey and sell it at a profit to European
customers (Skalamera, 2016). In economic terms, BOTAS¸ wants to exercise market
power with gas transits (transit market power). Therefore, Chapter 4 quantifies the
implications of Turkish transit market power for the European gas markets with a
global partial equilibrium gas market model. The Turkish behavior is examined in
two different upstream market configurations, (1) an oligopolistic upstream market
based on a calibration to the European gas markets in 2014, and (2) a competitive
upstream market based on a calibration to the European gas markets in 2016. It
is found that Turkish market power would reduce the European consumer surplus
by 6.6 billion EUR in the case of an olgiopolistic upstream market in 2030. In a
competitive European upstream setup, however, the impact of Turkey’s behavior on
European gas markets is limited due to the comparably high costs of the gas supplies
from the Southern Gas Corridor. As a policy implication, the EU should either avoid
dependencies on transit countries such as Turkey or harmonize the energy laws of
the transit countries with EU rules that sanction market power abuses.
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1.2.4 Tender Frequency and Market Concentration in Balancing Power
Markets
Whereas Chapter 2, Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 analyze natural gas markets, Chapter 5
focuses on the design of balancing power markets. In 2014, primary and secondary
balancing power was procured in a weekly auction in Germany giving rise to a miss-
ing market for hourly balancing power products. Our analysis evaluates implications
of a shortening of the provision duration to a daily and hourly procurement for the
market efficiency and market concentration based on a summer week and a winter
week in 2014. A unit commitment model for the German electricity market account-
ing for balancing power markets characteristics and power plants features is applied
in the analysis. We find that pooling effects within power plant portfolios of the
large German operators reduce balancing power costs significantly in the weekly
market design compared to a case without pooling in which specific power plants
would have to offer the balancing power during a whole week. Allowing a shorter
provision duration further lowers the cost of balancing power provision by up to
15% compared to a weekly market design. However, the analysis identifies cases in
which shorter tender frequencies for balancing power lead to higher market concen-
trations. Therefore, regulators should carefully monitor market concentration and
price levels after a shortening of provision duration.
1.3 Methodology
In order to answer the research questions of this thesis, fundamental models for en-
ergy markets are applied. Whereas the model in Chapter 2 is solved analytically, the
models in Chapter 3, Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 are numerical simulation models. It is
inevitable to discuss the underlying assumptions of the models in order to interpret
and evaluate the results.
In Chapter 2 the demand side as well as the supply side is assumed to be able to
influence prices strategically in a sequential model. The sequential order of stages
in the model is connected to the assumption that a country is able to decide on the
quota before the market conduct. This is justified if the market intervention is a
credible announcement by the government or regulator of the country. Additional
assumptions taken in Chapter 2 are linear demand and supply functions when ap-
plying the developed model to the Lithuanian gas market. However, as shown in
Section 2.3, more sophisticated functional forms would not change the key result
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that there is a rationale behind incentivizing the LNG imports to Lithuania as long
as the demand function would not be too concave and the marginal costs of the LNG
suppliers would not be too high.
In Chapter 3 a model of capacity constraint traders is used in order to rationalize
gas price differences between the German and Italian gas markets. An important
assumption of this analysis is that traders buying gas in Germany set the Italian gas
price. This is justified due to the high competitiveness and flexibility of gas volumes
sourced at the liquid Central European gas hubs compared to alternative supply op-
tions to the Italian market. Furthermore, we assume that the German gas price is not
influenced by the trade with Italy. This is approximately appropriate given that the
traded volumes in Central European gas hubs to which the German market is con-
nected are much larger than the volumes traded in Italy, i.e. the arbitrage volumes
between Central Europe and Italy can be considered to be small. For modeling the
price formation in gas markets, frictions in the markets, e.g. features of LTCs and
the costs of long-term bookings, have to be considered. In order to account for an
uncertainty about the model parameters describing those frictions, sensitivity anal-
yses are used in Chapter 3 to test the robustness of the results against variations of
those parameters.
The analysis in Chapter 4 is based on the global gas market model COLUMBUS.
It is formulated as a mixed complementarity problem with linear functions for the
inverse demand and production costs. General model features and potential caveats
of the COLUMBUS model are discussed by Hecking (2014). Because the analysis in
Chapter 4 focuses on the year 2030, there is an uncertainty about the future develop-
ment of gas markets. In order to account for this uncertainty, two potential market
structures are considered, i.e. a competitive upstream behavior and an oligopolistic
upstream behavior. Furthermore, an important assumption is that the analysis in
Chapter 4 is based on a pure economic rationale and does not account for any po-
litical constraints. Although this is a simplifying assumption, such an analysis helps
to identify drivers of stakeholders in the Southern Gas Corridor, and is an essential
step towards a comprehensive understanding of Turkey’s role for the European gas
supply.
Balancing power markets that are in the focus of Chapter 5 are based on oppor-
tunity costs relative to the day ahead electricity market. The reason for this is that
power plant capacity which is marketed as balancing power cannot be offered any-
more at the day ahead market. Therefore, the day ahead market has to be consid-
ered in studies of balancing power markets. In order to account for characteristics
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of specific power plants, e.g. technical features as well as information about the
ownership of the plants, a cost minimizing mixed integer problem is used in Chap-
ter 5. Whereas electricity prices cannot be derived with a non-convex mixed integer
problem2, this methodology allows to determine a simultaneous dispatch of the day
ahead and balancing power markets. Cost minimization implies a cost efficient dis-
patch of those markets as achieved under perfect competition. For the day ahead
market, this assumption is approximately justified according to the findings of the
German regulator (Bundesnetzagentur, 2014). For balancing power markets, the
cost efficient dispatch allows to determine cost advantages of balancing power sup-
pliers in specific situations. Such cost advantages can result in high market shares
of certain suppliers. A final assessment to which extent balancing power suppliers
with high market shares would be able to increase prices for balancing power is left
for further research.
Besides the discussion of the methodology in this section, the following chapters
of the thesis contain sections with detailed descriptions of the methodology.
2The marginal of the market clearing constraint cannot be interpreted as an estimator for electricity
prices in mixed integer problems.
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2 LNG Import Quotas in Lithuania – Economic
Effects of Breaking Gazprom’s Natural Gas
Monopoly
Until 2014, Russia’s Gazprom had a natural gas monopoly in Lithuania. In order
to break the Russian monopoly, the Lithuanian state financed an import terminal
for liquefied natural gas (LNG) in Klaipe˙da. In addition to building the terminal,
Lithuania signed a long-term contract (LTC) which can be interpreted as a minimum
import volume quota for LNG having higher marginal supply costs than Russian
gas. This study assesses the potential of such a minimum import volume quota
to mitigate the market power of a monopolistic supplier. A market consisting of a
dominant supplier with low marginal supply costs and a competitive fringe with high
marginal supply costs is analyzed. It is shown that there is a minimum import volume
quota for fringe supplies that optimizes the consumer surplus, which is adjusted by a
compensation paid for the fringe’s market entry. Therefore, the Lithuanian decision
to incentivize the market entry of high-cost LNG can be rationalized.
2.1 Introduction
In recent years, natural gas prices in Eastern Europe have been significantly higher
than in Central or Western Europe (ACER, 2016), primarily due to the dominant po-
sition of Russia’s gas exporter Gazprom in the Eastern European gas markets (Hen-
derson and Mitrova, 2015). As of 2013, several European Union (EU) member
states were subject to a Russian gas supply monopoly: Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia
and Finland (ACER, 2014). Apart from the economic disadvantages resulting from
Gazprom’s monopoly, political actors in those countries feared that Russian gas de-
liveries could be used as a political tool by the Russian administration. Against this
background, Lithuania, built an import terminal for liquefied natural gas (LNG) in
Klaipe˙da in 2014 with financial support from the EU to allow LNG suppliers access
to their market, thus breaking Gazprom’s monopoly (Pakalkaité, 2016).
Although the political goal of supply diversification was achieved by this measure,
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an economic assessment of the terminal crucially depends on global LNG market
developments.1 Lithuania secured a long-term contract (LTC) with the Norwegian
supplier Statoil in 2014 to provide must-run LNG imports ensuring the continuous
utilization of the newly built terminal. The marginal supply costs of Gazprom were
generally considered to be much lower than those of LNG, which has to be lique-
fied, transported by ship and regasified at the destination. In addition, there was
a global scarcity of liquefaction plants in the mid 2010s, which led to a high uti-
lization of existing plants and an increase in LNG prices compared to previous years
(International Gas Union, 2015).
The objective of this paper, therefore, is to investigate the economic rationale be-
hind the Lithuanian policy to incentivize must-run imports of high-cost LNG. Such
incentives may not be necessary in the case of comparably low LNG prices, i.e. LNG
would be imported without a minimum import requirement if an LNG import termi-
nal has been constructed. However, the LTC leads to economic disadvantages for the
owner of the LNG terminal if LNG import prices are higher than the gas price paid
to the dominant supplier. If the owner of the LNG terminal is the state, as is the case
in Lithuania, the potential losses generated by the LNG imports are then passed on
to the citizens or gas customers in one way or another. Hence, one would intuitively
think that securing a LTC for LNG may induce additional burdens for gas customers
in situations with comparably high LNG import prices. However, the study at hand
argues that a minimum import requirement for LNG could enhance Lithuanian na-
tional welfare2 even if the LNG import prices would be above the former Russian
monopoly price. This is due to the reaction of the dominant supplier on the market
intervention. Hence, the Lithuanian decision to build the terminal and sign a LTC
can be rationalized as a feasible instrument to address Gazprom’s market power.
Generally speaking, our analysis investigates a market consisting of a dominant
supplier with low marginal supply costs and a competitive fringe with high marginal
supply costs. In this setting, a minimum volume quota3 for the fringe supply is
considered. It is shown that a minimum volume quota can increase the consumer
surplus of an importing country adjusted by the compensation payments necessary
to introduce the quota.
The structure of the paper is as follows: Section 2.2 gives an overview of the liter-
1LNG is a global commodity as analyzed by e.g. Barnes and Bosworth (2015).
2Due to the fact that Lithuania does not have indigenous natural gas resources and thus no production,
national welfare is identical to the consumer surplus.
3A volume quota means that a fixed amount of fringe volume needs to be imported in the market. A
share quota, however, would mean that a certain share of the demand needs to be supplied by the
fringe.
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ature relevant for this analysis. Section 2.3 focuses on a stylized model in which the
implications of a minimum volume quota are discussed analytically. In Section 2.4,
the model is applied with parameters characterizing the Lithuanian gas market in
2014. Finally, Section 2.5 concludes.
2.2 Literature Review
There are two aspects of our research that, to the best of our knowledge, have yet
to be investigated in the literature. First, a minimum import volume quota for a
high-cost fringe as a trade policy instrument to increase the consumer surplus of a
national market is a novelty. Second, the application of this policy instrument to the
Lithuanian natural gas market is new. We have identified three different branches
of literature that are relevant for our investigation: 1) literature on (strategic) trade
theory, 2) industrial organization literature focusing on fringe-firm intervention and
multiple sourcing, and 3) literature on the Lithuanian natural gas market.
Strategic trade theory (also referred to as "strategic trade policy") investigates
policy instruments affecting the output of a dominant foreign firm. Within the lit-
erature, there exist several studies analyzing the effects of tariffs and quotas for the
national welfare of a country. The first seminal work to examine the equivalence of
different trade restrictions was Bhagwati (1965). He shows equivalence of tariffs
and quotas for a market configuration with a dominant foreign firm and a domestic
producer that is assumed to be competitive. Based on his findings, but relaxing the
assumption of a competitive domestic producer, Shibata (1968), Yadav (1968) and
Bhagwati (1968) show non-equivalence of tariffs and quotas because the domestic
producer benefits from monopoly power under a quota. Furthermore, Hwang and
Mai (1988) illustrate that the equivalence of tariffs and quotas also depends on the
market behavior of the firms analyzed. By using a conjectural variation approach
with different conjectures, they expose that equivalence holds only for the Cournot
case. Other works investigate quotas and tariffs separately. Brander and Spencer
(1981), for instance, analyze tariff policies in an imperfectly competitive market.
They show how a tariff can be used to extract rents from a foreign exporter. More-
over, their results illustrate the benefits regarding the national welfare of using a
tariff to support the market entry of a domestic firm. Eaton and Grossman (1986)
focus on Bertrand competition rather than Cournot competition analyzing the wel-
fare effects of trade policy under oligopoly. They find that a tax optimizes national
welfare with Bertrand competition. Breton and Zaccour (2001) focus on import
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quotas in an abstraction of European gas markets in the 1980s. They consider an
asymmetric oligopoly with a diversification constraint on a player representing the
Soviet Union. Krishna (1989) studies the effect of an import quota in a duopoly of
a home firm and a foreign firm. He examines the increasing profitability of a home
firm that is able to raise its prices when imports are restricted. He shows that the
home consumers are the losers of the maximum import quota.
The aforementioned literature analyzes instruments having a direct effect on the
dominant supplier. A minimum quota in our study supports the market entry of
the high-cost supplier and has thereby only an indirect effect on the output of the
dominant firm. A similar effect is examined by Brander and Spencer (1985): Based
on a two stage game, they show that export subsidies may be an attractive trade
policy instrument from a domestic point of view. While governments set subsidies
in a first stage, firms set their output levels based on the subsidy and on the rivals’
output in a second stage. The results of Brander and Spencer (1985) illustrate that
the export subsidy lowers a good’s world price and increases the domestic firm’s
profit by extracting rents from the foreign firm. Whereas the subsidy analyzed in
the work of Brander and Spencer (1985) supports the domestic producer, the study
at hand considers a minimum import quota to incentivize the entry of an external
high-cost competitive supplier.
A further stream of literature that is relevant for this analysis can be clustered
under the concepts of multiple sourcing and fringe-firm intervention as part of the
literature on partial industry regulation. According to Ayres and Braithwaite (1992),
fringe-firm intervention means that a regulator or private company supports the en-
try of a competitive fringe into a market with a dominant player. In line with Stigler
(1964) and Tirole (1988), an increasing number of competitors in a market results
in increasing competition. Hence, competition is induced without a direct regula-
tory restrain to the dominant firm. Examples for markets in which fringe-firm in-
tervention takes place are the defense or the automotive industry, e.g. Riordan and
Sappington (1989), Farrell and Gallini (1988), Anton and Yao (1987) and Demski
et al. (1987). However, literature on fringe-firm interventions of private companies
is limited because private companies are faced with a free-rider problem: If one
company decides to support the market entry of a competitive fringe, and the fringe
produces an input for the company, also the company’s competitors would benefit.
Moreover, the examples provided in the literature focus on complex and differenti-
ated goods as defense systems. In our work we analyze the market for natural gas,
which is a homogeneous good. An import quota as investigated in the following, is
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only applicable to a homogeneous good.
There are only a few contributions in the literature on resource markets address-
ing the Lithuanian energy market. Works that include the Baltic gas markets in
analyzing the European gas security of supply are e.g. Richter and Holz (2015) and
Baltensperger et al. (2017). Hinchey (2018) discusses Russian natural gas pricing
in Europe in the presence of alternative supply options for gas. In doing so, a special
focus is put on the Lithuanian LNG terminal. Similar to our paper, Hinchey (2018)
finds that importing LNG was economically rational for Lithuania. However, her fo-
cus is rather on a bargaining solution than on a non-cooperative game. In addition,
compared to the analysis of Hinchey (2018) who only examines prices, our study
evaluates the welfare impacts of LNG imports for the Lithuanian gas market.
2.3 Theoretical Model
Before the Lithuanian natural gas market is analyzed in more detail, the effect of a
minimum import quota on a market for a homogenous good is analyzed within a
theoretical framework. First, general functional forms of the cost and supply func-
tions in the model are considered. Later on, linear simplifications for those functions
are used.
2.3.1 General Model Setup
A country demands a homogeneous good q from abroad. The demand is given by
q (p), and p (q) is the inverse demand function. The law of demand is assumed to
hold.
There are two sources for the good: (i) a dominant supplier D and (ii) a com-
petitive fringe F . The cost functions of both supply sources CD (q) and CF (q) are
convex. The dominant supplier is more cost efficient than the competitive fringe,
i.e. has lower marginal supply costs: C ′D (q) < C ′F (q) . The importing country con-
siders introducing a quota L for imports from the competitive fringe. The question
is whether a quota increases national welfare, and how it is optimally chosen. We
analyze this in a two stage interaction model. In the first stage, L is determined by
the country with the objective to maximize national welfare, which is equivalent to
the consumer surplus in the absence of indigenous production. Afterwards, there is
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supply by the dominant supplier and the fringe firms.4
Fringe firms sell their output at the marginal cost C
′
F to meet the quota. Thus, the
country’s expenditures for the import from the fringe firms will be L · C ′F (L) . The
dominant supplier takes the quota as given and maximizes profit with respect to the
residual demand qR (p) = q (p) − L. Graphically, the residual demand is a parallel
shift of the demand function. The dominant supplier chooses a quantity qD:
qD ∈ arg maxqD p (qD + L) · qD − CD (qD) . (2.1)
The country chooses L∗ to maximize national consumer surplus adjusted by a com-
pensation paid to the fringe firms (from now on called "adjusted consumer surplus"):
L∗ ∈ arg max
L
CS (L) , (2.2)
where CS (L) =
∫ qD+L
0
p (x) d x − p (qD)qD − LC ′F (L) . (2.3)
Assuming an interior solution, the optimal national quota is given by:
∂ CS
∂ L
=

1+
∂ qD
∂ L

p (qD + L)− ∂ qD
∂ L

∂ p
∂ q
qD + p (qD)

− C ′′F L − C ′F != 0. (2.4)
This can be reformulated as follows:
p (qD + L)− C ′F − C ′′F L = −∂ qD∂ L p (qD + L) +
∂ qD
∂ L

p (qD) +
∂ p
∂ q
qD

. (2.5)
On the left hand side of equation (2.5), there is the change in consumer surplus
due to receiving one (marginal) unit more from the fringe firms when (marginally)
increasing the quota: The first term represents the additional consumer surplus, the
second term the cost for the additional unit, and the third term the change in cost for
all inframarginal units bought from the fringe. On the right hand side, there is the
change from the reaction of the dominant supplier. If the supply of the dominant
supplier decreases (∂ qD/∂ L < 0), the consumer surplus is reduced (first term).
4Similar to the game in the seminal analysis of Brander and Spencer (1985), the country’s action takes
place before the firm’s actions. Brander and Spencer (1985) mention that the market intervention
announced by the government is assumed to be credible as the reason why the country is able to
move first.
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However, less supply from the incumbent saves the cost for this reduced supply (first
part of the expression in brackets in the second term) but also drives up the price
for all inframarginal units (second part of the expression in brackets in the second
term).
A strictly positive quota L > 0 is optimal, if the following condition holds:
∂ CS
∂ L

L=0
=

1+
∂ qD
∂ L

p (qD)− C ′F (0)− ∂ qD∂ L

∂ p
∂ q
qD + p (qD)

> 0. (2.6)
Proposition 2.1. A strictly positive quota, L > 0, increases the importing country’s
adjusted consumer surplus if (a) the fringe firms’ marginal costs are not too high, and
(b) the inverse demand function is not too convex.
Proof. The first order conditions of the dominant supplier’s problem are given by:
∂ p
∂ q
q + p (q + L)− ∂ CD
∂ q
= 0. (2.7)
Thus, for an interior solution qD satisfying this condition, the implicit function the-
orem implies
∂ qD
∂ L
=
−p′
p′′q + 2p′ − C ′′D
. (2.8)
The numerator of the right hand side of equation (2.8) is positive because p′ is
negative due to the law of demand. The denominator, however, is negative because
of the second order conditions of the dominant supplier’s problem. Hence, the total
expression on the right hand side of equation (2.8) is negative. The right hand of
equation (2.8) is larger than −1 if and only if C ′′− p′ > p′′q, which holds as long as
p′′ is not too large, i.e. if the inverse demand function is not too convex. In that case,
0 > ∂ qD∂ L > −1 holds. This means that the first and the third term of equation (2.6)
are strictly positive (note that the dominant supplier’s optimization implies that the
expression in brackets in the third term is weakly larger than the (positive) dominant
supplier’s marginal costs). In that case, the left hand side of equation (2.6) is positive
if C
′
F (0) is not too large.
The requirement that the fringe’s marginal costs should not be too high intuitively
makes sense. Importing fringe volume by the quota is more expensive, the higher
the marginal costs of the fringe. The condition about the convexity of the inverse
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demand function, however, is more difficult to interpret intuitively because there
are two opposing effects: 1) A very convex inverse demand function implies that
a parallel leftward shift of the inverse demand will ceteris paribus lead to higher
outputs by the dominant supplier (for any q, the slope of the inverse demand is
flatter, and placing additional units in the market requires a smaller decrease of
price). This leads to a decrease in price. 2) However, the additional consumer
surplus due to the decrease in price is small if the inverse demand is very convex.
Then, a situation can occur in which the compensation paid to the fringe exceeds
the additional consumer surplus leading to a negative total effect.
Besides the impact of the quota on the importing country’s adjusted consumer
surplus, the total welfare (including the producer surplus of the dominant supplier
and the fringe firms) is of interest. The welfare is defined as:
W (L) =
∫ qD+L
0
p (x) d x − CD (qD)− CF (L) . (2.9)
As shown in Appendix 2.6, the welfare does not increase if a positive volume quota
is introduced.
2.3.2 Optimal Quota for Linear Inverse Demand and Cost Functions
As a simplification, we now assume a linear inverse demand function:
P(qD + L) = α− β · (qD + L). (2.10)
Additionally, linear cost functions for the dominant supplier D and the fringe F are
assumed:
Ci(qi) = ai + C
′
i · qi for i = D, F. (2.11)
Plugging this into equation (2.5), we get:
Lopt = − 1
β
· ∂ CF
∂ L
+
α
β
+ qD · ∂ qD
∂ L
. (2.12)
Equation (2.8) becomes for the linear simplification: ∂ qD∂ L = −12 . Then, the follow-
ing solution is obtained:
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Lopt = − 1
β
· ∂ CF
∂ L
+
α
β
− qD · 12. (2.13)
qD =
∂ CF
∂ L − ∂ CD∂ L
3
2β
. (2.14)
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Figure 2.1: Market without a quota (left hand side) and with a quota (right hand side)
Figure 2.1 illustrates the effect of the minimum import quota schematically for lin-
ear inverse demand and cost functions. On the left hand side, the situation without
a quota is shown. No fringe volumes enter the market due to the fringe’s high con-
stant marginal supply costs. On the right hand side, the quota has been introduced.
It can be seen that the volumes supplied by the dominant supplier are reduced by
the introduction of the quota. However, because the dominant supplier has market
power, the reduction of her volume, L2 , is lower than the quota volume, L. Hence,
the total supplied volumes increase by the introduction of the quota leading to a
decrease in price and to additional consumer surplus. However, since the marginal
supply costs of the fringe exceed the resulting market price, the fringe firms must
be compensated for the difference between the market price and marginal supply
costs. Although the additional consumer surplus is reduced by this compensation,
there is still a positive effect on the consumer surplus.
After it was shown in general that it is possible to design volume quotas optimizing
the consumer surplus adjusted by payments to the fringe firms, the introduced model
is applied to the case of the Lithuanian gas market in the next section.
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2.4 Application to the Lithuanian Natural Gas Market
As outlined in the introduction, the Lithuanian gas market changed in 2014 from
a monopoly structure to a market structure with a dominant supplier having low
marginal supply costs and a competitive fringe having high marginal supply costs.
In addition, Lithuania signed a LTC for LNG, which can be interpreted as a minimum
volume quota for LNG allowing us to apply the theoretical considerations developed
in Section 2.3 to the Lithuanian gas market.
2.4.1 Background
In absence of natural gas resources, Lithuania is 100% dependent on imports. Be-
cause the country was a former part of the Soviet Union, its only import pipeline
is connected to Russia. Prior to December 2014, when the LNG import terminal
in Klaipe˙da started operation, Gazprom had a monopoly for gas sales to Lithuania,
which resulted in comparably high gas prices (ACER, 2015a). In the fourth quar-
ter of 2014, the Lithuanian gas price was 408 €/1000m3, whereas the gas price at
the Dutch hub Title Transfer Facility (TTF), the most liquid European gas hub, was
247 €/1000m3 (European Commission, 2014).
In addition to building the LNG terminal, Lithuania signed a LTC with Norway’s
Statoil with an annual contracted quantity (ACQ) of 0.55 bcm and a take-or-pay
(TOP) volume of 0.44 bcm of LNG.5 The LNG price was based on the natural gas price
of the National Balancing Point (NBP), the natural gas hub of the United Kingdom,
with a surcharge (Pakalkaité, 2016).
Historically, the purpose of LTCs in the gas industry was to mitigate price and
volume risks and ensure the usage of certain infrastructure elements, e.g. pipelines
and LNG terminals. In the Lithuanian case, this may have been a motivation behind
signing the LTC, too. However, it is clear that the LTC would be a bad decision from
the point of view of a profit optimizing terminal owner if the marginal supply costs
of LNG would be above the gas price in the Lithuanian gas market (the price having
to be paid to Gazprom). Because the marginal supply costs of LNG are higher than
the marginal supply costs of Russian gas, there is indeed the risk of such unfavorable
market conditions for the LNG terminal. Therefore, it is unlikely that private actors
would have financed a LNG terminal in Lithuania. Indeed, no actor other than the
5It is assumed that the TOP volume is 80 percent of the ACQ. This is a typical annual flexibility for
LTCs (Franza, 2014).
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Lithuanian state took the risk of the investment. The costs of the investments were
passed on to the gas customers by supplements on gas (Pakalkaité, 2016). However,
even in the absence of a private business case for the terminal, the enhancing effects
of minimum import quotas for the consumer surplus discussed in Section 2.3 indicate
that the decision of the Lithuanian state to build the terminal and sign a LTC can be
rationalized from a domestic point of view.
The assumptions of the model framework described in Section 2.3 fit well for the
Lithuanian gas market. Due to the coupling of the LTC prices to the NBP, the LNG
imports can be assumed to be competitively priced, even though the LTC was secured
with only one company. As in the theoretical model, capacity constraints of the gas
infrastructure are not relevant for Lithuania. The pipeline connection from Russia
allows imports of more than 10 bcm/a and the LNG terminal has a regasification
capacity of 4 bcm/a (Gas Infrastructure Europe, 2017), whereas the Lithuanian gas
demand was only 2.54 bcm in 2014 (IEA, 2016).6
2.4.2 Initial Monopoly Situation
In this subsection the monopoly situation before the construction of the LNG terminal
is considered. The analysis is based on linear functions for the inverse demand and
supply costs.
In line with Bros (2012), marginal costs for Russian gas of 0.07 €/m3 are as-
sumed.7 We introduce a reference price Pre f , a reference demand Dre f and a point
measure for the price elasticity of demand ε. The parameters of the inverse demand
function α and β can be related to those parameters:
β = −Pre f /Dre f /ε, (2.15)
α= Pre f + β · Dre f . (2.16)
Due to the fact that the Lithuanian LNG terminal was commissioned in December
of 2014, it is assumed that the average price and demand situation in 2014 still
6Even if the interconnection point between Lithuania and Latvia in Kieme˙nai having a capacity of
2 bcm/a would be fully used to reexport gas from Lithuania, Russian import pipeline capacities
would still be sufficient to cover the Lithuanian demand and the reexports to Latvia.
7This includes the Russian gas production costs, mineral extraction tax and transportation costs in
Russia. However, the Russian export duty is not included as a cost component because it is consid-
ered to be part of the Russian producer surplus from exporting gas.
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corresponded to a monopoly situation. With the historic demand of 2.54 bcm and the
price of 394 €/1000m3 that is the weighted average price of Russian gas deliveries
to Lithuania in 2014 (European Commission, 2016) the point elasticity is chosen so
that the monopoly quantity matches the reference demand. Then, the monopoly
price also corresponds to the reference price by construction. This value of the point
elasticity is given by:
ε=
Pre f
C ′D − Pre f
. (2.17)
With the parameters discussed above, this results in a point elasticity of -1.22.8
As can be seen in Table 2.1, this parameterization leads to a Russian profit Φ of
822 million Euro while the Lithuanian consumer surplus CS is 411 million Euro. Af-
ter discussing the monopoly situation, the impact of LNG imports on the Lithuanian
market will be analyzed in the next section.
Table 2.1: Characteristics of the Lithuanian gas market in 2014
Parameter Value Unit
C
′
D 70 €/1000m3
Pre f 394 €/1000m3
Dre f 2.54 bcm
ε -1.22 -
CS 411 million €
Φ 822 million €
2.4.3 The Effects of a minimum LNG Import Quota
Based on the inverse demand function of 2014, the Lithuanian decision to sign the
LTC for 0.44 bcm/a of LNG is now evaluated. Because the marginal supply costs C
′
F
of LNG were uncertain when the LTC was signed, market implications of LNG imports
are discussed in dependence on the costs C
′
F .
8This is close to -1.25, which is the empirically determined value for the long-run price elasticity
of natural gas demand according to Burke and Yang (2016). As also mentioned by Burke and
Yang (2016), the literature reports small (inelastic) values for the price elasticity in the short-run.
Especially for households, the demand is usually assumed to be very inelastic in the short-run due
to the requirement to heat in the cold period of the year. Since a monopolist chooses a point on
the elastic segment of the demand function according to basic economic theory, it seems plausible
that his pricing behavior is rather determined by the long-run price elasticity of demand.
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The left hand side of Figure 2.2 illustrates the Lithuanian LNG import volumes
when the costs C
′
F are varied. The figure shows three different setups: (1) im-
ports without a quota (solid graph), (2) imports with the quota of 0.44 bcm/a as
introduced by the Lithuanian government (dashed graph), and (3) imports with an
optimal quota maximizing the adjusted consumer surplus as described in Section
2.3 (dashed-dotted graph). Without a quota, LNG enters the market at costs C
′
F
lower than the monopoly price of 394 €/1000m3, whereas no LNG imports would
take place if the costs C
′
F would be above the monopoly price. However, with the
Lithuanian quota, at least 0.44 bcm of LNG would be imported irrespective of the
costs C
′
F . With the optimal quota, more LNG compared to the two other illustrated
cases would be imported. For instance, the optimal minimum import quota would
be approximately 1.7 bcm at the monopoly price.
The right hand side of Figure 2.2 shows the development of Russian gas imports
in dependence on the marginal supply costs for LNG for the case without a quota,
with the Lithuanian quota and an optimal quota. Obviously, a binding import quota
for LNG lowers the gas imports from Russia compared to the case without a quota.
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Figure 2.2: LNG imports (left hand side) and Russian gas imports (right hand side) in de-
pendence on C
′
F
After discussing the implications of a minimum quota on import volumes, the ef-
fects on gas prices are analyzed in a next step. Hereto, Figure 2.3 shows the Lithua-
nian gas price in dependence on the LNG costs C
′
F . As long as the import requirement
is over-fulfilled, the prices without a quota and with the Lithuanian quota (solid and
dashed graphs) are matching and correspond to the costs C
′
F . In other words, the
marginal supply costs of LNG set the price in the Lithuanian gas market. However,
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at high costs C
′
F , the Lithuanian gas price with the quota of 0.44 bcm/a is lower than
the gas price without a quota. In such situations, private owners of the LNG import
terminal would generate a loss because their expense per imported LNG unit, C
′
F ,
would be above the price in the market. In 2014, the average global LNG price was
approximately 445 €/1000m3 (International Gas Union, 2015). Hence, LNG prices
above the Lithuanian monopoly price were historically already observed. With an
optimal import quota, the Lithuanian gas price is below the price without a quota
as long as the marginal LNG costs C
′
F are above the dominant supplier’s marginal
costs C
′
D.
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Figure 2.3: Lithuanian gas price in dependence on C
′
F
Besides gas prices, the influence of the LNG import quota on the Lithuanian con-
sumer surplus adjusted by the payment for the LNG imports is analyzed. Figure 2.4
illustrates the adjusted consumer surplus in dependence on the marginal supply costs
C
′
F . In line with the conventions in the previously discussed diagrams, the function
illustrated by the dashed graph indicates the adjusted consumer surplus with the
Lithuanian import quota of 0.44 bcm/a, whereas the dashed-dotted graph describes
the situation with an optimal quota. The solid graph is the benchmark of no quota.
For values of C
′
F above the monopoly price of 394 €/1000m3, the solid graph cor-
responds to the consumer surplus in the monopoly case. The solid and the dashed
graphs match for low C
′
F when more LNG than 0.44 bcm/a is imported and the
quota is therefore over-fulfilled. However, at high C
′
F , a binding volume quota leads
to additional consumer surplus. While no disadvantages of the quota occur with low
C
′
F , advantages can be realized if high LNG supply costs lead to a situation in which
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the dominant supplier could still exercise market power in the absence of minimum
import requirements.
300 350 400 450 500 550400
500
600
700
800
Marginal LNG Costs C ′F [EUR/1000m3]
A
dj
us
te
d
C
S
[M
io
.
EU
R
]
Diagramm 4
without quota
0.44 bcm/a quota
optimal quota
Figure 2.4: Lithuanian adjusted consumer surplus in dependence on C
′
F
Figure 2.2, Figure 2.3 and Figure 2.4 suggest that the actual Lithuanian import
quota of 0.44 bcm/a would be below the optimal quota. However, if C
′
F would be
too high, the change in adjusted consumer surplus relative to the monopoly case
could become negative for a given value of a quota. The dashed graph in Figure 2.4
intersects with the solid graph at C
′
F = 535 €/1000m3. For higher C
′
F , the quota of
0.44 bcm/a would not enhance the Lithuanian national welfare anymore. For larger
quotas than 0.44 bcm/a, this threshold value of C
′
F is lower. For instance, the optimal
quota at the monopoly price of approximately 1.7 bcm (cf. Figure 2.2) would lead to
a negative national welfare effect already at a value of C
′
F = 477€/1000m3. Hence,
committing to import a high minimum volume leads to the risk that the difference
of the adjusted consumer surplus relative to the monopoly case becomes negative
at high C
′
F . Risk averse actors may therefore prefer to commit to a comparably
small volume for the quota. Alternatively, the importers could introduce quotas
with volume flexibility, i.e. require additional imports in situations with low C
′
F and
require reduced imports in situations with high C
′
F .
The construction costs of the Klaipe˙da terminal add up to 101 million EUR, and a
yearly lease of 55.3 million EUR needs to be paid (The Baltic Course, 2015). If we
assume a life time of the investment of 20 years and an exemplary discount rate of
8%, the yearly annuity for the investment costs is 10.3 million EUR. Hence, the total
yearly fixed costs of the terminal amount to 65.3 million EUR. The benchmark of the
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consumer surplus in the monopoly case is 411 million EUR. As can be seen in Fig-
ure 2.4, the additional consumer surplus due to the LTC of 0.44 bcm/a is in the same
range as the total yearly fixed costs of the terminal if C
′
F is in the range between 380
and 400 €/1000m3. At C ′F below 380 €/1000m3, the quota of 0.44 bcm/a would
be over-fulfilled. Nevertheless, the consumer surplus would increase significantly
compared to the monopoly case due to the competitiveness of the LNG imports.
Figure 2.5 shows the development of the welfare (with consideration of the pro-
ducer surplus of the dominant supplier and the fringe firms) in the cases without
an import quota for LNG, with a quota of 0.44 bcm/a and with an optimal quota.
It can be seen that the imposition of a binding quota leads generally to a lower
welfare compared to the case without a quota (cf. Appendix 2.6 for a formal discus-
sion of the welfare implications of a quota). In the monopolistic case, the welfare
amounts to 1.2 billion EUR. With perfect competition (the dominant supplier and
the fringe firms bid their marginal supply costs), however, the welfare would be at
1.6 billion EUR.
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Figure 2.5: Welfare in dependence on C
′
F
The fact that the welfare is lowered by the quota indicates that the dominant sup-
plier and the gas consuming country could be both better off if the dominant supplier
would offer a price below the monopoly price and the gas consuming country would
abstain from introducing a quota. The exact price offered by the dominant sup-
plier would then be the outcome of a bargaining game. Because Lithuania regarded
the diversification (away from Russian gas) as desirable also for security of supply
reasons, it may have preferred the quota over a potential bargaining solution.
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2.4.4 Discussion of Results
In order to evaluate the Lithuanian strategy to mitigate Gazprom’s market power,
alternative concepts to reduce market power should be considered. Such other po-
tential strategies include, e.g., a further integration of markets by additional pipeline
connections9, gas release auctions and unbundling of the dominant supplier. Eco-
nomic theory indicates that the most efficient way to mitigate market power would
be to set a maximum price being equal to the marginal supply costs of the dominant
supplier if those were known. From a practical point of view, however, unilateral
actions of authorities (e.g. regulator, government) against the dominant supplier
potentially give rise to the risk that the dominant supplier cuts off the supply. In
particular, in markets for products with limited substitution options and high values
of lost load, e.g. in energy markets, taking such a risk could be costly. Therefore, a
practicable option to mitigate market power is to incentivize the entry of new sup-
pliers instead of taking direct actions against the dominant supplier.
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Figure 2.6: Historical development of the Lithuanian weighted average import gas price
Source: Lithuanian National Commission for Energy Control and Prices (2017); vertical
dotted line in December 2014 illustrates when the Lithuanian LNG terminal came online
As can be seen in Figure 2.6, gas prices in Lithuania decreased indeed signifi-
cantly in 2015 and 2016 compared to 2014. In 2015, the LTC for LNG was binding,
whereas Lithuania imported more than the contracted volumes in 2016. It would
9In principle, competitively priced pipeline gas could have been incentivized in Lithuania instead of
LNG. However, Gazprom had also a dominant position in the markets of the neighboring Poland
and Latvia leading to comparably high gas prices in those countries (European Commission, 2014).
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be interesting to test empirically the theoretical prediction that a binding LTC led to
higher Lithuanian welfare in 2015 compared to a counterfactual situation without a
minimum import quota. However, a development parallel to the commencing LNG
imports was the decrease in global oil prices. Because Russian LTCs in Europe were
still coupled to oil prices, this led generally to a lower level of Russian LTC prices
(European Commission, 2015a). Hence, even in the absence of LNG supplies, Russia
may not have been able to enforce a monopoly price in 2015 and 2016 due to its
contractual obligations. Additionally, because of substitution effects between nat-
ural gas and biofuels (Pakalkaité, 2016), the structure of the demand function for
natural gas could have changed after 2014. Hence, empirically disentangling the
different price decreasing effects in the Lithuanian gas market after 2014 is left for
further research.
2.5 Conclusion
This analysis explains the economic rationale to incentivize the import of LNG in
isolated gas markets like Lithuania by a minimum import quota. Before building
the LNG terminal, Russia had a monopoly for natural gas in Lithuania, which led to
high gas prices. In such a situation, supplier diversification can increase the national
welfare due to a decrease in prices. If the price of LNG available at the global market
is in the range of the marginal supply costs of the dominant supplier, the profitabil-
ity of the LNG terminal can be ensured without market intervention. The analysis
at hand, however, focuses on a situation in which the fringe volumes have higher
marginal supply costs compared to the dominant supplier leading to a situation in
which the dominant supplier can still exercise market power despite the existence
of alternative supplies. It is shown that a minimum volume quota for the high-cost
fringe leads to an increase in the consumer surplus adjusted by a compensation paid
to the fringe firms. For a specific market situation, an optimal quota, from the point
of view of the importing country, can be found. As a policy implication, countries
with gas markets with dominant suppliers other than Lithuania could also consider
to incentivize the import of competitively priced gas, ideally with flexible volume
quotas.
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2.6 Appendix: Welfare Implications of a Quota
Proposition 2.2. The imposition of a strictly positive quota L > 0 does not increase
the total welfare.
Proof. A quota would not increase the welfare if ∂W∂ L |L=0 ≤ 0 holds. Therefore, we
consider the first order condition of welfare optimization:
∂W
∂ L
=

1+
∂ qD
∂ L

p (qD + L)− C ′D (qD) · ∂ qD∂ L − C
′
F (L) . (2.18)
This yields:
∂W
∂ L

L=0
= p (qD) +

p (qD)− C ′D (qD)
 · ∂ qD
∂ L
− C ′F (0) . (2.19)
The second term is zero or negative because:
•  p (qD)− C ′D (qD)≥ 0 due to the profit optimization of the dominant supplier
(she would not bid below marginal costs)
• ∂ qD∂ L < 0 (cf. proof for Proposition 2.1 )
Therefore, it follows:
∂W
∂ L

L=0
≤ p (qD)− C ′F (0) . (2.20)
For C
′
F (0)≥ p (qD), it holds true that the welfare does not increase:
∂W
∂ L

L=0
≤ 0. (2.21)
Please note that the welfare strictly decreases for C
′
F (0)> p (qD).
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3 Non-physical Barriers to Natural Gas Trade –
Gas Price Differences between Germany and
Italy
In recent years, there were periods in which Italian wholesale gas prices were signif-
icantly higher than German wholesale gas prices. While the Austrian pipelines be-
tween Germany and Italy were congested during the periods with high price spreads,
the Transitgas pipeline in Switzerland was not always used to the full extent in those
periods. Therefore, this study discusses two non-physical barriers to gas trade as
possible explanations for the high Italian gas prices: (1) withholding of Swiss gas
flows to increase Italian gas prices, and (2) high transmission costs in Switzerland.
A fundamental model for the gas trade between Germany and Italy is applied to a
historical gas market situation in 2014 with persistently high price spreads while
accounting for the market imperfections in Switzerland. Based on this model frame-
work, it is found that withholding Swiss gas flows can rationalize historic Italian
gas prices and gas flows between Germany and Italy. As a policy implication, an
application of congestion management procedures for Swiss gas transmission rights
is recommended.
3.1 Introduction
In the European gas target model, the Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regula-
tors (ACER) formulates the vision "of a competitive European gas market (...) where
market integration is served by appropriate levels of infrastructure, which is utilized
efficiently and enables gas to move freely between market areas to the locations where
it is most highly valued by gas market participants".1 In the countries adjacent to
the Dutch Title Transfer Facility (TTF), the most liquid natural gas hub in Conti-
nental Europe, this vision can be considered to be realized because wholesale gas
price differences between those countries are mainly driven by regulated transmis-
sion tariffs in the absence of physical congestion in the gas infrastructure (Heather,
1Page 4 in ACER (2015b)
29
3 Non-physical Barriers to Natural Gas Trade – Gas Price Differences between Germany and Italy
2015).2 However, the Italian gas market area Punto di Scambio Virtuale (PSV)
showed occasionally large prices in recent years (2014, 2015 and 2016) compared to
the South German market area NetConnect Germany (NCG) although there are two
direct pipeline links through Austria and Switzerland connecting the markets. The
Germany-Austria interconnection point in Oberkappel was physically congested in
the periods with large Italian price premiums3, whereas the Swiss Transitgas pipeline
was not fully used pointing to non-physical barriers to trade (Petrovich et al., 2016).
Since firstly the network codes of the European Union (EU) that require conges-
tion management procedures and market transparency for gas transmission rights4
are not binding in the non-EU country Switzerland, and because secondly more than
80% of the transmission rights in Switzerland are booked long-term by one company
(Petrovich et al., 2016), the non-physical trade barriers are likely due to regulatory
inefficiencies in Switzerland. Against this background, the research objective of this
study is to analyze the drivers of the Italian gas price premium.
Harris et al. (2013), a study about international experiences in pipeline capacity
trading, mention "two main ‘market failures’ that can prevent capacity trading. First,
the transaction costs of selling capacity could be too large. (...) Second, the capacity
holder may have market power.”5 Petrovich (2014) also discusses those two non-
physical trade barriers that could be responsible for the price difference between
PSV and other European hubs. Therefore, this analysis focuses on high transmission
costs6, potentially caused by transaction costs in the Swiss market for gas transmis-
sion rights, and market power, i.e. withholding of Swiss gas flows to increase Italian
2In European gas markets, there is a regulated tariff that covers fixed and variable network costs. In
the case of congestion in the network, an additional congestion fee would have to be paid.
3With the term "Italian price premium", the following is meant: PSV gas price minus the NCG gas
price minus the regulated tariff for shipping gas from Germany through Austria to Italy.
4In European gas markets, traders book entry and exit capacity into market areas instead of capacity
of specific pipelines. With the term "transmission right", bookings of the capacities in Austria and
Switzerland enabling to ship gas from Germany to Italy is meant.
5Page 4 in Harris et al. (2013)
6With the term "transmission costs", the transmission tariff, i.e. the price for using the transmission
capacity as determined by the transmission system operator (TSO), plus any additional costs in
order to realize the transmission is meant. In EU countries, there should be no additional cost
besides the regulated transmission tariff (in the absence of congestion). However, in the Swiss
case, this could be different: For instance, ACER (2014) mentions a tariff for transiting through
Switzerland of 0.81 EUR/MWh in 2014. Considering the German exit tariff to Switzerland and
the Italian entry tariff from Switzerland, the total tariff for transporting gas from Germany to Italy
through Switzerland would be 1.67 EUR/MWh in 2014 according to ACER (2014). When referring
to the efficient Swiss transmission tariff, this figure is meant. However, because this figure is even
below the regulated tariff to transport gas from Germany through Austria to Italy in 2014 (1.77
EUR/MWh), the efficient Swiss transmission tariff alone cannot be responsible for the gas price
spreads between Germany and Italy in 2014, as also discussed by Petrovich et al. (2016). It is
possible that transaction costs in the market for Swiss transmission rights occur leading to higher
transmission costs than the tariff, e.g. search, information and bargaining costs.
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gas prices, as explanation approaches for the Italian gas price premium.
A fundamental model for the trade between the German and the Italian gas market
is developed. Parameterized versions of the model for the high transmission costs
hypothesis and the market power hypothesis are used to simulate the historical gas
market situation in the second half of 2014 when persistently high spreads were
observed. Different statistical indicators/tests are used to compare the model results
showing that market power in the Italian gas market is a better explanation for the
Italian gas price premium than high transmission costs in Switzerland. In addition,
this study sheds light on possible countermeasures against the market power.
The structure of the paper is as follows: After a literature review, a background
discussion about the gas markets of Italy and Germany is given. Then, the theoretical
analysis in Section 3.4 and an application of the theoretical model with parameters
for the historic gas market situation in Section 3.5 follow. Section 3.6 discusses the
results and Section 3.7 concludes this analysis.
3.2 Literature Review
There are three streams of literature that are of relevance for this study: 1) literature
on the specific price difference between NCG and PSV, 2) empirical literature on
spatial price differences in commodity markets and 3) industrial organization (IO)
literature on identifying market structures.
Within the first stream of literature, Petrovich (2014) analyzes gas price correla-
tions among European hubs based on over the counter (OTC) prices finding a per-
sistent premium of PSV over NCG in 2012. Physical congestion, non-physical trade
barriers and inefficient pricing in the Italian gas market are discussed as possible rea-
sons for the premium. In Petrovich (2015), the price correlation analysis is updated
for 2014 and the costs of the price delinkage are estimated to 330 Mio. EUR. Unlike
Petrovich (2014), Petrovich (2015) focuses only on non-physical trade barriers as
potential reasons underlying the Italian price premium. Physical congestion can be
excluded as an explanation because a rarely fully used Swiss capacity is observed.
Given periods without large price premiums when the Austrian pipeline was not con-
gested, inefficient pricing can also be excluded as an explanation. Finally, Petrovich
et al. (2016) aim to reproduce historical bottlenecks in 2014 in a simulation with the
European gas market model TIGER. In the efficient benchmark of the cost minimiz-
ing TIGER simulation, the Swiss pipeline connection was used to the full capacity
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in 2014. In reality, however, full utilization was only reached at single days in 2014
implying an inefficient capacity usage. Whereas the so far mentioned contributions
discuss the reasons behind the Italian gas price premium only qualitatively, our study
compares different explanation approaches on a quantitative basis.
Among the empirical analyses about spatial price differences in commodity mar-
kets, many studies focus on the concept of cointegration, e.g. Growitsch et al. (2015)
who study German gas markets and Siliverstovs et al. (2005) who focus on interna-
tional gas markets. Nick and Tischler (2014) apply a threshold cointegration analysis
to time series of U.S. American and British gas prices. Whereas those approaches
have the aim to identify a long-run equilibrium between price time series, they do
not consider trade flows as is done in this study. Therefore, cointegration analyses
are not suitable to distinguish between different trade regimes, e.g. between a situa-
tion with and without congestion on a specific trade route. Empirical methodologies
capable of taking trade regimes into account are parity bounds models. Massol and
Banal-Estanol (2016) apply this methodology to the gas markets of the UK and Bel-
gium that are connected by the capacity constraint interconnector pipeline. They
detect imperfect competition in the years 2003-2006. In the case of the German
and Italian gas markets, however, this methodology cannot be applied without ad-
ditional assumptions because the physical flows between the markets contain unob-
served long-term contract (LTC) volumes from Norway and the Netherlands besides
arbitrage driven trade flows. Furthermore, parity bounds models rely on maximum
likelihood estimations and the model outcomes are influenced by assumptions about
the distribution of error terms in each trade regime.
The IO literature that focuses on market structure is relevant for this analysis be-
cause distinguishing between two explanation approaches for the Italian gas price
premium in this analysis is methodologically similar to e.g. distinguishing between
different forms of competition in other markets. Within this stream of IO literature,
there are simulation based contributions (for an overview of applications to energy
and resource markets cf. Lorenczik and Panke (2016)) as well as econometric con-
tributions (for an overview cf. Berry and Reiss (2007)). In this study, a simulation
based methodology is used because this approach offers flexibility to model different
market setups, i.e. market power, high transmission costs as well as a configuration
with an efficient regulation in Switzerland that can be used to quantify the welfare
loss due to the non-physical barriers to gas trade.
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As a summary, the novelty of our research is the quantitative analysis of drivers
for the price premium of PSV. Since Germany and Italy were the largest and third
largest gas markets in the EU in 2014-2016 (IEA, 2017), barriers to trade between
those markets have a high policy relevance.
3.3 Background
Figure 3.1 shows the daily development of the spreads between NCG and PSV7 in
the years 2013, 2014 and 2015 and the regulated transmission tariff on the Austrian
pipeline route (ACER, 2014). Whereas the spread was close to (or even below) the
Austrian transmission tariff on most days in 2013 and the first half of 2014, long
periods with high price premiums occurred afterwards. The second half of 2014
was the time period within the years 2013-2015 in which (a) the spread persistently
exceeded the Austrian transmission tariff for the longest duration and (b) the highest
values of the Italian price premium occurred.8 Therefore, the focus of this analysis
is especially on the second half of 2014.
7Source for the prices underlying the spreads: NCG Day Ahead price data were downloaded from
the NCG homepage (NetConnect Germany, 2017). More than 95% of the traded volumes in the
Italian gas market were OTC volumes in 2014 (Heather, 2015). OTC price data, however, are not
in the public domain. Previous research, e.g. Petrovich (2016), used the product PBGas G+1 as a
proxy for the Italian day ahead gas price. PBGas G+1 is gas in storage used for balancing purposes.
Petrovich (2016) shows that the PBGas G+1 product was aligned most of the time in 2015 with
OTC prices (median difference lower than 0.4 EUR/MWh). Hence, within this analysis, the PBGas
G+1 product is also used as a measure for the Italian day ahead gas price. PBGas G+1 price data
can be downloaded on the website of the Italian power exchange (Gestore dei Mercati Energetici,
2016). The Italian balancing regime changed in 2016. Therefore, the PBGas G+1 product can only
be used as a proxy for the Italian day ahead gas price previous to 2016.
8While there were periods with Italian gas price premiums in 2016, a situation comparable to the
second half of 2014 (in terms of magnitude of the premium and duration of the situation) did
also not occur in 2016 (Heather and Petrovich, 2017). The highest Italian gas price premium ever
(above 50 EUR/MWh) occurred in December 2017. However, the reason for this price spike was
not a non-physical trade barrier but an accident in a compressor station in Baumgarten (European
Commission, 2017c).
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Figure 3.1: Daily gas price spreads between Germany and Italy in comparison to the regu-
lated tariff on the Austrian route in 2013, 2014 and 2015
Source: NetConnect Germany (2017), Gestore dei Mercati Energetici (2016), ACER (2013),
ACER (2014), ACER (2015a)
The left hand side of Figure 3.2 shows the daily utilization of the Austrian pipeline
connection in the second half of 2014 based on the flows at the interconnection point
in Oberkappel.9 The right hand side of the figure illustrates the daily utilization of
the pipeline connection through Switzerland based on flows between Switzerland
and Italy at Passo Gries. Previous studies, e.g. Petrovich (2015) and Massol and
Banal-Estanol (2016), mention an interconnector utilization of more than 80% as a
rough indicator for physical congestion. Whereas the Austrian pipeline utilization
was above 80% almost continuously in the second half of 2014, the utilization on
the Swiss route rarely exceeded 80%.
9There is also a connection between Germany and Austria in Überackern. However, the pipeline
starting in Überackern (Penta-West) connects to the WAG pipeline starting in Oberkappel that can
be used to transport gas to Italy. Shippers holding transmission rights in Oberkappel have priority
access to the WAG, whereas only interruptible entry capacity into the Austrian market area is avail-
able at Überackern (E-Control, 2014). Previous studies, e.g. Petrovich et al. (2016), also consider
the flows in Operkappel as the relevant flows for the trade between Germany and Italy.
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(i) Austrian pipeline connection
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(ii) Swiss pipeline connection
Figure 3.2: Daily utilization of pipeline connections between Germany and Italy in the sec-
ond half of 2014
Source: ENTSO-G (2016)
Combining Figures 3.1 and 3.2, Figure 3.3 shows a scatter plot of the daily spreads
and the daily Swiss pipeline utilization. It can be seen that many points lie in the
dashed window defining the area with spreads above the efficient Swiss transmis-
sion tariff according to ACER (2014) and Swiss pipe utilization below 80%. This
illustrates non-physical barriers to trade being present in the second half of 2014.
Against this backdrop, a theoretical model is developed in the next section to shed
light upon those non-physical trade barriers.
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Figure 3.3: Scatter plot of daily Swiss pipeline utilizations and daily gas price differences
between Germany and Italy in the second half of 2014
Source: NetConnect Germany (2017), ENTSO-G (2016), Gestore dei Mercati Energetici
(2016)
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3.4 Theoretical Analysis
The theoretical analysis is based on the assumption of two markets, M1 and M2. A
maximum capacity cap restricts the trade between the two markets, which is split
into a route I with capacity capI and a route E with capacity capE . It is assumed
that the endowment of traders with transmission rights allowing them to use the
capacities on the routes is exogenously given.10 There is one trader I controlling
all capacity capI , and one trader E controlling all capacity capE . Traders that use
capacity have to pay a charge per unit of trade between the regions, i.e. the trans-
mission costs TI on the route I and the transmission costs TE on the route E. The
traded volume on route E (respectively route I) is denoted with qE (respectively qI),
and the total traded volume between the markets is q = qE+qI . Figure 3.4 illustrates
this setup schematically.
Figure 3.4: Schematic illustration of the model for the trade between market M2 and mar-
ket M1
M2 is large, in particular in relation to q, such that its price is independent of the
trade between the two markets. For the purpose of this analysis, it is exogenously
given by P2. M2 is assumed to be the low price region, i.e. the only direction of trade
will be from M2 to M1. M1 is small and its price is determined by the trade between
the two regions, P1 = P1(q), with
∂ P1(q)
∂ q < 0.
Trader E is assumed to be efficiently regulated. This means that all capacity on
route E will always be fully used as long as the price difference between the markets
exceeds the transmission costs TE . Put differently: Trader E is assumed to have no
market power in market M1.
For trader I, we distinguish two model configurations that can both lead to a price
difference ∆P = P1(q) − P2 exceeding TE: (1) also trader I has no market power,
10The issue of the total amount of capacities available and how the capacities may be allocated to
traders will be discussed later (cf. Section 3.6).
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but has to pay high transmission costs TI > TE , (2) trader I has market power in
market M1, i.e., when choosing her traded quantity qI , 0 ≤ qI ≤ capI , trader I may
withhold some of it to drive up the price difference between the two markets.
We are interested in explaining a situation in which ∆P exceeds TE while the
utilization of the route I is non-negative but below 100%. In the model, such a
situation is only possible in the following cases:
1 P1(capE+qI)−P2 = TI : High transmission costs on route I determine the price
differences ∆P (high transmission costs hypothesis)
2 P1(capE + qI)− P2 > TI : Trader I withholds traded volumes in order to drive
up the profit on the inframarginal units qI (market power hypothesis)
When traders E and I are assumed to be profit maximizing, their first order condi-
tions can be formulated as a mixed complementarity problem (cf. Appendix 3.8.1).
Based on conjectural variations, a configuration with a competitive trader I having
high transmission costs as well as a configuration in which trader I exerts market
power in M1 can be considered. Both model configurations are parameterized in
the following to the historical gas market situation in the second half of 2014.
3.5 Application of the theoretical Model to the historical
Gas Market Situation
3.5.1 Model Parameterization
For the model application, a linear approach for the inverse demand function for
traded volumes q is considered as a simplification:
P1(q) = α− β · q. (3.1)
All variables and the parameters P2, α and β of the model
11 are assumed to be time
dependent with a daily resolution in the following. M1 corresponds to the Italian
gas market PSV, and M2 to the German gas market NCG.
12
11The model is formally given by equations (3.11)-(3.14) in Appendix 3.8.1.
12In 2014, the two most liquid and well integrated European gas hubs TTF and NBP that are the price
benchmark for NCG had together a traded volume of more than 33,000 TWh, whereas only 550
TWh were traded in Italy (Heather, 2015). Against this background, it is justified to consider the
volumes transported to Italy as small in comparison to the total traded volumes in the liquid Central
European gas markets.
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Parameterization of the Pipeline Capacities available for Short-Term Trade
The flows from Switzerland to Italy in Passo Gries are used to calibrate the trade
on route I, qI .
13 However, the flows between Austria and Italy contain not only
gas volumes from Central Europe, but mainly Russian volumes from the Ukrainian
corridor. Therefore, the flows from Germany to Austria in Oberkappel are used for
calibrating the trade on route E, qE . Because physical gas flows consist either of LTC
driven flows or short-term trade flows between different markets, two factors restrict
the capacity for short-term trade between the German and the Italian gas market:
• There are LTC driven flows within the physical flows in Oberkappel and Passo
Gries denoted with f lowDE>AT,must−run and f lowCH>I T,must−run.
• In Oberkappel, not all short-term trade flows are directed to Italy because the
Austrian pipeline system is connected to the Austrian demand and to neighbor-
ing countries such as Slovakia. This alternative usage of the Austrian pipelines
is denoted with fa,t .
While the technical capacities capE,technical and capI ,technical are taken from ENTSO-
G (2016), the remaining capacity available for short-term trade between the German
and the Italian gas market is calculated as follows:
capE = capE,technical − f lowDE>AT,must−run − fa,t and (3.2)
capI = capI ,technical − f lowCH>I T,must−run. (3.3)
Italian importers hold 111 TWh of Norwegian and Dutch LTCs (Neumann et al.,
2015) that are transported through Switzerland (Honoré, 2013). In addition, there
are 14 TWh of Norwegian contracts to Austria (Neumann et al., 2015), which pass
the border between Germany and Austria. Besides those annual contracted quanti-
ties (ACQ), the exact contract features are private information. The daily contracted
quantity (DCQ) is defined as ACQ/365. In this analysis, 80% of the DCQ is assumed
as a steady must-run flow because LTCs with a high degree of hub indexation such as
13Besides being connected to Germany in Wallbach with 0.58 TWh/d, the Swiss Transitgas pipeline
has a connection to France in Oltingue with 0.22 TWh/d (ENTSO-G, 2014). Because the price
development of NCG and the French hub PEG Nord were aligned in 2014 (Petrovich et al., 2016),
profit optimizing traders would be (almost) indifferent between sourcing gas volumes in Germany
and France.
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Norwegian and Dutch LTCs have only limited volume flexibility (Chyong, 2015).14
In the course of the Ukrainian crisis, gas was transported from Germany through
Austria and Slovakia to Ukraine (ACER, 2015b) starting in September 2014. The
physical flows from Austria to Slovakia that occurred for the first time in September
2014 according to ENTSO-G (2016) are used as a proxy for the alternative usage
of the Austrian pipelines fa,t (cf. Figure 3.5).
15 Given an auction premium16 at the
congested interconnection in Oberkappel exceeding the spread between the German
and the Austrian gas market in the second half of 2014 (ACER, 2015b), a profit
optimizing trader would not buy transmission rights in order to serve the Austrian
demand. Therefore, it is assumed that the gas from Germany was either transported
to Eastern Europe or to Italy.
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Figure 3.5: Physical gas flows from Austria to Slovakia
Source: ENTSO-G (2016)
14The producers regained control about the flexibility when introducing hub indexation in contracts
(Franza, 2014). The flexibility can then be marketed as a separate product. Even if there would be
flexibility in the contracts, the flexible volumes would also be hub indexed. With perfect hub index-
ation, traders in our model would be indifferent between sourcing contracted flexibility and spot
volumes directly. The figure of 80% is oriented on typical take-or-pay volumes of LTCs. In Appendix
3.8.4, other percentages of the DCQ are considered as must-run flows in model sensitivities.
15This implies that all the flows crossing the Austria-Slovakia border have their origin in Germany.
Because (a) Austria’s hub CEGH has only limited liquidity compared to Central European hubs
(Heather, 2015) and (b) key people of the Austrian incumbent OMV made statements in 2014 to
not sell any gas to Ukraine (The Wall Street Journal, 2014), this assumption seems approximately
appropriate.
16There is an auction for the transmission rights. If the demand for transmission rights exceeds the
technical capacity, an auction premium occurs leading to a price for the transmission right above
the regulated tariff.
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Parameterization of the Italian Inverse Demand Function
The slope βt of the inverse demand function is approximated by using a reference
demand Dre f ,t based on Snam Rete Gas (2016), a reference price Pre f ,t from Gestore
dei Mercati Energetici (2016) and a point elasticity of demand ε based on Egging
et al. (2010)17:
βt = −Pre f ,t/Dre f ,t/ε.
Furthermore, a maximum willingness to pay αtot,t is determined by:
αtot,t = Pre f ,t + Dre f ,t · βt .
αtot,t is the maximum willingness to pay in the Italian gas market. However, the
relevant parameter for our analysis is αt , the maximum willingness to pay if no trade
from the German market to the Italian market would be conducted. Besides the price
setting trade volumes, the Italian gas market is supplied by non-spot volumes that
have flexibility constraints on a short-term basis (cf. Section 3.8.2 for a discussion
about the different supplies to the Italian gas market). αt can be calculated with the
flexibility constraint volumes qcon,t :
αt = αtot,t − β · qcon,t . (3.4)
qcon,t is determined by subtracting an estimation for the historic short-term trade
between Germany and Italy from the total demand. With the historical physical
flows in Oberkappel f lowAT>DE and in Passo Gries f lowCH>I T , qcon,t is calculated
as follows:
qcon,t = Dre f ,t− f lowAT>DE+ f lowDE>AT,must−run+ fa,t− f lowCH>I T+ f lowCH>I T,must−run.
(3.5)
17For more information about the chosen values for Dre f ,t , Pre f ,t and ε, cf. Table 3.1.
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General Model Parameters
The NCG gas prices are taken from NetConnect Germany (2017). The Austrian
transmission costs are based on the regulated tariff from ACER (2014). The value
for the Swiss transmission costs TI is varied in the different model configurations. For
the market power model, a value of 0 EUR/MWh is assumed because the Italian gas
importer owning more than 80% of Swiss transmission rights booked them long-
term (Petrovich et al., 2016) and long-term bookings can be considered as sunk
costs for short-term trade.18 In the high transmission costs model, 2.9 EUR/MWh
is assumed for TI because the average utilization of the Swiss pipeline in the high
transmission costs model for this value of TI corresponds to the average utilization
in the historical data in the second half of 2014 (approximately 0.44 TWh/day).
Overview of Parameters
Table 3.1 gives an overview of the parameters that are either direct inputs to the
model or are used to determine input parameters. For the parameters f lowDE>AT,must−run,
f lowCH>I T,must−run and ε, either no exact values or only ranges of values are known
from the literature. Therefore, sensitivity analyses with focus on those parameters
will later be conducted in order to test the impact of the used assumptions on the
results (cf. Appendix 3.8.4).
18In Appendix 3.8.4, different values for TI are considered and the impact of this parameter on the
model results is discussed.
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Table 3.1: Overview of model parameterization
Parameter Description Value Source & Assumptions
Austrian Pipeline
capE,technical Austrian
pipeline capacity
0.25 TWh/d ENTSO-G (2016)
f lowDE>AT,must−run LTC driven must-run
flow from Germany to
Austria
0.03 TWh/d DCQ based on Neumann et al.
(2015), 0.8 · DCQ assumed as a
steady flow
fa,t Alternative usage of
Austrian pipeline
daily
time series
Flows AT>SK based on ENTSO-G
(2016)
Swiss Pipeline
capI ,technical Swiss
pipeline capacity
0.68 TWh/d ENTSO-G (2016)
f lowCH>I T,must−run LTC driven must-run
flow from Switzerland
to Italy
0.24 TWh/d DCQ based on Neumann et al.
(2015), 0.8 · DCQ assumed as a
steady flow
Inverse Demand Function
Pre f ,t Italian reference
price
daily
time series
Gestore dei Mercati Energetici
(2016)
Dre f ,t Italian reference
demand
daily
time series
Snam Rete Gas (2016),
storage inflows (respectively out-
flows) are added (respectively
subtracted) from the demand
ε Italian point elasticity
of demand
-0.75 Egging et al. (2010) use values
between -0.25 and -0.75
f lowCH>I T Pipeline flows in
Passo Gries
daily
time series
ENTSO-G (2016)
f lowDE>AT Pipeline flows in
Oberkappel
daily
time series
ENTSO-G (2016)
General Model Parameters
P2,t German gas price daily
time series
NetConnect Germany (2017)
TE Austrian
transmission costs
1.77
EUR/MWh
Regulated tariff based on ACER
(2014)
TI Swiss
transmission costs
0 / 2.9
EUR/MWh
Assumption depending on model
configuration, i.e. 0 EUR/MWh
in market power model and 2.9
EUR/MWh in high transmission
costs model
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3.5.2 Model Results for the Second Half of 2014
Figure 3.6 illustrates the historical spreads between the German and the Italian gas
market in the second half of 2014 in comparison to the modeled spreads with the
parameterization discussed in Section 3.5.1. Based on visual inspection, the market
power model reproduces the level and certain structural elements of the historical
time series, whereas the spreads of the high transmission costs model seem to be
worse with respect to the level and structure. This impression can be confirmed by
comparing the arithmetic means as well as the standard deviations of the spreads in
the different model configurations to those indicators for the historical data (cf. Ta-
ble 3.2).
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Figure 3.6: Historical spreads in comparison to modeled spreads in the second half of 2014
Table 3.2: Arithmetic mean and standard deviation of spreads in historical data and in dif-
ferent model configurations
[EUR/MWh] Data Market power model High transmission costs model
Arithmetic Mean 3.40 3.42 2.90
Standard Deviation 1.13 1.40 0.21
In order to obtain further quantitative insights, the coefficient of determination R2
for both model configurations can be considered. With an observed time series sobst
and a modeled time series smodelt , both having T elements, R
2 is defined as follows:
R2 = 1−
∑T
t=1(s
obs
t − smodelt )2∑T
t=1(s
obs
t )2
. (3.6)
However, R2 cannot be generally interpreted as the variance explained by the
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model if the residuals sobst − smodelt do not sum to zero.19 Therefore, the normalized
mean bias is calculated in addition:
NMB =
∑T
t=1(s
obs
t − smodelt )∑T
t=1 s
obs
t
. (3.7)
As can be seen in Table 3.3, both models have a comparably high R2. Whereas the
low NMB value for the market power model implies only a small overestimation, the
high transmission cost model is more biased, i.e. the insights that can be derived
from the high R2 value for the high transmission costs model are limited.
Table 3.3: R2 and NMB for spreads from market power model and high transmission costs
model in the second half of 2014
Market Power Model High Transmission Costs Model
R2 0.90 0.89
NMB 0.01 -0.17
Given the shortcomings of R2, an encompassing test for the Italian gas prices as
also applied by Bushnell et al. (2008) is a more formal way in order to compare both
models to each other. Because the market power model is not a restricted version of
the alternative high transmission costs model or the other way around, the models
are non-nested. In order to compare them, an encompassing model nesting both
models is constructed. pobst denotes the historical Italian prices, p
mp
t the Italian prices
in the market power model and phtct the Italian prices in the high transmission costs
model. Because the price time series are non-stationary, the literature, e.g. Fair and
Shiller (1989), Fang (2003) and Newbold and Harvey (2004), suggests to regress
actual changes ∆pobst = p
obs
t − pobst−1 on predicted changes20:
∆pobst = γ1 · (pmpt − pobst−1) + γ2 · (phtct − pobst−1) + ut . (3.8)
In the regression conducted by means of ordinary least squares, the standard er-
rors are corrected to account for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation (Newey and
West, 1987). Table 3.4 shows the regression results. The coefficient for the mar-
ket power model is significant at the 5% level, whereas the coefficient for the high
19In the case of an OLS regression, the residuals sum to zero if a constant is included in the regression.
However, if the output of a fundamental model is compared to data, this is not necessarily the case.
20Bushnell et al. (2008) use level data in the regression instead of actual and predicted changes. How-
ever, if the considered time series are non-stationary, a regression with level data can be problematic
due to spurious correlations.
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transmission costs model is insignificant.
Table 3.4: Regression results for the prices in the market power model and the high trans-
mission costs model in the second half of 2014
*: 5% significance level, **: 1% significance level, ***: 0.1 % significance level
Value Standard Error
γ1 0.06* 0.03
γ2 0.03 0.03
After fitting equation (3.8), the actual encompassing test is conducted. A Wald
test is used in order to compare the market power model and the high transmission
costs model separately to the encompassing model given by equation (3.8). The
test rejects the hypothesis γ1 = 0 at the 5% level, but does not reject the hypothesis
γ2 = 0. The intuition behind this is that the high transmission costs model is signifi-
cantly worse than the encompassing model, whereas the market power model is not
significantly worse than the encompassing model.
Besides price based measures, it is also important to consider gas flows when
evaluating the models. In Appendix 3.8.3, the indicators and tests introduced in
this section are used to compare modeled flows to the historical flows. It is found
that the modeled flows in the market power model and the high transmission costs
model are similar. Both models reproduce the historical flows to an extent that it is
not possible to reject a model as inappropriate purely based on the flows.21
However, since the market power model is able to explain prices besides flows,
it is unambiguous that the market power model is overall a better explanation for
the historical data than the high transmission costs model.22 In Appendix 3.8.4,
robustness checks are conducted by varying key parameters of the models confirming
this result.
21The flows in both model configurations are similar to the historical flows because (a) the efficiently
regulated Austrian route is used up to capacity on most days in both model configurations, (b) be-
cause the value of TI was chosen in the high transmission costs model to reproduce the historical
utilization of the Swiss route, and (c) the same must-run flows are assumed in both model config-
urations.
22Nevertheless, the indicators/tests for the prices in this section reveal slight deviations between the
market power model and the data. Market imperfections that are not modeled, e.g. imperfect
information and behavioral aspects of gas traders, could be responsible for this. Furthermore,
the historical pipeline capacity could have deviated slightly from the maximum technical capacity
assumed in the model (cf. discussion in Appendix 3.8.3).
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3.6 Discussion of Results
3.6.1 Welfare Effects
An indication for the loss of consumer surplus due to withholding of Swiss gas flows
can be derived by comparing the market power model to a model representing an
efficient Swiss regulation, i.e. a competitive Swiss trader with TI = 1.67 EUR/MWh
according to the efficient Swiss transmission tariff from ACER (2014). Based on this
methodology, the loss of consumer surplus in the Italian gas market is quantified to
502 million EUR in the second half of 2014.23 Whereas the producer surplus from
trading gas between NCG and PSV by using Swiss pipelines is 0 EUR in the case of an
efficient Swiss regulation, it amounts to 128 million EUR in the market power case.
While there are transmission revenues in the efficient regulation case in Switzerland
(116 million EUR in the second half of 2014 excluding LTC volumes), there are no
revenues from arbitrage driven trade in the market power model because TI = 0 was
assumed in line with an interpretation of long-term booking costs as sunk costs on
short time scales. Nevertheless, costs for the long-term bookings occurred on longer
time scales, i.e. the Swiss TSO generated revenue by selling long-term transmission
rights.
3.6.2 Potential Swiss Incentives for Inefficient Regulation
The Swiss TSO could benefit from the exertion of market power by capturing a part
of the producer surplus, e.g. by auctioning off the transmission rights or bargaining
with traders interested in buying the transmission rights.24 As long as the surplus
captured by the Swiss TSO monotonically increases with the total generated surplus,
the Swiss TSO would have an interest to uphold the regulation enabling market
23There are two opposing effects influencing the consumer surplus when changing the model rep-
resenting an efficient Swiss regulation to the market power model: (1) the consumer surplus is
increased due to a lower value of TI in the market power model, but (2) the consumer surplus is
decreased by the exertion of market power. The dominating effect of market power leads to an
overall negative effect.
24At a first glance, it may be surprising that the revenues that the Swiss TSO could generate from
transiting arbitrage driven trade flows in the competitive scenario (116 million EUR) are in the
same range as the producer surplus for the trader with market power (128 million EUR). However,
the company owning the Swiss transmission rights also controls other supply options of the Italian
gas market which is not modeled. In fact, the respective company had a market share of 55%
in the Italian gas market in 2014 (Eni S.p.A., 2017). Hence, the total producer surplus due to
withholding of Swiss gas flows could be larger than the producer surplus from the trade volumes
only. Therefore, a situation is conceivable in which both the trader with market power and the
Swiss TSO could be better off in the inefficient regulation regime that enables market power.
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power. If this would be the case, the question arises why pipeline capacity was built
in the first place in order to withhold some of it later. The answer could be that the
profit optimizing transmission quantity varies in time. Depending on the elasticity of
the residual demand that owners of the Swiss transmission rights face, withholding
could be more or less profitable in specific situations. Therefore, it can make sense to
build capacity that is sometimes fully used, but sometimes is left partly idle. Against
this backdrop, further research could focus on how traders acquire the transmission
rights. While it would be possible to consider a profit optimizing TSO construct-
ing the capacity in a first step and selling transmission rights for the capacity later
within a theoretical analysis, the calibration of such a model to historical data could
be challenging given (a) the lack of public knowledge about relevant parameters,
e.g. prices of transmission rights in long-term booking agreements (Petrovich et al.,
2016), (b) because of extensive data requirements, e.g. long-term time series for the
Italian gas price, and (c) due to the fact that the gas pipelines in Switzerland were
at least partly built in the time previous to the liberalization of European energy
markets (Transitgas SA, 2018) in which other incentives to invest into infrastructure
existed than today.
3.6.3 Countermeasures against Market Power
Furthermore, a natural follow-up question to this analysis is about the EU’s op-
tions for countermeasures to mitigate the market power. The Italian government
announced plans to create a so called "liquidity corridor" as part of its national en-
ergy strategy 2017, i.e. a regulated body should buy transmission rights connect-
ing the Netherlands through Germany and Switzerland to Italy and offer the rights
in auctions with reserve prices below 0 EUR/MWh (ICIS, 2017). Such a measure
would allow the application of EU rules also on Swiss pipelines and would likely
lower the Italian gas prices significantly. However, it remains unclear at which price
the Swiss transmission rights could be bought and how a sale could be enforced. In
addition, there is strong opposition against the plans, e.g. by the European Federa-
tion of Energy Traders (2018) that fears that the plans could be "highly distortive to
competition" and "produce negative impacts on neighbouring hubs".25
Less controversially, the Italian regulator could aim to create more gas market
competition on short time scales for traders, e.g. by reducing the existing secu-
rity of supply requirements for storage operators (Honoré, 2013). Another possi-
25Page 2 in European Federation of Energy Traders (2018)
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ble strategy to address the Swiss regulatory inefficiency could be to increase the
Austrian transmission capacity. Figure 3.7 shows the influence of additional Aus-
trian transmission capacity on the mean of the modeled price spreads in the market
power model in the second half of 2014. In order to reach levels of the spread be-
low 2 EUR/MWh, more than 0.25 TWh/day of additional capacity through Austria
would have to be built. Based on Lochner (2011), a rough estimate for the cost of
such an investment would be in the range of 300 million EUR.
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Figure 3.7: Effect of additional Austrian capacity on the mean of the modeled spreads in the
second half of 2014
Alternatively, the EU could aim to free the existing Austrian capacity from usage
other than trade within the EU. According to the market power model, the average
gas price spread between NCG and PSV would have been 0.60 EUR/MWh lower in
the second half of 2014 without the reverse flows from Central Europe to Ukraine.
Projects like the planned capacity addition in Hermanowice at the border between
Poland and Ukraine could therefore decrease the Italian gas price. Obviously, in-
creasing the EU-Swiss energy cooperation with the goal to implement EU network
codes in Switzerland would be the most efficient way to mitigate the market power.
Talks about the EU-Swiss energy cooperation, though, were suspended after a Swiss
anti-immigration vote in 2014 (Pollitt, 2017).
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3.7 Conclusion
In the second half of 2014, the price spread between the German gas market NCG
and the Italian gas market PSV exceeded the regulated tariff on the congested Aus-
trian pipeline significantly. Since the Swiss pipeline was not used to the full extent in
this time period, a non-physical trade barrier is claimed to be the reason underlying
the high Italian gas prices. The Italian gas prices (as well as observed gas flows)
can be rationalized by a trader withholding Swiss gas flows to increase gas prices in
Italy. This is plausible given that EU rules for congestion management do not apply in
the non-EU country Switzerland and because more than 80% of Swiss transmission
rights have been booked long-term by one company. Statistical indicators/tests show
that the model with market power is a better explanation for the observed prices than
a competitive Swiss trader with high transmission costs. Against this background,
regulatory measures aiming to decrease transmission costs, e.g. reduce transaction
costs for trading transmission rights in Switzerland, may not be successful in elimi-
nating the non-physical bottleneck on their own. Instead, congestion management
procedures like the enforcement of the use-it-or-loose-it principle for Swiss trans-
mission rights would mitigate the market power in the Italian gas market. From this
analysis, the policy implication arises that the EU should find an agreement with
Switzerland leading to the harmonization of energy markets regulation.
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3.8 Appendix
3.8.1 Formal Model Description
The profit maximizing problem of the traders I and E competing in quantities qI and
qE is given by:
max
qE
ΠE(qE) with ΠE(qE) = (P1(q)− P2 − TE) · qE subject to 0≤ qE ≤ capE , (3.9)
max
qI
ΠI(qI) with ΠI(qI) = (P1(q)− P2 − TI) · qI subject to 0≤ qI ≤ capI . (3.10)
The first order conditions of the problems are given with the conjectural variations
rE =
∂ qI
∂ qE
and rI =
∂ qE
∂ qI
by:
− P1(q) + P2 + TE − ∂ P1(q)
∂ qE
· qE · (1+ rE) +λE ≥ 0⊥ qE ≥ 0, (3.11)
capE − qE ≥ 0⊥ λE ≥ 0, (3.12)
− P1(q) + P2 + TI − ∂ P1(q)
∂ qI
· qI · (1+ rI) +λI ≥ 0⊥ qI ≥ 0, (3.13)
capI − qI ≥ 0⊥ λI ≥ 0. (3.14)
Since trader E behaves competitively, the conjectural variation rE is assumed to
have the value -1. For trader I, the following two cases are distinguished:
1 Market power in market M1: Cournot-Nash conjecture rI = 0
2 High transmission costs: Competitive conjecture rI = −1, TI > TE
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3.8.2 Discussion of Flexibility Constraint Supplies to the Italian Gas
Market
The model introduced in Section 3.4 implies that traders buying gas at the exoge-
nous price P2 in Central Europe set the price in the Italian gas market. This means
that other gas supplies would not be relevant for the price formation in Italy. On a
cost basis, the trade volumes from Central Europe are likely to be the supply option
with lowest marginal costs in Italy after must-run supplies (contracted volumes, in-
digenous production) due to the competitiveness of the Central European gas hubs.
In addition, it can be argued that supply options other than spot based trade vol-
umes in Italy have only limited flexibility to react on short-term market develop-
ments. A typical LNG supply chain response to high price signals in a specific market
usually takes 1-3 weeks (Timera Energy, 2016). Hence, spot based LNG imports can
be considered as inflexible on a daily basis. Ejections from LNG storage at the site of
a regasification terminal are rather driven by contractual and technical constraints
of the terminal than by commercial considerations, e.g. the arrival of a new cargo
leads to the requirement to deplete the storage (Timera Energy, 2017). Further-
more, underground storage sites are able to provide short-term flexibility. However,
Italian storage can be considered as price unresponsive due to strong security of
supply regulations that require e.g. a national strategic gas reserve (European Com-
mission, 2015b). According to Honoré (2013), "storage is not used for trading oppor-
tunities"26 in Italy and rather serves to balance the household demand. Apart from
the specifics of the Italian gas market, price taking behavior of natural gas storage is
a common assumption in strategic gas market models (cf. Growitsch et al. (2014)).
Another potential supply source are flexible long-term contract volumes (pipeline
gas or LNG). Whereas hub indexed contracts usually have only limited flexibility,
contracts with oil indexed elements have a certain flexibility. In particular, volumes
above the take-or-pay volume can be used flexibly. While the exact flexibility fea-
tures of the contracts are confidential, the flexibility is mainly intended to address
seasonal fluctuations of gas demand, not short-term fluctuations based on market
developments. Generally, in the literature on gas markets, the prevailing view is that
long-term contracts lost importance in the price finding of European hubs after 2009
and that there is a trend towards hub indexation (Franza, 2014).
26Page 60 in Honoré (2013)
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3.8.3 Comparison of modeled and historical Flows
For the following comparisons of flows, contracted must-run volumes and in the
Austrian case additionally the alternative usage of the capacity fa,t are added to the
modeled trade flows. This allows a consistent comparison of the modeled flows to
the historically observed physical flows. As in Section 3.5.2, an elasticity of -0.75
and LTC driven must-run flows of 80% of the DCQ are assumed.
Table 3.5: Arithmetic mean and standard deviation of flows in historical data and in different
model configurations
[TWh/d] Data Market Power Model High Transmission Costs Model
Swiss Flows
Arithmetic Mean 0.44 0.42 0.44
Standard Deviation 0.12 0.07 0.14
Austrian Flows
Arithmetic Mean 0.23 0.24 0.25
Standard Deviation 0.02 0.02 0.01
As can be seen in Table 3.5, the means of the modeled flows are close to the
mean of the historical flows (within the standard deviation of the historical data).
The market power model slightly underestimates the Swiss flows, but overestimates
the Austrian flows less than the high transmission costs model. The mean of the
Swiss flows in the high transmission costs model matches the mean of the historical
Swiss flows by construction because the value of TI was chosen in order to repro-
duce the historical average utilization on Swiss pipelines. In the case of the Austrian
flows, both considered model configurations reproduce the congestion on the Aus-
trian route, i.e. the modeled Austrian flows correspond to the assumed capacity on
most days. However, the historic flows deviate slightly from the reported technical
capacity (cf. Figure 3.2) because e.g. the actually available capacity could have
changed in time due to temperature and dispatch decisions on pipelines upstream
and downstream to the Austrian pipelines. Because a varying capacity is not mod-
eled, there are small deviations between modeled and historical flows even on days
with congestion on the Austrian route.
Table 3.6 shows the values for R2 and NMB for the flows. Both models have high
R2 values and comparably low NMB values.27
27Because TI in the high transmission costs model was chosen in order to reproduce the historical
average utilization on Swiss pipelines, the residuals of the modeled flows sobst − smodelt sum to 0 by
construction resulting in a value for NMB of 0.
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Table 3.6: R2 and NMB for the flows in the market power model and high transmission costs
model in the second half of 2014
Market Power Model High Transmission Costs Model
Swiss Flows
R2 0.98 0.99
NMB -0.04 0.00
Austrian Flows
R2 0.98 0.98
NMB 0.06 0.09
Repeating the encompassing test based on equation (3.8) for the flows leads to the
outcome that both coefficients γ1 and γ2 are significant (cf. Table 3.7). Therefore,
no inference can be made based on the test which of the two models is the better
one.28
Table 3.7: Regression results for the flows in the market power model and the high trans-
mission costs model in the second half of 2014
*: 5% significance level, **: 1% significance level, ***: 0.1 % significance level
Value Standard Error
Swiss Flows
γ1 0.25*** 0.06
γ2 0.51*** 0.07
Austrian Flows
γ1 0.08* 0.03
γ2 0.26** 0.10
28As discussed by Ghali et al. (2009), a situation when encompassing tests fail to distinguish between
the models is common when both models fit the data well, i.e. have high coefficients of determi-
nation.
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3.8.4 Robustness Checks: Parameter Variations
Variation of LTC driven Must-Run Flows and Price Elasticity of Demand
Table 3.8 and 3.9 show the results of the regression given by equation (3.8) with
prices from the competing models on historical data when the LTC driven must-
run flows and the elasticity is varied.29 Coefficients for the prices in the market
power model are significant at the 5% level for explaining the data, whereas the
coefficients for the prices generated by the high transmission costs model are not
significant. Furthermore, the absolute values of the coefficients change only slightly
when varying the LTC driven must-run flows and the elasticity.
Table 3.8: Regression results for the prices with different LTC driven must-run flows
*: 5% significance level, **: 1% significance level, ***: 0.1 % significance level
Coefficient Share of DCQ Value Standard Error
γ1 60% 0.06* 0.03
γ2 60% 0.03 0.02
γ1 65% 0.06* 0.03
γ2 65% 0.03 0.03
γ1 70% 0.06* 0.03
γ2 70% 0.03 0.03
γ1 75% 0.06* 0.03
γ2 75% 0.03 0.03
γ1 80% 0.06* 0.03
γ2 80% 0.03 0.03
γ1 85% 0.07* 0.03
γ2 85% 0.03 0.03
γ1 90% 0.07* 0.03
γ2 90% 0.02 0.03
29In the considered parameter range, the average utilization of the Swiss pipeline route in the high
transmission costs model still matches the historical average utilization in the second half of 2014
with only minor deviations. Therefore, the value of TI=2.9 EUR/MWh is not varied.
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Table 3.9: Regression results for the prices with different elasticities
*: 5% significance level, **: 1% significance level, ***: 0.1 % significance level
Coefficient elasticity Value Standard Error
γ1 -0.60 0.05* 0.02
γ2 -0.60 0.03 0.02
γ1 -0.65 0.05* 0.02
γ2 -0.65 0.03 0.02
γ1 -0.70 0.06* 0.03
γ2 -0.70 0.03 0.03
γ1 -0.75 0.06* 0.03
γ2 -0.75 0.03 0.03
γ1 -0.80 0.07* 0.03
γ2 -0.80 0.03 0.03
γ1 -0.85 0.08* 0.03
γ2 -0.85 0.03 0.03
γ1 -0.90 0.08* 0.03
γ2 -0.90 0.02 0.03
Furthermore, as shown in Table 3.10 and Table 3.11, the result that no model
can be rejected based on the encompassing tests for the flows is robust to variations
of the LTC driven must-run flows and the elasticity. While both coefficients for the
Swiss flows are significant at the 0.1% level in the considered parameter range, the
significance of the coefficients for the Austrian flows varies with varying parameters.
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Table 3.10: Regression results for the flows with different LTC driven must-run flows
*: 5% significance level, **: 1% significance level, ***: 0.1 % significance level
Coefficient Share of DCQ Value Standard Error
Swiss Flows
γ1 60% 0.29*** 0.07
γ2 60% 0.48*** 0.07
γ1 65% 0.29*** 0.07
γ2 65% 0.49*** 0.07
γ1 70% 0.28*** 0.06
γ2 70% 0.48*** 0.07
γ1 75% 0.27*** 0.06
γ2 75% 0.50*** 0.07
γ1 80% 0.25*** 0.06
γ2 80% 0.51*** 0.07
γ1 85% 0.23*** 0.07
γ2 85% 0.52*** 0.07
γ1 90% 0.20*** 0.07
γ2 90% 0.54*** 0.07
Austrian Flows
γ1 60% 0.11** 0.04
γ2 60% 0.23* 0.09
γ1 65% 0.10* 0.05
γ2 65% 0.24** 0.09
γ1 70% 0.09* 0.05
γ2 70% 0.25** 0.09
γ1 75% 0.08* 0.04
γ2 75% 0.26** 0.10
γ1 80% 0.08* 0.03
γ2 80% 0.26** 0.10
γ1 85% 0.07* 0.03
γ2 85% 0.26** 0.09
γ1 90% 0.05 0.03
γ2 90% 0.27** 0.09
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Table 3.11: Regression results for the flows with different elasticities
*: 5% significance level, **: 1% significance level, ***: 0.1 % significance level
Coefficient Share of DCQ Value Standard Error
Swiss Flows
γ1 -0.60 0.21*** 0.06
γ2 -0.60 0.62*** 0.07
γ1 -0.65 0.23*** 0.06
γ2 -0.65 0.58*** 0.07
γ1 -0.70 0.24*** 0.06
γ2 -0.70 0.55*** 0.07
γ1 -0.75 0.25*** 0.06
γ2 -0.75 0.51*** 0.07
γ1 -0.80 0.24*** 0.06
γ2 -0.80 0.55*** 0.07
γ1 -0.85 0.27*** 0.07
γ2 -0.85 0.45*** 0.07
γ1 -0.90 0.28*** 0.07
γ2 -0.90 0.42*** 0.07
Austrian Flows
γ1 -0.60 0.11* 0.05
γ2 -0.60 0.22* 0.10
γ1 -0.65 0.10* 0.04
γ2 -0.65 0.24* 0.10
γ1 -0.70 0.10* 0.04
γ2 -0.70 0.24* 0.10
γ1 -0.75 0.08* 0.03
γ2 -0.75 0.26** 0.10
γ1 -0.80 0.10* 0.04
γ2 -0.80 0.24* 0.10
γ1 -0.85 0.06* 0.03
γ2 -0.85 0.28** 0.09
γ1 -0.90 0.06* 0.03
γ2 -0.90 0.28** 0.09
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Variation of Swiss Transmission Costs in the Market Power Model
Besides the LTC driven must-run flows and the elasticity, another important param-
eter for the analysis are the Swiss transmission costs TI . Whereas TI was chosen as
2.9 EUR/MWh in the high transmission costs model (a value at which the average
utilization of the Swiss route matches the historical utilization), TI in the market
power model is chosen as 0 EUR/MWh. As Figure 3.8 illustrates, higher values of
TI lead to lower R
2 values for the spreads in the market power model compared to
TI = 0 EUR/MWh. This indicates that the interpretation of sunk costs in the mar-
ket power model leads to better results than the assumption that trader I considers
transmission costs when holding back volumes.
0 0.5 1 1.5 20.7
0.75
0.8
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0.9
0.95
1
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R
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Diagramm 11
R2 for Spreads
Figure 3.8: Development of R2 for the spreads in the market power model in dependence on
Swiss transmission costs TI
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4 Natural Gas Transits and Market Power – The
Case of Turkey
Turkey is a key country in order to realize the Southern Gas Corridor (SGC) due
to its geographical location. However, as the main transit country within the SGC,
Turkey could potentially exert market power with gas transits. Whether Turkey ex-
erts market power or not, is crucial for an economic assessment of the SGC. Hence,
this study investigates this issue quantitatively using a global partial equilibrium gas
market model. An oligopolistic and a competitive supply structure in the European
upstream market in 2030 are considered in the model based on calibrations to his-
torical gas market situations. If the European gas market in 2030 is characterized
by an oligopolistic supply, Turkey is able to exert market power resulting in higher
prices compared to competitive transits, in particular in South Eastern Europe. In
a competitive market structure, however, the importance of the SGC and thus the
potential of Turkish market power with gas transits is limited.
4.1 Introduction
The Southern Gas Corridor (SGC) consists of planned pipeline projects that connect
the natural gas producers in the Caspian region and the Middle East (Azerbaijan,
Turkmenistan, Iran, Iraq and Israel) with the natural gas markets of the European
Union (EU). The EU promotes the SGC for two reasons: (1) it would like to diversify
its natural gas supplies and (2) it aims to close its growing supply gap that arises
due to decreasing indigenous production. Turkey has a key role in realizing the
SGC because Turkey’s geographical location is between the producing countries and
the EU. This crucial role of Turkey is widely discussed in the literature.1 Compared
to Ukraine, which is a single-source transit country for Russian gas only, Turkey
has the potential to become a multi-source transit country fed by several suppliers
from the Caspian region and the Middle East or Russia. The goal of the Turkish
government, however, is not only to aim for a pure transit role for Turkey, i.e. allow
1See for instance Berk et al. (2017), Tagliapietra (2014a), Tagliapietra (2014b), Winrow (2013),
Wigen (2012) or Lise et al. (2008)
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upstream producers the access to the Turkish transmission network and to the EU
downstream market, but rather to use its multi-source advantage for actively trading
in the natural gas markets, as is outlined in Skalamera (2016): "Turkey, however,
bargained hard against a straightforward transit role, intending instead to take over
the role of a hub, which means that it would buy gas arriving at its borders, consume
what it needs, and sell on the balance at profit."2
However, this perception is far away from the economic definition of an energy
hub.3 In economic terms, the Turkish perception means that Turkey wishes to use its
geographical location to exercise market power in the European natural gas market
(transit market power). If the natural gas producers have market power themselves,
Turkey’s plans would give rise to double marginalization (Tirole, 1988). This per-
spective is missing within the current discussion about the SGC although it could
potentially eliminate the economic benefits of the entire project.
Hence, the research objective of this paper is to investigate possible implications of
Turkey’s strategic behavior for the EU natural gas markets and for the economic feasi-
bility of the SGC project. The global natural gas market model COLUMBUS (Hecking
and Panke, 2012) is extended and applied in order to simulate strategic behavior of
transit countries like Turkey.4 In a simulation for the year 2030, a case with compet-
itive Turkish transits, i.e. a scenario in which upstream producers have to pay only
a tariff covering variable and fixed network costs to ship gas through Turkey to Eu-
ropean markets, is compared to a case with Turkish market power. Besides varying
the Turkish behavior, different market structures in the European upstream market
are considered, i.e. an oligopolistic upstream market and a competitive upstream
market, in order to derive a comprehensive understanding of Turkey’s role in the
SGC. It is found that Turkish transit market power could have a negative impact on
the European consumer surplus especially in a setup with an oligopolistic upstream
market.
The structure of the paper is as follows: In Section 4.2, a review of literature that is
2Page 4 in Skalamera (2016)
3Heather (2015), for instance, identifies five important requirements for an energy hub: a high level
of (1) liquidity, (2) volatility and (3) anonymity as well as (4) market transparency and (5) traded
volumes. Furthermore, a physical hub is a location where several pipelines coming from and going
to different directions converge and enable physical trade and competition. The Turkish perception
of becoming a hub rarely fulfills those requirements. For a deeper discussion of this topic see also
Berk et al. (2017).
4In reality, besides buying gas volumes upstream and reselling them downstream, a transit country
could exert market power by inducing high transit fees or imposing taxes for gas transits on its
territory. Those measures would result in a mark-up increasing the price of gas deliveries through
the transit country and hence have a similar effect for the final customers as a policy of the transit
country to explicitly buy and resell gas.
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relevant for the analysis is given. A stylized theoretical model to discuss the problem
of Turkish transits is developed in Section 4.3. Subsequently, the global natural gas
market model COLUMBUS and its inputs are described in Section 4.4. Afterwards,
the model calibration is discussed. Based on the calibration, Section 4.5 focuses on
the model results and discusses the implications of Turkish transit market power for
the EU. Finally, Section 4.6 concludes.
4.2 Literature Review
There are four different streams of literature to which this work is related to: (a) lit-
erature on gas market modeling based on non-cooperative game theory, (b) liter-
ature on natural gas transits, (c) publications about Turkey’s energy relations, and
(d) literature focusing on vertical externalities like double marginalization.
The first literature stream is based on simulation models that are programmed
as mixed complementarity problems (MCP). As the COLUMBUS model that is used
within this work, MCPs allow the simulation of market behavior and thus to con-
sider different forms of competition on different stages of the value chain. An early
study is provided by Boots et al. (2004) in which gas producers are represented
as oligopolists in a static model called GASTALE. The model considers downstream
traders that act either oligopolistically or competitively. The study shows that succes-
sive oligopolies in gas markets lead to high prices - similar to the case of successive
oligopolies in the SGC in this study. Later on, a dynamic version of GASTALE is devel-
oped by Lise and Hobbs (2009) that consider the SGC producers Azerbaijan, Iran and
Iraq as potential suppliers for Europe. A further early work is Gabriel et al. (2005a).
It also considers the natural gas supply chain as a MCP in which the traders market-
ing gas of the producers had market power. Several existence and uniqueness results
are provided as well as illustrative numerical results. Gabriel et al. (2005b) consid-
ers more in-depth numerical simulations of a version of this model for the North
American natural gas market. In a later contribution by Holz et al. (2008), a static
model named GASMOD is applied to analyze the European gas markets with regard
to their market structure. Using data of 2003 they analyze different combinations of
competition in upstream and downstream markets and come to the conclusion that
Cournot competition in both markets (double marginalization) is the most accurate
representation to model the European gas market. In Section 4.4.3, a similar cali-
bration is conducted for the years 2014 and 2016. In later research, Holz (2009)
extends the static GASMOD model into a dynamic version.
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Within the stream of literature that focuses on gas transits, Yegorov and Wirl
(2010) analyze games that appear in the context of gas transits. They distinguish be-
tween games with a transit country as a net gas exporter (such as the case of Turkem
gas transits through Russia) and with a transit country as a net gas importer (such
as Turkey). They conclude that the game structure arising from a transit problem
is not absolute but depends on geography and international law. Furthermore, von
Hirschhausen et al. (2005) analyze Ukrainian market power for Russian gas exports
to Central Europe. They focus on the effects of an alternative Russian export route
to Central Europe, the Yamal pipeline via Belarus and how cooperation between
Ukraine and Russia could have made the investment into the Yamal pipeline un-
necessary. Dieckhöner (2012) analyzes Ukrainian transits from a security of supply
perspective discussing potential diversification options for Europe like the Nabucco
pipeline. Later, Chyong and Hobbs (2014) introduce a strategic European natural
gas market model to analyze a gas transit country. They apply their model to inves-
tigate the case of the South Stream gas pipeline. The question of Ukrainian transit
market power is hereby important for the profitability of this offshore pipeline. Tran-
sit market power is represented by a conjectured transit demand curve approach.
However, the conjectural variations of the transit country are chosen as a calibra-
tion parameter and vary between 0 and 1. This approach is common in natural gas
market modeling but also often criticized, e.g. by Perry (1982), Dockner (1992)
and Smeers (2008). Within the literature on transit problems, there are further
cooperative game theory approaches: Hubert and Ikonnikova (2004), Hubert and
Suleymanova (2008), and Hubert and Ikonnikova (2011), for instance, analyze mar-
ket power of transit countries within the Eurasian supply chain. Furthermore, they
examine strategic investments into alternative infrastructure projects to bypass the
transit countries and reduce their market power. However, the above-mentioned
works focus all on Ukraine, a single source transit country fed by Russian gas only.
In the study at hand, the potential multi-source transit country Turkey that would
not be dependent on a single dominant exporter is in the focus of investigation.
Within the literature on Turkey’s energy relations, there are geopolitical and eco-
nomic contributions. Cagaptay (2013) discusses geopolitical factors associated with
different potential gas suppliers for Turkey. Skalamera (2016) finds that there are
many obstacles for Turkey to become a gas hub. Furthermore, Berk and Schulte
(2017) show that Turkey’s potential to become an important transit country for
natural gas is strongly restricted in a competitive European upstream gas market.
Moreover, they quantify different drivers that could increase Turkish transit volumes.
However, contrary to our study, they do not consider market power exerted by Turkey
62
4.3 Stylized Theoretical Model
as a factor impacting the transits.
Apart from a specific gas market context, there are studies that discuss options to
avoid double marginalization. Joskow (2010b) analyzes different factors that im-
pact the decision of companies to either rely on markets to source supplies or to
integrate vertically. Double marginalization would be a neoclassical factor favoring
vertical integration. In the context of this study, competitive access for upstream gas
producers to the Turkish transmission grid would lead to the same shipment quan-
tities through Turkey that vertically integrated companies, i.e. upstream producers
owning pipelines through Turkey, would choose. Besides vertical integration, other
options to avoid the vertical externality of double marginalization caused by Turk-
ish strategic behavior could be contractual agreements in which Turkey would gain
a part of the upstream producers’ rent. Therefore, it is important to note that the
simulated configurations (competitive transits and double marginalization) are two
extreme outcomes, and bargaining about the rents could also lead to a solution in
between.
The value added to the literature of this analysis is two-fold. Firstly, it consid-
ers the specific case of Turkey and quantitatively examines its potential to exercise
transit market power in the EU gas market. Secondly, a double marginalization ap-
proach (successive oligopolies) is used to describe a multi-source transit country like
Turkey.5
4.3 Stylized Theoretical Model
Tirole (1988) describes double marginalization in the most basic setting, the suc-
cession of two monopolies in a vertical integrated value chain. In this section, an
extended version of this textbook model is introduced to describe a market structure
with a multi-source transit country potentially giving rise to double marginalization
and suppliers that are not dependent on the transit country. Therefore, a setup with
4 players, 3 producers having constant marginal costs and the multi-source transit
country, is considered in order to obtain insights into the functioning of transit mar-
ket power. It is assumed that the transit country and the producers are not vertically
integrated. Producer 1 sells volumes q1 directly to the final market representing a
value chain without double marginalization. Producer 2 (respectively producer 3) is
5In contrast to Chyong and Hobbs (2014), the conjectural variation of a transit country in our study
takes on either the value of the Cournot conjecture or the competitive conjecture. Thus, the critique
of arbitrary conjectural variations does not apply to this analysis.
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dependent on the transit country and thus can only sell volumes q2 (respectively q3)
to the transit country that then resells the volumes qT = q2 + q3 to the final mar-
ket. Figure 4.1 illustrates the stylized model. The assumption that all the volumes
entering the transit country are resold corresponds to the assumption that no domes-
tic market of the transit country needs to be served (in the absence of indigenous
production of the transit country).
Figure 4.1: Illustration of the stylized model describing a multi-source transit country
The final market has a price PF and a total supply Q = q1+qT . The inverse demand
function of the final market is assumed to be linear with an intercept α and a slope β:
PF (Q) = α− βQ.
The profit-maximization problem of producer 1 with her marginal cost C1 is given
by:
max(ΠP1) with ΠP1 = (PF (Q)− C1) · q1 subject to q1 ≥ 0. (4.1)
The corresponding first-order conditions with a conjectural variation r1 =
∂ qT
∂ q1
,
which takes on the value of 0 for Cournot behavior and -1 for competitive behavior
of producer 1, are:
C1 − PF + β · (1+ r1) · q1 ≥ 0⊥ q1 ≥ 0. (4.2)
Producer 2 (respectively producer 3) produces gas at marginal cost C2 (respec-
tively C3) and sells it to the transit country at the price PE . The problems of the
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producers 2 and 3 are given by:
max(ΠPi) with ΠPi = (PE(qi)− Ci) · qi subject to qi ≥ 0 for i = 2, 3. (4.3)
The corresponding first-order conditions are:
Ci − PE − ∂ PE
∂ qi
· qi ≥ 0⊥ qi ≥ 0 for i = 2,3. (4.4)
The inverse demand function PE(qT ) is found by considering the transit country’s
profit maximizing problem and its first-order conditions with the conjectural varia-
tion rT =
∂ q1
∂ qT
. The transit country’s profit is determined by the difference between
the price of the final market PF (Q) and the price for which the transit country can
buy volumes from the upstream producer PE:
max(ΠTR) with ΠTR = (PF (Q)− PE) · qT subject to qT ≥ 0. (4.5)
The first-order conditions are given by:
PE −α+ βq1 + βqT + β · (1+ rT ) · qT ≥ 0⊥ qT ≥ 0. (4.6)
If rT has the value -1, transits are modeled as competitive, whereas the value of 0
corresponds to a situation in which the transit country exerts market power (Cournot
conjecture). If qT > 0 is fulfilled, equation (4.6) can be rewritten as:
PE = α− βq1 − βqT · (2+ rT ). (4.7)
With qT = q2 + q3, this can be plugged into equation (4.4). With r2 =
∂ q3
∂ q2
and
r3 =
∂ q2
∂ q3
, this yields:
Ci − PE + β · (1+ ri) · (2+ rT ) · qi ≥ 0⊥ qi ≥ 0 for i = 2, 3. (4.8)
Equations (4.2) and (4.8) define the mixed complementarity problem for the styl-
ized model. The important insight is that the inverse transit demand function can be
included in the first-order conditions of producer 2 and producer 3. Turkey’s inverse
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transit demand function is implemented in the global gas market model COLUMBUS
accordingly as described in detail in Appendix 4.7.2.
4.4 Methodology: The Global Gas Market Model
COLUMBUS
4.4.1 Model Description & Overview
In order to analyze the double marginalization induced by a multi-source tran-
sit country within a more complex market, the global natural gas market model
COLUMBUS (cf. Hecking and Panke (2012), Growitsch et al. (2014), Hecking et al.
(2016), Berk and Schulte (2017) as well as Berk et al. (2017)) is extended and ap-
plied. It is an intertemporal partial equilibrium model. Formulated as an MCP, it
is able to account for strategic behavior of the upstream sector. Inputs are assump-
tions about production capacities, demand and gas infrastructure. COLUMBUS is a
dynamic model which means that demand for investment into gas production and
infrastructure are determined endogenously based on exogenously given economic
factors such as investment costs and discount rates.
In its standard version, the COLUMBUS model is only able to consider strategic be-
havior of the vertical integrated suppliers defined "as a trading unit associated with
one or more production regions" (Hecking and Panke, 2012). Transit countries, as
in the focus of this study, are not associated with their own production region but
can buy gas at their border from the neighboring countries. Therefore, the model
is extended by introducing transit countries such as Turkey as profit-optimizing ex-
porters. Technical details of the model extensions as well as a detailed technical
description of the standard version of the COLUMBUS model can be found in the
appendix.
The COLUMBUS model is calibrated with the data described in Section 4.4.2. Two
calibrations with different conjectural variations are considered, one calibration to
the year 2014 and one calibration to the year 2016. Both years are relevant because
we aim on having calibrated configurations for an oligopolistic and a competitive
upstream sector. As shown in Section 4.4.3, the European gas market of 2014 fits
better to an oligopolistic setup, whereas the European gas market of 2016 fits better
to the competitive assumption.
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4.4.2 Input Data and Assumptions
Market Characteristics
In line with political and regulatory targets of the EU6 (ACER, 2015b), further in-
tegration of the natural gas markets until 2030 is assumed. The EU market is ag-
gregated into two clusters of countries: (1) a Northern & Western European (NWE)
market and (2) a South Eastern European (SEE) market. The respective countries of
each cluster are shown in Figure 4.2. The SEE market consists of the Balkan penin-
sula and Italy that will be connected in 2020 by the Trans Adriatic Pipeline (TAP)
via Greece to the Trans Anatolian Pipeline (TANAP) in Turkey. The NWE market is
composed of the remaining EU countries. The countries of each cluster are assumed
to form an integrated market. Integration means that only one entry tariff (respec-
tively exit tariff) has to be paid in order to ship gas into (respectively out of) the
integrated market area.7 A prerequisite for such a market design are investments in
pipeline connections between the countries of the market area to reduce the risk of
structural congestion.8 An integrated market implies that there is only one gas price
within each market area.
While the NWE market is already today characterized by a high degree of market
integration in terms of sufficient infrastructure, competitive hub pricing and a high
number of supply sources, the SEE market currently lacks connecting infrastructure
and is dominated by Russian gas supply and oil-indexed long-term contracts (ACER,
2015a). However, there are various infrastructure projects, e.g. the CESEC initia-
tive (European Commission, 2018a), and regulatory incentives, e.g. agreements be-
tween the European Commission and Gazprom about destination clauses and pricing
issues in LTCs (European Commission, 2017a), aiming to increase the market inte-
gration within the SEE region. Hence, the assumption of an integrated market in
SEE in 2030 is in line with the EU’s long-term energy strategy. The modeling of two
segments of the EU gas market allows a differentiation of effects of imports via the
SGC on the NWE and SEE markets.
6Within this study the EU includes the United Kingdom, Switzerland, Norway and all states of former
Yugoslavia.
7Uniform entry/exit tariffs are assumed that are calculated as a capacity weighted average of histor-
ical tariffs from the ACER market monitoring reports (ACER (2014) and ACER (2016)). Basing
the analysis on historical tariffs implies that the costs of further investments into the natural gas
infrastructure would be regained at the exit points to the customers. For an interesting discussion
of how to derive entry/exit fees in an integrated European market cf. Hecking (2015).
8Persistent congestion within a market area would lead to high redispatch costs that would have to
be distributed to the gas customers within the market area.
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Figure 4.2: Definition of the two clusters NWE & SEE
Demand
The model is based on linear demand functions as in Lise et al. (2008). Inputs for
each demand region are a reference demand, reference price and point elasticity of
demand.9 The fundamental data source for the historical reference demand is the
Natural Gas Information 2017 (IEA, 2017). The future development of the reference
demand is based on the projections of the New Policies Scenario of the World Energy
Outlook 2015 (WEO) (IEA, 2015b). Hence, a nearly constant demand development
in the EU is considered in this analysis. The European reference price is based on the
Title Transfer Facility (TTF) price for the history10, whereas the future development
of reference prices is in line with IEA (2015b). The point elasticities of demand
are chosen in line with Growitsch et al. (2014) and Egging et al. (2010). Thus, for
instance, for Europe a price elasticity of -0.25 is assumed.
Production
The indigenous production of the EU is modeled exogenously, i.e. the respective
EU reference demand is reduced by indigenous production. However, the produc-
tion of all external natural gas suppliers relevant for the EU, i.e. Norway, Russia,
9The general level of the demand is an input to the model as the reference demand. However, given
the fact that the model is an equilibrium model, the equilibrium demand is an output of the model
and can deviate slightly from the input demand path.
10TTF prices can be obtained in a daily granularity from NetConnect Germany (2017).
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North African suppliers, potential suppliers from the SGC and global LNG suppliers,
is modeled endogenously. The input data about production capacities, operational
and capital costs is based on a comprehensive literature research of current and his-
toric upstream projects. Data has been obtained from Seeliger (2006), Aguilera et al.
(2009), Henderson and Mitrova (2015), Henderson (2016), Aissaoui (2016), cur-
rent press notifications about new field discoveries / developments, and by exchange
with industry experts.
Infrastructure
The COLUMBUS model encompasses the major elements of the global gas infras-
tructure including pipelines and LNG terminals. Some projects having reached the
financial investment decision (FID) status are exogenously given to the model (e.g.
LNG terminals in the USA and Australia). The data for the existing pipeline infras-
tructure in Europe is based on the capacity map and the Ten Year Network Devel-
opment Plan (TYNDP) of the European Network of Transmission System Operators
for Gas (ENTSOG, 2015). In Turkey, the existing pipeline connections from Russia
(Blue Stream), Georgia (Southern Gas Pipeline) and Iran (Tabriz-Ankara Pipeline)
are modeled. Additionally, the first stage of the TANAP and the TAP are consid-
ered in the model with commissioning in 2018 and 2020. Information regarding
LNG liquefaction and regasification capacities has been gathered from publications
of Gas Infrastructure Europe (GIE) (GIE, 2015) and from the LNG Industry Report
2015 (GIIGNL, 2016). Facts about gas storage originate from reports of Gas Storage
Europe (GIE, 2015) and the Natural Gas Information 2017 (IEA, 2017).
Besides investment costs, short-run marginal transport costs are relevant for the
market equilibrium. As already mentioned in Section 4.4.2, for the two consid-
ered European market areas, uniform capacity weighted entry/exit tariffs based on
ACER (2014) for 2014 and on ACER (2016) for 2016 and 2030 are used.11 The
Ukrainian entry/exit tariffs are from Interfax (2015).12 Transport costs for the SGC,
for the South Caspian Pipeline (SCP), for the TANAP and for the TAP are based on
a detailed analysis by Pirani (2016). A distance-based approach is applied to derive
transport costs for other non-European world regions for which no detailed cost data
11Due to the fact that we consider only two market regions within Europe changes of entry/exit tariffs
have only a minor impact due to averaging effects.
12The assumed Ukrainian tariffs from 2015 imply that the Ukrainian route is the most expensive Rus-
sian export option to Europe. So despite not modeling the Ukrainian market power with respect
to transit volumes endogenously, the Ukrainian market power is reflected in the exogenous tariff
assumption.
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is available.
The analysis is based on a pure economic rationale. This means that if not explic-
itly stated no political constraints are considered. Such constraints could be, for ex-
ample, limited pipeline investment options between countries hostile to each other,
or limited production capacities in countries that are politically unstable. While we
know that political factors should be taken into account for a comprehensive analysis
of Turkey’s role in the SGC, we nevertheless believe that the economic perspective is
helpful to understand drivers of all relevant stakeholders in the SGC including polit-
ical actors. Furthermore, the model does not consider discrete investment choices.
Therefore, the simulation may also identify small capacity demands for investment
into infrastructure that would not take place in reality.
4.4.3 Model Calibration
The calibration results are shown in Figure 4.3 and Figure 4.4. Figure 4.3 illus-
trates the modeled and historical EU natural gas supply by source in 2014 and
2016. The respective bar in the middle depicts historical data from IEA (2017). The
left bar illustrates the COLUMBUS simulation results if the upstream sector behaves
oligopolistically, and the right bar is the result for competitive behavior. For 2014,
it becomes clear that the oligopolistic case matches history better than the results
with the competitive assumption. In the competitive case, about 5% more gas would
have reached the EU gas markets compared to the historical imports. According to
the model results, especially Russia withheld gas volumes in 2014. In 2016, there is
an opposing picture. Figure 4.3 shows that the simulation of competitive behavior
of the upstream producers matches reality better than oligopolistic behavior. In a
market with oligopolisitc behavior, 6% less gas would have been consumed in 2016
compared to the actual consumption. However, when comparing both behaviors,
it becomes clear that Russia was able to deter additional LNG imports in 2016 by
offering its gas at more competitive prices.
Furthermore, Figure 4.4 shows the historical average European import natural gas
prices of 2014 and 2016.13 It depicts also the price results of the COLUMBUS simu-
lation, differentiated for the NWE and the SEE market as well as for an oligopolistic
and a competitive upstream behavior for each respective year. Again, it can be seen
that in 2014 the simulation of oligopolistic suppliers fits the reality best. For 2016,
13The average import border price is based on World Bank (2017) with applied exchange rates of 1.32
EUR/USD (2014) and 1.10 EUR/USD (2016).
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Figure 4.3: Comparison of historical imports to model results for 2014 and 2016
historic prices match better with a simulation of competitive suppliers.
Figure 4.4: Comparison of historical prices to model results for 2014 and 2016
However, it is hard to predict today if the upstream producers will behave oligopolis-
tically or competitively in 2030. Therefore, both potential developments are consid-
ered in the following analysis.
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4.5 Simulation Results
4.5.1 Turkish Transit Market Power in an oligopolistic European Gas
Market
In order to analyze the effects of Turkish transit market power in an oligopolistic EU
upstream gas market (based on the conjectural variations for the model calibration
to 2014)14, two different scenarios are investigated: (1) a scenario with competitive
Turkish transits, i.e. the SGC producers can access the Turkish transmission system,
and (2) a scenario with Turkish transit market power, i.e. the SGC producers have
no own access to the Turkish transmission system and need to sell the volumes to an
Turkish exporter (for an overview of all considered scenarios in this analysis cf. Table
4.6 in Appendix 4.7.3).15
Initially, a scenario with competitive Turkish transits is considered. The left bar of
Figure 4.5 illustrates the simulated EU supply mix with competitive Turkish transits
in 2030. Due to exhausting resources, the EU natural gas production declines from
125 bcm in 2016 to 98 bcm in 2030. For similar reasons, Norwegian imports are
diminished from 115 bcm in 2016 to 65 bcm in 2030. In addition, Russian imports
decrease from 149 bcm in 2016 to 112 bcm in 2030 in the oligopolistic scenario due
to the withholding of quantities. The LNG market, which is assumed to be competi-
tive, partly fills the resulting supply gap. Another part is filled by imports from the
SGC via Turkey. On this route 45 bcm reach the EU market in 2030. Assuming that
10 bcm/a of SGC capacity is already financed in the TAP project and will be realized,
this means that an additional pipeline capacity investment into the SGC of 35 bcm/a
would be economically viable according to the model results. Turkey and the SGC
producers could benefit from an oligopolistic EU market situation with high prices
in 2030. Hence, the share of EU’s gas consumption that arrives via the SGC could
be about 9%.
14The SGC producers Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Iran, Iraq and Israel are also assumed to act strategi-
cally in 2030, i.e. they potentially withhold quantities to generate higher prices.
15In Appendix 4.7.4, a sensitivity analysis on the conjectural variation of Turkey with values between
-1 (competitive) and 0 (Cournot behavior) is considered.
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Figure 4.5: EU supply mix per source in dependence on Turkish behavior in 2030
Besides the scenario with competitive transits, a scenario in which Turkey acts as
a Cournot player earning a profit with the transits is considered. Because the SGC
producers are modeled as Cournot players as well, this implies successive oligopolies
with double marginalization as described in Section 4.3.16 The SGC producers are
assumed to have pipeline access to the EU market via Turkey only. Pipeline invest-
ments on Russian territory by non-Russian actors are thereby excluded. This as-
sumption is relaxed in Appendix 4.7.4. The simulation results of the scenario when
Turkey exerts market power are shown in the right bar of Figure 4.5. If Turkey exerts
market power, Turkish re-exports would be much lower than in the competitive case
at 13 bcm/a or additionally to the TAP capacity 3 bcm/a in 2030. For the EU this
would mean higher gas prices and thus a slightly lower demand (-10 bcm/a). How-
ever, most of the gas that would originally be imported via Turkey could be replaced
by higher LNG imports (+10 bcm/a) as well as higher direct imports from Russia
(+7 bcm/a).
The effect of Turkish transit market power on the EU gas market prices in 2030
is shown in Figure 4.6.17 The figure again compares a situation with (left bar) and
16Russian transits through Turkey are still assumed to be competitive. Russian volumes are not bought
by the Turkish Cournot player but can be sold to the European markets through Turkey directly
by the Russian exporter that pays competitive transit fees. Turkey is not in the position to force
Russia into a double marginalization structure as long as Russia has alternative channels to supply
the European markets. Russia’s direct investment options to Europe are not restricted and Russia
rather prefers such direct routes to the EU as Nord Stream 2 due to lower costs compared to the
Turkish transit option (even with competitive Turkish transit fees).
17Prices are in real terms based on EUR 2014.
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without (right bar) the exertion of Turkish transit market power. Additionally, due to
the differentiation of the EU markets into a NWE and a SEE market, regional prices
in Europe can be analyzed. In the competitive scenario, prices are lower in SEE
than in NWE in 2030. This is opposed to today’s situation in which prices in South
Eastern Europe are the highest on the continent. As already illustrated in Figure 4.4
in Section 4.4.3, the calibration results also show higher prices in SEE in 2014 and
2016 than in NWE. This can be explained with the fewer number of exporters that
offer gas in the SEE market compared to NWE. If the SGC producers enter the market
as new suppliers via Turkey, competition increases in the SEE market leading to
lower prices. However, if Turkey would exert market power, the positive effect of
further market entries diminishes resulting again in higher prices in SEE. It can be
observed that by the exertion of Turkish transit market power prices in NWE would
be 4.3% higher, while prices in SEE would be 6.9% higher than in a situation with a
competitively behaving Turkey. This points out that in an oligopolistic European gas
market structure the strategic behavior of Turkey would have a significant economic
impact, in particular on the SEE market.
Figure 4.6: Natural gas prices in dependence on Turkish behavior in 2030
Figure 4.7 shows the implication of Turkish transit market power on the profits of
Turkey, Russia and the SGC producers. Additionally, the figure points out the impact
on the EU consumer surplus. It shows the differences in profits and consumer surplus
between a competitively acting Turkey and when Turkey exerts transit market power.
In the competitive case, the Turkish profits are by definition 0. However, if Turkey
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exerts market power, it earns profits of 1.8 billion EUR in 2030. Due to less SGC
gas within the EU gas markets, more Russian gas is exported to the EU in the transit
market power case which leads to higher Russian profits of 2.5 billion EUR. However,
profits of the SGC producers are 13.1 billion EUR lower in 2030. The EU suffers a
loss of consumer surplus by 6.6 billion EUR.
Figure 4.7: Development of profits and consumer surplus if Turkey exerts market power in
2030
The results discussed so far have focused on transits of the SGC producers via
Turkey to the EU. However, it is also important to look at the domestic Turkish gas
market. Within this study, it is assumed that Turkey would not exert market power in
its domestic market. This is in line with a policy of the Turkish government to aim on
low domestic gas prices that support economic growth. Thus, the domestic market
can be directly supplied by all connected exporters. In the scenario with competitive
Turkish transits, Turkey’s modeled gas demand grows to 63 bcm in 2030 from 46
bcm in 2016. If Turkey exerts transit market power, its domestic demand is expected
to amount to 65 bcm in 2030 according to the model results. In the market power
case, the SGC producers have an incentive to ship gas to the Turkish domestic market
instead of using the expensive transit option to the EU. Therefore, the competition
in the Turkish domestic market increases leading to 5% lower gas prices and hence
to 1.1 billion EUR additional Turkish consumer surplus compared to the case with
competitive Turkish transits. Thus, Turkey benefits twice by the exertion of transit
market power: (1) by profits from transits and (2) by a higher consumer surplus in
its domestic market.
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Figure 4.8 shows the origin of the gas exports of Turkey to the EU in 2030. It
compares the transits for both considered scenarios (with and without the exertion of
Turkish transit market power). If Turkey behaves competitively, about two thirds or
30 bcm of Turkish transits to the EU is Azerbaijani gas from the Shah Deniz field in the
Caspian Sea. Since no Iranian sanctions are considered (pure economic rationale),
an additional 11 bcm of Iranian gas would reach the EU market via Turkey in 2030.
This figure seems to be quite small compared to the fact that Iran has the world’s
largest natural gas reserves (BP, 2016). Nevertheless, according to the model results,
Iran supplies other markets than the EU such as Pakistan, India or the global LNG
market.18 Furthermore, about 4 bcm of expensive Israeli off-shore gas from the
Mediterranean Sea would reach the EU. Turkmenistan and Iraq would not transit
gas via Turkey to the EU due to comparably low price signals and the far distance.
They would only supply the Turkish domestic market (both would deliver about
7 bcm). Whereas Turkmenistan would supply gas to Asian customers, the exports
from Iraq are limited due to the increasing indigenous demand (mainly gas demand
from the crude oil production).
On the contrary, if Turkey exerts market power, nearly all of the 13 bcm gas transits
that would reach the EU would be from Azerbaijan. The reason lies in the country’s
missing alternative demand sinks and thus the strong Azerbaijani dependence on
Turkey compared to Iran that can ship gas to the above mentioned alternative mar-
kets. Gas from Israel, however, would be too expensive and not exploited. Again,
Turkmenistan and Iraq would deliver to the Turkish domestic market only (Turk-
menistan: 12 bcm, Iraq: 10 bcm). Besides that, Turkmenistan would focus on non-
European markets. Against this background, Appendix 4.7.4 considers a sensitivity
analysis in which Azerbaijan can ship gas through Russian territory to the EU. In such
a setup, market power exerted by Turkey would reduce the transit volumes through
the SGC to below 7 bcm in 2030.
18For a more detailed discussion about Iranian exports see Berk and Schulte (2017).
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Figure 4.8: Turkish gas transits into the EU per source in dependence on Turkish behavior
in 2030
4.5.2 Turkish Transit Market Power in a competitive European Gas
Market
In the next step, the effects of Turkish transit market power in a competitive EU
market are investigated. Hereto, we use the same conjectural variations as for the
model calibration for 2016 (cf. Section 4.4.3). However, as already shown by Berk
and Schulte (2017)19, the chance of Turkey to become an important transit country
for the EU is quite limited under competitive market conditions. There is only a
minor demand for expensive gas from the SGC in a competitive EU gas market setting
with a nearly constant future gas demand development. Similar results are found in
this study.
If Turkey behaves competitively and SGC producers have only to pay the current
TANAP transit fees, 23 bcm of gas would pass through Turkey to the EU in 2030.
Nearly 18 bcm would come from Azerbaijan and approximately 5 bcm form Iran.
Gas from Israel would be too expensive to reach the EU markets. However, even in
this situation Turkey would be able to exert transit market power. Hereby it would
19A further study that investigates the role of the SGC under competitive market conditions is Hecking
et al. (2016).
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earn profits of 0.5 billion EUR. Nonetheless, if Turkey would exert market power in
such a competitive environment, the potential of the SGC to diversify the EU gas
markets is negligibly small. Only approximately 5 bcm from Azerbaijan would reach
the EU gas markets. That means that even the capacity of the already financed first
stage of the SGC would be oversized. That underlines the minor importance of the
SGC under competitive market conditions.
4.6 Conclusion
The results of the study illustrate that Turkey has the potential to exert market power
in the EU natural gas markets if an oligopolistic market structure (similar to the his-
torical gas market situation in 2014) is assumed. If Turkey behaves competitively in
this market environment, 45 bcm of Turkish transit volumes would arrive in Europe
in 2030 according to the model outcome. In such a situation, gas prices in the SEE
region could be lower than in the NWE region because the SGC producers would in-
crease the competition, in particular in the SEE region. In the case of Turkish transit
market power, however, the transits through Turkey would be reduced to 13 bcm in
2030, illustrating a big potential to withhold quantities from the markets. According
to the model outcome, gas prices in the NWE region would be 4.3% higher in this
setting in 2030 compared to a situation with competitive Turkish transits. However,
SEE would be most significantly affected by 6.9% higher prices if Turkey exercises
market power. The consumer surplus of the EU would be 6.6 billion EUR lower
compared to the case in which Turkey behaves competitively. If Turkey would only
withhold quantities to the European markets and not to its domestic market, lower
gas prices in Turkey would be the consequence. Hence, Turkey could increase its
consumer surplus (by 1.1 billion EUR) besides earning profits from transits (1.8 bil-
lion EUR) making it attractive for Turkey to use the market power option.
However, in a competitive future gas market setting (similar to the historical gas
market situation in 2016), gas imports via Turkey and the SGC would be only of
minor importance, even if Turkey behaves competitively. Hence, also the Turkish
potential of pursuing transit market power is limited.
Our analysis illustrates that the economic raison d’être for the SGC is only given for
an EU gas market that is characterized by oligopolistic natural gas suppliers. How-
ever, in this oligopolistic environment, Turkey could benefit from exerting market
power and hereby eliminate the potential benefits of the SGC for the EU. As a pol-
icy implication, the EU could prefer direct connections between supply and demand
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avoiding new dependencies on transit countries. Another potential policy measure
would be the harmonization of Turkey’s energy laws with EU directives that guaran-
tee a non-discriminative access to transmission grids.
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4.7 Appendix
4.7.1 Model Description
The following model description is based on Hecking and Panke (2012). The COLUM-
BUS model is a spatial model consisting of vertices and edges. Vertices can be either
sources (production facilities) or sinks (demand). Pipelines and LNG shipping routes
are connected with edges.
Notation: Sets, Variables and Parameters
Table 4.1, Table 4.2, Table 4.3 and Table 4.4 give an overview of all sets, parameters
and variables in the COLUMBUS model.
Table 4.1: Sets in the COLUMBUS model
Set Description
n, n1 ∈ N all model nodes
c ∈ C cost levels (steps of piecewise linear supply function)
t ∈ T months
y ∈ Y years
p ∈ P ∈ N producer / production regions
e ∈ E ∈ N exporter / trader
d ∈ D ∈ N final customer / demand regions
r ∈ R ∈ N regasifiers
l ∈ L ∈ N liquefiers
s ∈ S ∈ N storage
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Table 4.2: Primal variables in the COLUMBUS model
Primal variable Description
prp,c,t produced gas volumes
f le,n,n1,t physical gas flows
t re,d,t traded gas volumes
sts,t gas stock in storage
sis,t injected gas volumes in storage
sds,t depleted gas volumes from storage
drp,c,y depleted resources
ipp,c,y annual investment into production capacity
i tn,n1,y annual investment into pipeline transport capacity
iss,y annual investment into storage capacity
ilng y annual investment into LNG transport capacity
irr,y annual investment into regasification capacity
ill,y annual investment into liquefaction capacity
mdoe,d,t minimal delivery obligation
Table 4.3: Dual variables in the COLUMBUS model
Dual variable Description
λp,c,t marginal costs of physical gas supply by exporter e to node n in
time period t
σs,t (intertemporal) marginal costs of storage injection
αp,c,y marginal value of resources in node n at cost level c in year y
βd,t marginal costs / price in node n in time period t
µp,c,t marginal benefit of an additional unit of production capacity
φn,n1,t marginal benefit of an additional unit of pipeline capacity
εs,t marginal benefit of an additional unit of storage capacity
ψs,t marginal benefit of an additional unit of storage injection capacity
θs,t marginal benefit of an additional unit of storage depletion capac-
ity
ιt marginal benefit of an additional unit of LNG transport capacity
γr,t marginal benefit of an additional unit of regasification capacity
ζl,t marginal benefit of an additional unit of liquefaction capacity
χe,d,t marginal costs of delivery obligation
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Table 4.4: Parameters in the COLUMBUS model
Parameter Description
demd,t final customer’s demand for natural gas
capn,t/n,n1,t/n,c,t monthly infrastructure capacity
resn,c,y maximum resources
t rcn,n1,t transport costs
prcn,c,t production costs
opcn,t operating costs
incn,y/n,n1,y/n,c,y investment costs
distn,n1 distance between node n and node n1 in km
LNGcap initial LNG capacity
speed speed of LNG tankers in km/h
c fs conversion factor used for storage inj. and depl. capacity
el t economic life time of an asset
sloped,t slope of the linear demand function in node d
cve conjectural function of exporter e; market power level
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KKT Conditions
The COLUMBUS model is based on profit optimization problems of the different
players (exporters, producers, transmission system operators, liquefiers, regasifiers).
Each profit optimization problem has corresponding first order conditions. Together
with the market clearing conditions, the first order conditions define the model. The
KKT conditions for the exporters are given by:
−βd,t+(cve+1)·sloped,t ·t re,d,t−χe,d,t+λe,d,t ≥ 0 ⊥ t re,d,t ≥ 0 ∀e, d, t, (4.9)
−λe,n,n1,t +λe,n,t + t rcn,n1,t + t rcn,n1,t + opcn,t
+φn,n1,t + ζl,t + γr,t
+ ιt · 2 · dist l,r ≥ 0 ⊥ f le,n,n1,t ≥ 0 ∀e, n, n1, t.
(4.10)
The KKT conditions for the producers are given by:
−λe,p,t + prcp,c,t +
∑
y∈Yt
αp,c,y +µp,c,t ≥ 0 ⊥ prp,c,t ≥ 0 ∀p, c, t, (4.11)
αp,c,y+1 −αp,c,y ≤ 0 ⊥ drp,c,y ≥ 0 ∀p, c, y, (4.12)
inc,p,y −
∑
t∈T (y)
µp,c,y ≥ 0 ⊥ ipp,c,y ≥ 0 ∀p, c, y. (4.13)
The KKT conditions for the transmission system operators are given by:
incn,n1,y −
∑
t∈Ty
φn,n1,t ≥ 0 ⊥ i tn,n1,y ≥ 0 ∀n, n1, y. (4.14)
The KKT conditions for the liquefiers are given by:
incl,y −
∑
t∈Ty
ζl,t ≥ 0 ⊥ ill,y ≥ 0 ∀l, y. (4.15)
The KKT conditions for the regasifiers are given by:
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incr,y −
∑
t∈Ty
γr,t ≥ 0 ⊥ irr,y ≥ 0 ∀r, y. (4.16)
The KKT conditions for the LNG shippers are given by:
incy −
∑
t∈Ty
(ιt · 8760/12 · speed)≥ 0 ⊥ ilng y ≥ 0 ∀y. (4.17)
The KKT conditions for the storage operators are given by:
−βd,t +σs,t + θs,t ≥ 0 ⊥ sds,t ≥ 0 ∀s, t, (4.18)
−σs,t + βs,t +ρs,t ≥ 0 ⊥ sis,t ≥ 0 ∀s, t, (4.19)
εs,t =∆σs,t = σs,t+1 −σs,t ≤ 0 ⊥ sts,t ≤ 0 ∀s, t, (4.20)
inc,s −
∑
t∈Ty
[εs,t + c fs,t · (ρs, t + θs,t)]≥ 0 ⊥ iss,y ≥ 0 ∀s, y. (4.21)
The market clearing conditions are given by the following equations:∑
c∈C
prp,c,t−t re,d,t+
∑
n1∈(n1,n)∈A
f le,n1,n,t−
∑
n1∈(n,n1)∈A
f le,n,n1,t = 0 ⊥ λe,n,t free ∀e, n, t,
(4.22)
∑
e∈E
t re,d,t + mdoe,d,t + sds,t + sis,t − demd,t = 0 ⊥ βd,t free ∀d, t. (4.23)
Equation (4.22) must be fulfilled for each exporter e ∈ E that is active at the node
n ∈ Ne. Additionally, the equation ensures equality of traded volumes and physical
flows. Equation (4.23) defines the gas balance at demand nodes d in month t making
sure that the final demand is met.
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4.7.2 Model Extensions
Equation (4.9) defines the first-order conditions of the exporter’s problem.20 This
problem is re-formulated to optimize profits of exporters that sell volumes to a transit
country with the transit country’s conjectural variation cvt r and the slope of the final
demand region slopedem,t
21:
−βd,t+(cve+1)·(2+cvt r)·slopedem,t · t re,d,t−χe,d,t+λe,d,t ≥ 0⊥ t re,d,t ≥ 0 ∀e, d, t.
(4.24)
Equation (4.24) has the structure of equation (4.8). The transit country can be
modeled as competitive (conjectural variation cvt r = −1) or as a Cournot player
(conjectural variation cvt r = 0). The exporters supplying final markets (including
the transit country itself) have still first-order conditions of the form of equation
(4.9).
Furthermore, the market clearing conditions given by equations (4.22) and (4.23)
need to be extended. The volumes bought by the transit country t ransi t t need to
be included in those market clearing constraints for the nodes at the border of the
transit country where it buys the transit volumes n ∈ NTR:
∑
c∈C
prp,c,t+t ransi t t−t re,d,t+
∑
n1∈(n1,n)∈A
f le,n1,n,t−
∑
n1∈(n,n1)∈A
f le,n,n1,t = 0⊥ λe,n,t free ∀e, n ∈ NTR, t.
(4.25)
The volumes bought by the transit country t ransi t t are included in the second
market clearing constraint as follows:
∑
e∈E
t re,d,t + sds,t − sis,t − t ransi t t = 0⊥ βd,t free ∀d, t. (4.26)
20Growitsch et al. (2014) use a different convention of conjectural variations. This explains the dif-
ference between equation (11) in Growitsch et al. (2014) and equation (4.9).
21In the study at hand this is the slope of the linear demand function of the EU market, which is
modeled in two regions. A more detailed description of the regions is given in Section 4.4.2. It is
based on the countries’ linear demand functions that are aggregated for the respective EU regions.
The parameters of the EU demand functions determine the demand function for Turkish transit
gas.
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4.7.3 Data Sources and Scenarios
Table 4.5 lists the most important data sources of this study, whereas Table 4.6 gives
an overview of the considered scenarios.
Table 4.5: Data and Sources
Model Input Source
Reference demand Natural Gas Information 2017 (IEA, 2017), World
Energy Outlook 2015 (New Policies Scenario) (IEA,
2015a)
Price elasticities Growitsch et al. (2014) and Egging et al. (2010)
Reference price Based on TTF 2014 (NetConnect Germany, 2017)
Production costs Seeliger (2006), Aguilera et al. (2009), Henderson and
Mitrova (2015), Henderson (2016), Aissaoui (2016)
Existing pipelines Ten Year Network Development Plan (ENTSOG, 2015)
LNG facilities Capacity Map (GIE, 2015), LNG Industry Report (GI-
IGNL, 2016)
Storage facilities Gas Storage Map (GIE, 2015), Natural Gas Information
2017 (IEA, 2017)
Transportation costs ACER Market Report 2014 (ACER, 2015b), Interfax
(2015) and Pirani and Yafimava (2016)
Table 4.6: Scenario overview
Scenario
Number
Section Upstream
Sector
Turkish
Behavior
Further Scenario
Characteristics
1.1 Section 4.5.1 oligopolistic competitive -
1.2 Section 4.5.1 oligopolistic oligopolistic -
2.1 Section 4.5.2 competitive competitive -
2.2 Section 4.5.2 competitive oligopolistic -
A.1 Appendix
4.7.4
oligopolistic oligopolistic transits from Azerbaijan and
Turkmenistan via Russia
possible
A.2 Appendix
4.7.4
oligopolistic oligopolistic cartel of Russia, Azerbaijan
and Turkmenistan
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4.7.4 Sensitivity Analysis
Sensitivity on Turkish behavior in an oligopolistic European Gas Market
Figure 4.9 illustrates how the Turkish transits (by origin) vary if the conjectural vari-
ation of Turkey is varied between -1 and 0 in the oligopolistic gas market configu-
ration. It becomes clear that Israel and Iran are very sensitive on Turkey’s transit
behavior. If Turkey decides to exert market power, transits of these countries via
Turkey to Europe are not competitive. Azerbaijan, however, is less sensitive because
it is only able to export gas via Turkey (cf. Appendix 4.7.4 for a sensitivity in which
this assumption is relaxed).
Figure 4.9: Turkish gas transits into the EU per source in dependence on Turkish behavior in
2030
Figure 4.10 illustrates how the Turkish conjectural variation affects natural gas
prices in SEE and NWE. While the SEE price is below the NWE price with compet-
itive Turkish transits, this interrelation changes when market power is exerted: For
conjectural variations larger than -0.8, the SEE price is larger than the NWE price.
The market situations with Turkish conjectural variations between -1 and 0 illus-
trated in the Figures 4.9 and 4.10 are cases in which both the EU and Turkey would
benefit from the SGC, i.e. Turkey would earn some profits from transiting, and the EU
would enjoy lower gas prices compared to a situation with double marginalization.
Such a market situation could be e.g. the result of a bargaining process between gas
consumers and the transit country (similar to the bargaining between upstream pro-
ducers and the transit country mentioned in Section 4.2). However, it is important
to note that such a bargaining solution could become obsolete if a competitive up-
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stream market structure is assumed instead of an oligopolistic market because fewer
volumes would pass through the SGC in the competitive setup.
Figure 4.10: Natural gas prices in SEE and NWE in dependence on Turkish behavior in 2030
Caspian Gas via Russia in an oligopolistic European Gas Market
In Section 4.5, it was assumed that Azerbaijan would be able to only deliver gas
via Turkey to the EU markets. Besides the EU, Azerbaijan could solely sell its gas to
Georgia or Turkey. However, the Turkish and Georgian demand for Azerbaijani gas is
relatively small and accounted for only 8 bcm in 2015 (Pirani, 2016). Looking into
the past, Azerbaijan delivered up to 2 bcm of gas to Russia in 2012 (Pirani, 2016).
Since then, supplies have declined to zero in 2015. As of 2016, Azerbaijan is even
importing about 2 bcm/a from Russia (Azernews, 2016). The main reason is the
increasing domestic demand and the underdeveloped production of the Shah Deniz
field. This situation may change when the Shah Deniz stage 2 will come online.
Then, Azerbaijan would be able again to export gas also to Russia or even via Russia
into the EU.
The sensitivities discussed in the following are implemented within an oligopolis-
tic upstream market structure in 2030. Therefore, the results from Section 4.5.1 are
the relevant reference to compare the sensitivities to. In a first sensitivity, it is as-
sumed that Azerbaijan and also Turkmenistan are able to deliver gas competitively
via Russia to the EU while Turkey is exerting transit market power. As a conse-
quence, both countries would not deliver any gas via Turkey and the total Turkish
transits to the EU would only be at 6.7 bcm in 2030. As shown in Figure 4.11, these
6.7 bcm of natural gas that would reach the EU are Iranian gas. Due to reduced
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competition in the first-stage oligopoly (SGC producers competing about the transits
through Turkey) compared to a situation in which Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan are
part of this oligopoly, the remaining SGC producers can exercise more market power
when selling gas to Turkey. Hence, it becomes more profitable for Iran to export gas
via Turkey to the EU. The EU, however, benefits from Azerbaijani and Turkmen gas
supplies via Russia. While EU prices would be 1.5% (0.9%) lower in SEE (NWE)
compared to the scenario "Turkish market power" without outside options of Azer-
baijan and Turkmenistan, EU’s consumer surplus would be 1.6 billion EUR higher. As
can be seen in Figure 4.11, due to lower natural gas transits, Turkey’s profit would
be 0.5 billion EUR if Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan can circumvent Turkey instead
of previously 1.8 billion EUR. However, because of lower European gas prices and
stronger competition with Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan in its key markets, Russia
would also lose 0.7 billion EUR revenues as well as 0.2 billion EUR of profits by
allowing transits on its territory compared to the case in which Turkey exercises
market power and no SGC producer can ship through Russia. Thus, a situation in
which Russia would allow Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan to use its infrastructure to
bring additional gas amounts into the EU seems to be an unlikely solution for a more
competitive European upstream gas market.
Another possible scenario would be that Russia buys gas from Azerbaijan and Turk-
menistan and resells it to the EU instead of allowing competitive transits - similar
to Turkey’s assumed behavior. However, it is questionable if double marginalization
would be the appropriate approach to describe this setting because Russia has a huge
indigenous gas production with comparably low production costs. Hence, Azerbai-
jan and Turkmenistan are not in a good position to exert market power against the
Russian exporter.22 Therefore, the scenario in which Russia buys gas from Azerbai-
jan and Turkmenistan is modeled as a cartel situation in which the three countries
offer their gas amounts jointly as one player23. Together, these countries are in a
strong position to act strategically. Thus, compared to the scenario in which all SGC
producers have to sell gas to an oligopolistic Turkey in order to deliver gas to Eu-
ropean markets, gas prices are higher in both modeled EU market areas (SEE and
NWE) by about 2.8%. This leads to a loss in EU consumer surplus of 3.6 billion
EUR compared to the Turkish market power scenario with all SGC producers sell-
ing to Turkey. Nonetheless, as illustrated in Figure 4.11, even if Russia and the
Caspian producers Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan would form a cartel, still 5.7 bcm
of mainly Iranian natural gas would reach the EU markets via Turkey. Turkey could
22Turkey, on the other hand, does not have a significant indigenous gas production.
23For modeling a cartel the same modeling approach as in Egging et al. (2009) is chosen.
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earn 0.4 billion EUR of profits.
Concluding, if Azerbaijan und Turkmenistan can ship gas through Russia (either
competitively or by cooperation forming a cartel with Russia), the volumes that
Turkey could resell to Europe would be below the already financed TAP capacity
of 10 bcm/a. Similar to the setting with a competitive upstream market discussed
in Section 4.5.2, the importance of the SGC for the European gas supply would be
small in such a scenario.24
Figure 4.11: Turkish gas transits into the EU per source and Turkish profits in dependence
on Caspian supply options in 2030
24In reality, it is possible that the Caspian countries and Russia could find a form of cooperation be-
tween competitive transits and the cartel. In principle, a transit problem can also be seen as a
bargaining problem in which cooperation (cartel) and Cournot competition among the respective
producers would be extreme outcomes (cf. the discussion in Section 4.2 about options to avoid
double marginalization). However, both considered scenarios with respect to the relations be-
tween the Caspian countries and Russia have similar implications for the SGC, i.e. if Azerbaijan
and Turkmenistan ship through Russia, the volumes coming through the SGC are diminished.
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5 Tender Frequency and Market Concentration in
Balancing Power Markets
Balancing power markets ensure the short-term balance of supply and demand in
electricity markets and their importance may increase with a higher share of fluctu-
ating renewable electricity production. While it is clear that shorter tender frequen-
cies, e.g. daily or hourly, are able to increase the efficiency compared to a weekly
procurement, it remains unclear in which respect market concentration will be af-
fected. Against this background, we develop a numerical electricity market model
for Germany to quantify the possible effects of shorter tender frequencies on costs
and market concentration. We find that shorter time spans of procurement are able
to lower the costs by up to 15%. While market concentration decreases in many mar-
kets, we – surprisingly – identify cases in which shorter time spans lead to higher
concentration.
5.1 Introduction
In electricity markets supply and demand need to be equal at all times and com-
monly transmission system operators (TSOs) are in charge of balancing supply and
demand. Due to unbundling policies, TSOs are not allowed to own generation as-
sets and need to procure short-term flexibility from operators of power plants. These
power plants need to be able to adjust their production on short notice to balance
supply and demand. In Germany, balancing power (which is one kind of ancillary
services) is currently procured on a weekly basis for the fastest two load balancing
services of primary and secondary balancing power.1 Operators that offer, for ex-
ample, positive balancing power therefore need to withhold production capacities
over the time span of a whole week and cannot sell their full capacity into the spot
market. The costs that arise from balancing power provision are thus based on the
opportunity costs with respect to selling the capacity in the spot market, namely the
foregone profits from spot market operation.
1The ancillary services primary and secondary balancing power are also known as Frequency Control
Reserve (FCR) and automated Frequency Restoration Reserve (aFRR), respectively.
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In this paper, we take a closer look at the German balancing power markets with
a special focus on two problems that may arise from the current (weekly) market
design. First, the weekly procurement leads to inefficiencies as operators need to
withhold capacities for a whole week and cannot fully participate in the hourly spot
market. There is a missing market for hourly balancing power products that could
be solved by an hourly procurement of balancing power. Secondly, we observe that
large players with a broad portfolio of power plants are able to provide balancing
power at lower costs, especially in a weekly auction. These economies of scale for
large players may lead to highly concentrated markets and the possible abuse of
market power.
Whereas in theory it is well understood that shorter time spans lower costs and
might change market concentration, the magnitude of a change in market design to-
wards shorter time spans remains unclear. In order to assess the possible impact, we
develop a numerical model that accounts for the operator structure in the balancing
power market and considers different time spans for balancing power procurement.
Based on the model we are able to quantify the effects of different market designs
(weekly, daily, hourly) on system costs and market concentration.
The modeling of balancing power markets is complex, as it is driven by the oppor-
tunity costs of operators. Just and Weber (2008) started to write down this problem
analytically and solved the simplified model numerically. Later the methodology
was again applied by Just (2011) to analyze the implications of different tender fre-
quencies on the procurement costs but without considering the operator structure.
Richter (2012) bases his analysis on the model developed by Just and Weber (2008)
and is able to show the existence of a competitive simultaneous equilibrium in spot
and balancing power markets that is unique and efficient. He finds out that the bids
of the capacity providers form a u-shaped bidding function around the spot demand.
This work shows that the integrated modeling of spot and balancing power markets
in a fundamental model as it is done in the analysis at hand yields meaningful results.
In addition, the equilibrium of the spot and balancing power market was further an-
alyzed by Müsgens et al. (2014) in the context of the German market design. They
present an analytical expression of the balancing opportunity costs as well which is
used in our latter analysis. The procurement of balancing power is commonly or-
ganized via auctions. A special characteristic of the balancing power procurement
process is that the cost structure of participants can be divided into two parts. One
part is fixed for a period and stems from withholding capacity for balancing purposes.
The second part are variable costs for the supply of energy in the case of being called
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during operation. Bushnell and Oren (1994) were the first to analyze the auction
design of balancing power markets. Their work was later extended by Chao and
Wilson (2002) in order to design incentive compatible scoring and settlement rules.
They found that incentive compatible auctions can be designed by considering only
the capacity bid for scoring in a uniform price auction. Nevertheless many of the
implemented auction designs in Europe differ from their proposals.
The auction design of balancing markets was also studied by Müsgens et al., who
analyzed the importance of timing and feedback (Müsgens and Ockenfels, 2011,
Müsgens et al., 2012). The development in the tertiary reserve market and the
change in rules was analyzed by Haucap et al. (2012). They find that the cooperation
of the four TSOs in Germany decreased costs for the procurement of tertiary reserve.
Whereas previous literature focuses on the efficient design, high market concen-
trations are an additional issue in balancing power markets with few big operators.
In 2010, Growitsch et al. (2010) analyzed the operator structure in the tertiary bal-
ancing power market. They find high market concentration in certain situations of
the tertiary balancing power market. Heim and Götz (2013) looked at the market
outcomes in the German secondary reserve market based on exclusive data provided
by the BNetzA and find that the price increase in 2010 can be traced back to the bid-
ding behavior of the two largest firms.
While the general effects of a design change towards shorter spans is well under-
stood, the empirical importance is less clear. In order to contribute to filling this
gap, we simulate one design change for the German balancing market. We compare
simulation results for the current market design to simulation results for shorter
time spans. Besides the changed provision duration, all other assumptions are held
constant to focus solely on the effect of a shortened provision duration. From the
comparison of the results, we derive a difference of 15% balancing cost in favor of
shorter time spans. With respect to concentration, our model results indicate that
an hourly market design for balancing power leads to certain periods with higher
market concentration. This means that in some hours market concentration could in-
crease by a change of market design from weekly to hourly, and policy makers should
be aware of this. The regulatory implication of this finding could be a trade-off be-
tween a moderate level of market power over a weekly provision or a potentially
high market power in certain periods of shorter provision durations. To the best of
our knowledge, there are no sufficient regulatory mechanisms to mitigate market
concentration or market power in occasional situations with high mark-ups. A po-
tential price-sensitive demand function might decrease market power but with the
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drawback of a reduced security of supply (which would need to consider the value
of lost load as well as statistical probabilities). These designs are not considered
in the current European balancing market harmonization approach (cf. European
Commission (2017b)). Whereas the analysis at hand is limited to market concen-
tration, it is left for further research to determine the mark-ups that can be realized
in concentrated situations and to establish a regulatory mechanism that is able to
mitigate this potential market power.
The paper is organized as follows: In Section 5.2 we focus on the background
information which include, among others, the general electricity market structure,
bidding behavior for balancing power and the concepts of market concentration in-
dices. Section 5.3 introduces the methodology, namely a unit-commitment model for
electricity markets and the model specifications to account for the balancing power
markets. Section 5.4 presents the modeling results as to the system costs and the
market concentration indices. Section 5.5 concludes.
5.2 Background
5.2.1 On the Functioning of the Balancing Power Market
The balancing power market is an additional market for electricity generators, be-
sides the classic spot markets like the day-ahead and intraday market. In the bal-
ancing power market, system operators procure spare production capacity that is
called upon in case of imbalances. It is usually divided into products depending on
the urgency and the direction of power provision. In Germany, the markets are di-
vided into primary, secondary and tertiary balancing power provision, which differ
mainly in reaction time. In the primary balancing power market, power plants need
to be able to adjust their output in both directions (upward and downward). Sec-
ondary and tertiary balancing power markets are divided into products for positive
and negative balancing power. The secondary balancing power market is further
divided into a peak (HT) and off-peak product (NT). Additional information on the
current German market design can also be found in Hirth and Ziegenhagen (2015).
An ongoing harmonization process of European energy and balancing markets
leads to similar designs for instance in the International Grid Control Cooperation
(IGCC).2 Typical design characteristics are an inelastic demand as well as a day-
2IGCC aims for an increased cooperation of balancing power procurement and utilization. Participat-
ing countries in 2017 are AT, BE, CH, CZ, DE, DK, FR, NL.
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ahead or week-ahead procurement of balancing power. An up to date comparison
of European balancing markets is given in Ocker et al. (2016). The European Com-
mission gives suggestions on an EU-wide balancing market, which aims at a harmo-
nization of regulations as it is done already within the IGCC (European Commission,
2017b).
In contrast to the European day-ahead or week-ahead balancing markets, real-time
balancing markets are implemented for instance by the regional transmission oper-
ators of PJM, MISO (formerly Midwest ISO) and ISO New England in the US (ISO
New England, 2011, MISO, 2016, PJM, 2017, Vlachos and Biskas, 2013). Here, the
balancing amount and corresponding prices are calculated in real-time, e.g. 5 min-
utes before delivery. In the subsequent paper, we focus on the implications of shorter
tender frequencies in the German balancing power market for two reasons. First,
the German market is the largest balancing market within Europe with similar char-
acteristics as in other European countries. Second, shortening of the week-ahead
provision duration to an hourly provision duration could be considered as a reason-
able step towards real-time balancing markets. Depending on the market design,
this could have impacts on efficiency and market concentration.
However, the scope of the paper is not to find an optimal market design for bal-
ancing markets (i.e. with consideration of the value of lost load and optimal demand
response), but to isolate the possible economic effects of a regulatory change by a
shortened provision duration.3
Because the balancing of imbalances has to occur in very short time periods before
physical delivery, providers of balancing power have to reserve capacity for balancing
purposes. This means for example that an operator for positive balancing power
cannot sell all her production capacity into the spot market and needs to operate
power plants below the maximum capacity level. When being called for the supply
of balancing power, the power plant needs to increase its output. For the case of
negative balancing power provision, operators need to run their plants above their
minimum production capacity and when negative balancing power is called, these
plants have to be able to decrease their electricity production.
The cost structure of participants in the balancing power market is thus different
compared to the spot market. The marginal costs of generation and the opportu-
nity costs for balancing power provision are exemplary shown for positive balancing
power in Figure 5.1. If no balancing power is procured it would be optimal that
3For analyses of the optimal design of balancing market see for instance Chao and Wilson (2002) or
Vandezande et al. (2010).
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all power plants sell their full generation capacity in the spot market based on their
marginal generation costs (blue dashed curve) until demand is satisfied. In the case
that positive balancing power is procured, power plants need to withhold produc-
tion capacity from the spot market for being able to satisfy the demand for balancing
capacity. Since power plants need to operate at a minimum production level and can
only offer a fraction of their generation for balancing purposes, some power plants
could face a trade-off between not running and running at minimum production to
offer balancing power. Two different types of opportunity costs are therefore pos-
sible which can either be inframarginal or extramarginal. Based on Müsgens et al.
(2014), they can be expressed for positive balancing power as
Capaci t yCostsreserve =
(V C − priceDA) , if V C ≤ priceDA(V C − priceDA) CapminCapreserve , if V C > priceDA. (5.1)
Here, V C are the variable costs of generation, Capreserve and Capmin are the reserve
capacity provision and the minimal load capacity, respectively. Inframarginal power
plants have generation costs lower than the spot price and would be running in the
spot market also without the existence of a balancing power market. The oppor-
tunity costs therefore just result in the difference between the spot price and their
variable costs. Extramarginal power plants have generation costs higher than the
spot price, but are nevertheless selling their electricity in the spot market if the loss
is compensated by a high balancing price.
For example, a power plant that has marginal generation costs a bit lower than
the spot market price, has very low opportunity costs for positive balancing power
provision (red dash-dotted curve). If this power plant decreases its spot market
production in order to offer positive balancing power, the income from the spot
market is only slightly lowered. The opportunity costs for the provision of positive
balancing power are thus close to zero, as can be seen for power plants close to the
spot market demand of 60 GW in Figure 5.1. In contrast to this, if the power plant has
very low marginal costs of production compared to the spot price, the opportunity
costs for positive balancing power provision are very high, as the forgone spot market
profits are very high. Opportunity costs are even higher for extramarginal power
plants with high variable costs that would incur a large loss when selling electricity
in the spot market.
The spot demand of electricity depends mainly on the time of consumption and
fluctuates throughout the day. Therefore, prices fluctuate as well. This means oppor-
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Figure 5.1: Capacity bidding behavior for balancing power markets is theoretically based on
an opportunity cost strategy to the spot market (here: positive balancing power)
tunity costs of single power plants are constantly changing and providers of balanc-
ing power need to take this into account. For the case of operators owning multiple
power plants with a well-diversified portfolio this effect is not as severe because in
the best case they are always operating a power plant with marginal costs close to
the spot price that has very low opportunity costs. This makes it obvious that big-
ger power plant portfolios may have significant cost advantages compared to small
players.
In order to illustrate the effect of the portfolio on the opportunity costs, we con-
sider the following example that is visualized schematically in Figure 5.2: Let us
assume that there are three power plants A, B, and C with the same capacity but
different marginal costs of 10, 20 and 30 EUR/MWh. With an ordering according
to the marginal costs, we derive the simplified spot market merit order. The spot
market clearing price is thus the intersection of the demand function with the merit
order. We calculate the opportunity costs based on Equation (5.1) above. Note that,
for this stylized example, we assume the minimum load capacity and the balancing
capacity provision to be equally sized (e.g. both 50% of the total capacity). Then,
both terms cancel out each other for the extramarginal case in Equation (5.1) which
simplifies the example. In the modeling approach, detailed technical characteristics
as to minimum load as well as capacity provision are considered.
Now, let us consider two demand situations: A low and a high spot market demand
situation. In the low demand situation, the demand is lower than the total capacity
97
5 Tender Frequency and Market Concentration in Balancing Power Markets
of plant A. Hence, the cheapest power plant A can satisfy the total spot market
demand resulting in a spot market clearing price of 10 EUR/MWh. This leads to
opportunity costs of 0, 10 and 20 EUR/MWh for A, B and C respectively4 (shown
in Figure 5.2 on the lower y-axis part). In the high demand situation, the demand
exceeds the joint capacity of plant A and B. Therefore, plant C determines the spot
price of 30 EUR/MWh which results in opportunity costs of 20, 10 and 0 EUR/MWh
for A, B and C respectively.
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Figure 5.2: Schematic illustration of the portfolio effect
If we assume that power plants need to provide the positive balancing power for
both situations, the opportunity costs in each situation sum up for each power plant:
TotalOppor tunit yCosts(p) =
∑
i=low,high
Oppor tunit yCostsi(p) , ∀p ∈ {A, B, C}.
(5.2)
This results in total opportunity costs of 20 EUR/MWh for each power plant. A
coalition of two power plants could reduce the joint opportunity costs. Power plants
A and B could cooperate, e.g. belong to the same operator. Then, in each situation
the operator can provide balancing power by her power plant with the lowest op-
portunity costs. She would use plant A in the low demand situation, and plant B in
the high demand situation. The joint opportunity costs for power plant A and B for
both situations is 10 EUR/MWh, which is lower than the individuals’ 20 EUR/MWh.
4We assume that power plants need to run in order to provide positive balancing power (e.g. due to
minimum load or ramping constraints). If plants B and C would not need to run, their opportunity
costs would be 0 EUR/MWh.
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For the negative balancing power, this portfolio effect does not hold in general.
The opportunity costs are 0 for inframarginal power plants and usually monotoni-
cally increasing for extramarginal power plants. This leads to monotonically increas-
ing opportunity costs in each demand situation. The sum of monotonically increas-
ing functions is still monotonically increasing. Thus, the cheapest power plants to
provide negative balancing power are always in the left segment of the merit order
and there is no possibility to get better off in a portfolio.
Note that we made some simplifying assumptions in this stylized example, e.g. we
neglected part load efficiency decreases and attrition costs. We assumed the capacity
provision and the minimum load capacity to be equal such that it cancels out for
the calculation of the extramarginal opportunity costs. Furthermore, we assumed
the balancing power demand to be comparably small such that the marginal power
plant can fully provide the balancing power demand. All simplifying assumptions
are relaxed and accounted for in the detailed optimization model.
The portfolio effect only occurs if balancing power is procured over a long time
horizon that differs from the hourly spot market tender frequency. Here, large play-
ers may have significant cost advantages because they can provide balancing power
at lower costs from their portfolio. For shorter time periods of balancing power
procurement, the portfolio effect is reduced.
In Figure 5.3, an exemplary merit-order for Germany divided into the main oper-
ators is shown. Power plants that do not belong to the largest five companies are
considered as power plants of a fringe.5
As previously explained, opportunity costs in the balancing power market do
strongly depend on the intersection of supply and demand in the spot market. There-
fore, to investigate market concentration, we need to consider the power plant port-
folio of all operators in the merit order (cf. Figure 5.3). Fuel costs as well as capacities
are based on the year 2014. Detailed numbers can be found in Table 5.4 in the ap-
pendix. We can see that several ranges of the merit order are covered by only a few
operators. Especially, in the left part of the merit order, there are only two to three
operators covering a range of up to several Gigawatts. These are operators own-
ing nuclear and lignite power plants with high investment costs and low marginal
costs.6 Those ranges with few operators tend to favor market concentration. By
5Throughout the paper we use the following abbreviation for the operators: RWE (RWE), E.ON
(EON), Vattenfall (VAT), STEAG (STE), EnBW (ENB), fringe (FRI).
6Note that the fringe at the right of the merit order does not cause higher market concentration
because those plants do not belong to a single firm.
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incorporating the operators and their power plant portfolio into our modeling, we
are able to show the effect of different provision duration on market concentration.
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Figure 5.3: Merit order in Germany colored as to the operators
(capacity and cost data corresponds to the year 2014 and can be found in Appendix 5.6.1)
5.2.2 Market Concentration
In order to compare different levels of market concentration, we apply typical market
concentration indices from the economic literature. Those indices are the Herfindahl-
Hirschmann-Index (HHI, Hirschman (1964)) and the residual supplier index (RSI).7
The HHI uses the market shares of operators as an indicator for market concen-
tration. It is defined as
HHI :=
n∑
i=1
MSi
2, (5.3)
where MSi is the market share of operator i in % and n the total number of opera-
7We do not focus on the pivotal supplier index (PSI) since the non-binary RSI is a refinement of the
binary PSI. Furthermore, we do not investigate market concentration indices which involve prices,
e.g. the Lerner-Index (Elzinga and Mills, 2011). Since we apply a mixed-integer model, prices can-
not be easily derived from the results due to the convexity problem (Bjørndal and Jörnsten, 2008,
Ruiz et al., 2012). Technical restrictions like minimum load or start-up costs in mixed-integer prob-
lems lead to non-convexities. Therefore, the marginal of the supply-demand-equilibrium cannot
directly be interpreted as an estimator for electricity prices. Power plant specific variable costs can
be above the system marginal costs of mixed-integer problems.
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tors.8 Note that we use the decimal representation of the market shares (50%= 0.5).
Therefore, our HHI index is in the range between 0 and 1. Comparably high market
shares have a higher impact on the HHI due to the squared functional representation.
If we would have only five operators in the electricity market, the HHI could not be
lower than 0.2 which would be the case of equally shared capacity. Since we also
consider a fringe in our numerical analysis, these lower bounds are not necessarily
holding.
The RSI for operator x measures the remaining capacity without supplier x ’s ca-
pacity to fulfill the demand. It is defined as
RSI(x) :=
TotalCapacity−Capacityx
demand
, (5.4)
where Capacityx is the capacity of operator x (cf. Twomey et al. (2006)). In our
analysis, we account only for active capacity which means capacity that is already
operating. Non-operating capacities cannot provide balancing power in time or have
additional start-up costs which make the opportunity costs not competitive. That
means, if a power plant provides balancing power, it has to be operating (such that
the production adjustment can be achieved) during the total provision duration. If
pooling is allowed, this constraint is relaxed. In this case, the operator may shift
the capacity within her power plant portfolio and hence is not dependent on the
operation of a single power plant. The capacity of the operator in a weekly balancing
power provision is defined by the minimum capacity of the operator’s portfolio in the
hours of the week. Note that HT and NT differentiation may apply. For comparison
reasons, we focus on the inverse value, i.e. RSI−1. Thus, similar to the HHI, a higher
value indicates higher market concentration
The HHI represents a market concentration index based on the market share while
the RSI represents a market concentration index based on the residual supply (re-
maining capacity). Both measures therefore give different insights on the level of
market concentration.
8The HHI is broadly applied in energy economics, see for instance Hogan (1997) and Twomey et al.
(2006). A general discussion on concentration indices can be found in Green et al. (2006).
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5.3 Methodology
In this section, details of the basic modeling approach as well as data and assump-
tions are presented.
5.3.1 Modeling Approach
The analysis is performed with a unit-commitment model for the German power mar-
ket.9 The basic model formulation is based on the work by Ostrowski et al. (2012)
and Morales-España et al. (2013) and is extended for the modeling of balancing
power provision.
In this section, we explain the general modeling approach for unit-commitment
models but abstract from the detailed formulation that can be found in the literature
on unit-commitment models (e.g. Ostrowski et al. (2012) and Morales-España et al.
(2013)). The focus is set on the introduction of additional equations that account
for the characteristics of balancing power markets.
The overall goal of the unit-commitment model is to derive the cost minimal pro-
duction schedule of power plants to satisfy the demand for electricity. Power plants
are modeled blockwise with an hourly time resolution. Power plant blocks are de-
noted by the index p and hourly timesteps by the index t. The objective function of
the unit-commitment model is to minimize the total costs of electricity production
and can be expressed as
min TotalCosts =
∑
t,p
(VarCosts(t, p) + Star tU pCosts(t, p)) . (5.5)
StartUpCosts arise if a power plant is not producing in time step t but produces elec-
tricity in time step t +1. The actual StartUpCosts are dependent on the power plant
p as well as on the non-production duration (time steps since last time operating).
Power plants produce electricity to satisfy the demand. This essential constraint is
represented as
∀sm : ∑
psm
product ion(psm)+impor t(sm)−ex por t(sm) = demand(sm), (5.6)
9The model builds on the modelling framework MORE (Market Optimization for Elec-
tricity with Redispatch in Europe) that was developed at ewi Energy Research and
Scenarios gGmbH and is written in GAMS (further information can be found at
http://www.ewi.research-scenarios.de/en/models/more/).
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and holds for every time step t and every spot market sm. Here, psm are the power
plants in spot market sm, import considers the electricity flow from other countries
(spot markets) to the respective one and vice versa for exports.10 The exogenous
demand is assumed to be perfectly inelastic.11
Technical characteristics of power plants are modeled via different constraints.
An important modeling aspect of unit-commitment models is that they account for
different states of power plants that can be incorporated by using binary variables.
This makes the model a mixed-integer model. For example, each power plant has a
range of feasible production which can be described by
product ion(p) = 0 or (5.7)
minload(p)≤ product ion(p)≤ capaci t y(p). (5.8)
Additional technical constraints of power plant blocks are also incorporated, such
as part load efficiency losses, load change rates, combined heat and power operation
and start up times. Part load efficiency is modeled via a convex function between the
minimum load level and the full load level (according to Swider and Weber (2007)).
This increases relative costs at reduced load levels due to part load losses compared
to operation at full load operation. Load change rates determine technology specific
ramping constraints that only allow for a certain adjustment of the power plants’
production from one timestep to the next. Those constraints apply for ramp-up and
ramp-down operations. We assume that the minimum load level corresponds to the
grid synchronization. Thus, as soon as the power plant operates at the minimum
load level, it feeds the production into the grid.
The basic model is extended to account for the unique characteristics of balancing
power markets. These characteristics are essentially given by (i) different provision
intervals and (ii) operator structures. We therefore need to map the hourly timesteps
to the balancing provision intervals as well as the different power plant blocks to
operators.
Table 5.1 gives an overview of the sets, parameters and variables used for the
modeling of balancing power. In the following, the equations of the model will be
discussed.
10In the analysis at hand, only the German spot market is considered. Imports and exports are given
exogenously as explained later.
11If this assumption would be relaxed, we expect a similar outcome with respect to balancing power
provision since the intersection point of demand and supply curve at the spot market, and hence
the relevant opportunity costs would not change.
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Table 5.1: Overview of sets, parameters and variables
Set
BPi interval for balancing power provision, e.g. week, day or hour
op operator
t hour
p power plant
t_BPi set of hours in the balancing power provision interval
p_OP set of plants that belong to respective operator
FRI Fringe operators
Parameters
D(BPi) balancing power demand in interval
Variables
BP_O(BPi, op) balancing power provision by operator in interval
BP(t, p) balancing power provision by plant and hour
BP_F(BPi, p) balancing power provided by fringe operators in the interval
The total demand for balancing power during a provision interval must be satisfied
by the sum of the provision of all operators:
∀ BPi : ∑
op
BP_O(BPi, op) = D(BPi). (5.9)
The balancing power provision of all operators during a provision interval is con-
stituted by the provision of the plants of the operators in each hour:
∀ BPi, t ∈ t_BPi, op : ∑
p∈p_OP
BP(t, p) = BP_O(BPi, op). (5.10)
The balancing power provision of the fringe during the provision interval is con-
stituted by the fringe power plants without the option to pool:
∀ BPi : ∑
p∈p_OP(“FRI”)
BPF (BPi, p) = BP_O(BPi, “FRI”). (5.11)
The power plant specific balancing power provision of fringe power plants is fixed
in each hour of the provision interval:
∀ BPi, t ∈ t_BPi, p ∈ p_OP(“FRI”) : BPF (BPi, p) = BP(t, p). (5.12)
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Thus, the model allows the fundamental modeling of power plants that provide
balancing power accounting for the operator structure. However, calls of balancing
power are not modeled. Model outputs are the hourly production per power plant,
as well as, balancing power provision by operator and power plant. In combination
with the operator structure, we can evaluate market concentration indices in an ex-
post analysis.
5.3.2 Input Data and Assumptions
We model two representative weeks in 2014, i.e. a winter week and a summer week.
Figure 5.4i shows the demand, residual demand, solar feed-in and wind feed-in
during the winter week. This winter week represents a typical situation of high
demand in the early evening hours combined with no or very few solar radiation
during the day. Especially at the beginning of the week, the wind production is low
as well. As a result, there are situations with a residual demand of up to 71.2 GW in
which the conventional power plant fleet (nuclear and fossil power plants, pumped
storage plants) is utilized up to 69.3%. In the last three days of the week, the residual
demand is low due to low demand during the weekend and high wind feed-in. In
such a situation of low residual demand, the base load power plants supply a large
share of the spot market demand. Since the base load plants are owned by the large
operators, situations with low demand may show a high market concentration in the
spot market. This has implications for the market concentration on the balancing
power markets as well.
(i) Winter week (Monday-Sunday) (ii) Summer week (Monday-Sunday)
Figure 5.4: Demand, residual demand, solar feed-in and wind feed-in
Figure 5.4ii shows the demand, residual demand and renewable feed-in in the
summer week. It can be seen that there is a contrast to the conditions of the winter
week. The demand in the summer is typically low and there is high solar radiation
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during the day. This combination leads to a reduced utilization of the power plant
fleet and therefore to lower prices. Here, even base load and mid load German power
plants (lignite and hard coal power plants) reduce their production. Wind feed-in
is on a relatively low level (below 10 GW in every hour), but increases during the
weekend when the demand is already low. This leads to a low residual demand of
only 24.3 GW on the Sunday.
Typical weeks during spring and autumn can be interpreted as a combination of
the situations in the modeled weeks. The varying demand and renewable feed-in
in every single hour of the modeled weeks cover a broad range of situations and
therefore reflect also average situations with medium demand and/or renewable
feed-in.
The assumptions on power plant capacities are based on Bundesnetzagentur (2015).
Only German power plants are modeled. Imports and exports are exogenously given
based on ENTSO-E data. Fuel costs and CO2 prices are based on historical data. In-
stalled capacities, fuel costs and techno-economic parameters of power plants can
be found in the Appendix 5.6.1.
Power plants are also constrained in their balancing power provision. We consider
primary and secondary balancing power in our model, but abstract from tertiary
balancing power provision.12
We assume that all running plants can provide a certain share of their capacity
as balancing power. For the fossil and nuclear power plants, this share is derived
by information about the ramping speeds multiplied by the time duration until the
power adjustment needs to be realized. The ramping speed deviates by the year of
construction of the technology. Furthermore, we assume that the capacity (share)
for positive balancing power is the same as for negative balancing power. Table 5.2
shows the maximum allowed share of the capacity to provide balancing power for
different power plant technologies.13
12We do not consider tertiary balancing power since (i) technical restrictions are lower for the tertiary
market, (ii) it tends to be compensated by the intraday-market (30 min before physical delivery),
(iii) the current market design of tertiary balancing power has already a high tender frequency
(provision duration of four hours), and (iv) there are many competitors in the tertiary market
which reduces the risk of market power. Therefore, primary and secondary balancing power are in
the focus of our analysis.
13Pumped storage plants have a high ramping speed. Therefore, they have a high technical potential
to provide balancing power (up to 30 % of the capacity for the primary balancing power, and up
to 45% for the secondary balancing power for a single plant). However, due to multiple bidding
strategies and prequalification requirements, we assume that not all pumped storage plants are
bidding their total technical potential into the balancing power markets.
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Table 5.2: Share of total capacity that can be used for balancing power provision
Primary Balancing Power Secondary Balancing Power
CCGT 2.5 - 4% 25 - 40%
Coal 1 - 2.5% 5 - 12.5%
Lignite 1 - 2.5% 5 - 12.5%
Nuclear 2 - 2.5% 10%
OCGT 5 - 12.5% 50 - 60%
Oil 2% 20%
Pumped Storage 10% 15%
We assume that power plants that are not running have high starting costs, e.g. due
to attrition and fuel consumption, and thus are not competitive in offering balancing
power.14 We do not consider balancing power provision by renewables and demand
side management because those technologies were not important for the balancing
power market in 2014 (Dena, 2014).
There is only one product that is procured for primary balancing power. How-
ever, in the case of secondary balancing power, we consider a positive and negative
product for peak and off-peak times, respectively. Additionally we investigate the
cases of shorter tendering times, namely daily and hourly. In the case of a weekly
provision, the peak time are working days between 8 am and 8 pm. All other hours
(night and weekends) are off-peak time. In the case of a daily provision, the peak
time is the time between 8 am and 8 pm on every day (including weekends). In an
hourly auction, the distinction between peak and off-peak products disappears.
We map the information about the ownership to each power plant. We consider
the German power plant operators E.ON, RWE, EnBW, Vattenfall and STEAG in our
model. All other power plants are mapped to the fringe. We obtain information
about ownership of plants from a list of the German regulator Bundesnetzagentur.15
E.ON, RWE, EnBW, Vattenfall and STEAG can use pooling to provide balancing
power over a time period, e.g. they can offer a certain volume of balancing power
during the provision period and use different power plants within their pool to fulfill
their commitment. The fringe is not allowed to pool meaning that each power plant
14Start-up costs for a cold start can be up to 60.000 Euro for e.g. a 500 MW CCGT or OCGT power
plant with 2010 cost data (Schill, 2016). These costs would have to be reimbursed by the revenue
in the balancing power markets. Additionally, a faster start-up than usually increases the attrition
and has a higher consumption of equivalent operating hours (EOH).
15Each power plant is mapped to only one owner. This corresponds to the assumption that even if
several owners have shares in one plant, only one owner is responsible for marketing balancing
power.
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of the fringe has to provide the balancing power of the whole provision period. This
is the most restrictive assumption for the pooling of the fringe. Indeed, there are sev-
eral pooling companies which aggregate smaller producers to a virtual power plant
and therefore allow for pooling for subsets of the fringe. However, if we allow that
the whole fringe may use pooling effects, the fringe would operate as an additional
big producer. Therefore, we expect that the general results for market concentration
hold and only the absolute level of market concentration deviates.16
5.4 Results
In this section, we present the model results for a weekly, daily and hourly provision
duration. The weekly provision duration represents the status quo which is cur-
rently in operation in Germany. Daily and hourly provision duration are currently
discussed as alternative market designs for the German balancing power market. We
analyze the balancing power provision in three dimensions. First, we focus on the
efficiency gains by a shortened provision duration which are captured in the total
system costs. Second, we analyze the balancing power provision by technology and
operator which enables us to shed light onto the level of market concentration for
the different provision duration using the indices HHI and RSI−1.17
5.4.1 System Costs
Power system costs of different model configurations are a benchmark for the effi-
ciency of the market design. In order to assess the costs of balancing power provi-
sion, we additionally model the electricity system without balancing power provi-
sion. The difference between this baseline run and the model runs with balancing
power provision can thus be considered as the extra costs of balancing power provi-
sion.18
16Furthermore, fringe power plants are typically gas fired power plants. Therefore, the effect on
market concentration affects only situations with high residual demand as to the opportunity cost
bidding strategy and the merit order.
17Note that we use RSI−1 instead of RSI. Thus, a higher value of RSI−1 indicates higher market con-
centration, similar to the interpretation of HHI.
18When referred to balancing power in this section, primary and secondary balancing power is meant.
108
5.4 Results
Table 5.3 gives an overview of the total system costs in the simulated summer and
winter week with different designs of the balancing power markets. Irrespective of
if and how balancing power is provided, it can be seen that the system cost in the
winter is more than EUR 50m higher than in the summer.
Table 5.3: Total system cost in reference scenario in million Euros
in mio. Euro no provision hourly daily weekly weekly (no pooling)
Winter 175.6 176.7 176.8 177.0 178.0
Summer 124.6 125.1 125.2 125.2 125.6
As outlined above, the major power plant operators are allowed to pool their port-
folio in order to provide balancing power. In order to quantify the efficiency gain
resulting from pooling, a sensitivity with weekly balancing power provision in which
pooling is not allowed is simulated additionally to a weekly configuration with pool-
ing and hence included in Table 5.3.
The difference between the system costs without balancing power provision and
the system costs of a configuration with hourly / daily / weekly balancing power
provision can be understood as the respective costs of balancing power provision.
Figure 5.5 illustrates those costs. It can be seen that not only the total modeled
system costs are higher in winter, but also the costs of balancing power provision.19
If pooling would not be allowed, the cost of balancing power provision would be
EUR 2.361m in the winter week and EUR 0.995m in the summer week. The modeled
costs of the current weekly market design (with pooling of major operators) amount
to EUR 1.328m in the winter week, and EUR 0.677m in the summer week. The cost
difference between the weekly configuration with pooling and without pooling that
can be interpreted as the efficiency gain of pooling is EUR 1.033m in the winter and
EUR 0.319m in the summer.20
The difference between the system costs of a configuration with weekly balancing
power provision and a configuration with hourly balancing power provision (from
now on we only consider configurations with pooling) can be interpreted as the max-
19A higher residual demand level in the winter compared to the summer leads to higher total system
costs. The relationship between the residual demand and the costs of balancing power provision is
more complex: Depending on the steepness of the merit order, an increasing residual demand can
increase the costs of balancing power provision by inframarginal power plants. However, low resid-
ual demand levels can lead to situations in which extramarginal power plants provide balancing
power causing high costs of balancing power provision.
20An additional sensitivity analysis not included in figure 5.5 in which pooling of all fringe operators
in one common fringe pool would be allowed shows no significant further efficiency gain.
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Figure 5.5: Costs of primary and secondary balancing power (compared to no provision)
imum efficiency gain from shortening the provision duration. This cost difference is
EUR 222k in the winter week, and EUR 96k in the summer week.21 The system costs
of the daily balancing power provision are between the system costs for the hourly
and weekly balancing power provision. Compared to the efficiency gain from pool-
ing, this further efficiency gain by a shortened provision duration is small.
The level of renewable feed-in can influence those results. Therefore, we consider
a sensitivity in which we double the values of the historically observed renewable
feed-in in the simulated weeks. The detailed results are shown in Appendix 5.6.2.
A higher renewable feed-in leads to higher costs of balancing power provision es-
pecially in the summer week compared to the configuration with less renewables.
For instance, in the case of weekly provision in the summer, the balancing power
costs increase by EUR 559k if the renewable feed-in doubles. Due to the lower and
more volatile residual demand, more power plants have to be operational only in
order to provide balancing power. The order of magnitude of the efficiency gain
from pooling, however, remains unchanged by doubling the renewable feed-in.
The German expenses for the provision of primary and secondary balancing power
was EUR 331m in 2014 (Bundesnetzagentur, 2016) corresponding to average ex-
penses of EUR 6.37m per week.22 This means that the average real expenses were
higher than the simulated costs for the balancing power market with the weekly
market design (EUR 1.328m in the winter and EUR 0.677m in the summer). Our
model calculates total costs for power plants to provide balancing power under per-
fect competition and foresight. Those can be interpreted as a lower bound for pro-
21Due to solver inaccuracies (difference between current best integer solution and optimal value of
LP relaxation), we cannot resolve the exact effect. However, we can be sure about the order of
magnitude of the effect.
22This figure is calculated based on capacity bids, not energy bids. This is consistent with our modeling
approach in which we consider only provision and not calling of balancing power.
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ducers’ costs for the balancing power provision. The Bundesnetzagentur publishes
the total expenditures for the balancing power provision. These expenditures also
include producers’ surplus. If every operator would bid their real costs in the pay-
as-bid auction (under perfect foresight and perfect information), both results should
be the same. However, since it is profit maximizing for the operators to estimate and
bid the system marginal costs instead of own marginal costs (see for instance Müs-
gens et al. (2014)), the real expenditures are higher than the modeled costs for
provision. Furthermore, the exercise of market power (e.g. withholding of volumes)
could even lead to higher system marginal costs and hence higher producers’ sur-
plus. Effects like strategic bidding between capacity and energy bid or sub-optimal
behavior due to information asymmetries could further increase the cost difference
between real expenditures and the model results. Additionally, uncertainty for e.g.
residual demand, prices, and power plant shortages of the next week are included
in the bids which increase costs. These aspects are not considered by the cost mini-
mizing model under perfect foresight. Therefore, we would expect our results to be
a lower bound for the possible cost reductions.
5.4.2 Provision of Balancing Power
Balancing power is provided by different types of power plants within the portfo-
lio of operators. Depending on the portfolio of operators and the pooling within
the portfolio, the balancing power provision by technology changes from hour to
hour. This effect can be observed in the graphs in Figure 5.6i for different provision
durations at the example of positive secondary balancing power in the winter week.
For the weekly provision, we see a strong hourly fluctuation within the technolo-
gies although operators are restricted to a weekly provision duration. This indicates
that the operators make significant use of the pooling option. The operators can
freely select the power plants that shall provide balancing power in certain hours
of the week. Therefore, the operators choose those power plants in their portfo-
lio which have the lowest opportunity costs with respect to the spot market. Here,
obviously, operators with a large portfolio have an advantage compared to small op-
erators. For primary balancing power as well as for the case of the summer week, the
fluctuation of balancing power providing technologies are similar to the Figure 5.6i.
If we take a look at the provision by technology for daily or hourly provision dura-
tion, we find a surprisingly similar structure to the weekly provision duration. How-
ever, small differences in the diagrams can be identified. CCGT, for instance, have a
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more important role in peak hours with the hourly provision compared to the out-
comes with longer provision duration. In the daily configuration, coal power plants
provide more often balancing power compared to the other configurations. The
hourly provision duration can be expected to be the efficient benchmark in which
the owner structure of power plants does not matter. This means that the most
cost efficient power plants in each hour provide balancing power. Since the capac-
ity provision by technology of the weekly and daily cases are similar to the hourly
benchmark, we conclude that the pooling possibilities allow a provision pattern that
is close to the most efficient outcome. Even with a weekly provision duration, al-
most the same cost efficient technologies provide balancing power as in the case
with an hourly provision. Except from the shown technology classes in Figure 5.6i,
no other modeled technologies provide balancing power.23 This interpretation is
in line with the results presented in Section 5.4.1 where the efficiency gain from
pooling was quantified to be EUR 1.382m in the winter week whereas the respective
efficiency gain from shortening the provision duration from a weekly to an hourly
market design was found to be EUR 0.222m.
Figure 5.6ii shows the modeled capacity provision by operator for positive sec-
ondary balancing power for a weekly, daily and hourly provision duration.24 Com-
pared to the modeled provision by technology, the modeled provision by operators
differs more significantly for the three market designs. The fluctuation of market
shares becomes higher with a shorter provision duration.
The capacity provision by operator can be considered as a first indicator for the
market concentration indices. Therefore, we expect stronger fluctuation of the mar-
ket concentration indices for shorter provision duration. Drivers for this are:
• the absolute residual demand level at a given time point in the time frame,
• the volatility of the residual demand level in the provided time frame,
• the steepness of the marginal cost function of the power plants and therefore
the steepness of the opportunity cost function,
• the operator structure of the opportunity cost function, i.e. whether operators’
capacities are in blocks or spread in the opportunity costs merit order.
Thus, the capacity provision by operator is typically dependent on the specific
23This result does not only hold for the case of positive secondary balancing power, but also for the
other investigated products.
24In Appendix 5.6.3, diagrams analogous to Figure 5.6 are shown for the other modeled balancing
power products and weeks.
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Figure 5.6: Comparison of the technologies (left) and operators (right) providing positive
secondary balancing power for the weekly, daily and hourly provision duration
in the winter week (model results)
market circumstances, e.g. the product definition, the annual season, and the provi-
sion duration. Hence, we investigate the different market designs based on market
concentration indices in detail to derive further insights.
5.4.3 Market Concentration
Based on the balancing power provision by operator observed in Figure 5.6ii we
compute market indices for the three balancing power products, primary, secondary
positive and secondary negative balancing power. The indices vary depending on
the market design and provision duration. In order to assess the different ranges
of market concentration indices, we analyze the model results in histograms for the
HHI (cf. Figures 5.7, 5.9 and 5.10). Those diagrams show the HHI values in the
weekly market design as a solid red line. In the case of secondary balancing power,
two solid red lines are present due to the two contract durations (HT and NT, as
described in Section 5.2). For the hourly provision duration, 168 different products
are defined and hence 168 HHI values. The histograms show the distribution of those
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hourly HHI values. Similar histograms for the RSI−1 are evaluated (cf. Figure 5.8,
Figure 5.17 and Figure 5.18).25
For the interpretation of the results, we also add dotted lines into the histograms,
which indicate threshold values for high market concentration. For the HHI, a strong
market concentration exists at a value of 25% according to US Department of Justice,
Federal Trade Commission (2010, §5.3) and at 20 % (with further restrictions) as
to EUR-lex (2004, 19. and 20.). In the case of the RSI−1 we consider a threshold
value of 1.11 (which corresponds to a threshold value of 0.9 for the original RSI
definition).
The indices are no absolute measures, i.e. a specific index would not be sufficient
to indicate market concentration. Nevertheless, high market concentration is more
likely if both discussed indices point to a critical level.
Market Concentration for Primary Balancing Power Provision
For the modeled provision of primary balancing power, the HHI values are displayed
in Figure 5.7. We observe that the summer seems to be slightly more concentrated
in balancing power provision than the winter. The reason for this lies in the dif-
ferent demand profiles and the increasing production of solar generation (cf. Fig-
ure 5.4i). In the summer, a lower electricity demand and higher solar generation
lead to less demand for generation from conventional power plants and therefore
there are less power plants available (i.e. running) that are able to provide primary
balancing power. This is also indicated by high values of the RSI−1 that can be seen
in Figure 5.8.
Based on the model results we can infer that the primary balancing power market
is prone to high market concentration. When the market design is changed from
weekly provision to hourly provision we observe that the indices take on a broader
range of values. This means there are hours in which market concentration is in-
creased and hours when market concentration is lowered. An increase in market
concentration may occur if the level of demand is at a level where only few operators
are close to the marginal production level. As previously explained in Section 5.2
and shown in Figure 5.3, there are intervals in the merit order where only some op-
25Additionally, an analysis for the concentration ratio CR1 and CR3 was conducted. The CR for m
firms is defined as CR(m) :=
∑m
i=1 MSi where MSi is the market share of operator i in % for the m
largest firms. The analysis for CR1 and CR3 did not lead to different conclusions compared to the
analysis based on HHI and RSI−1. Furthermore, the CR as an market share concentration index is
similar to the HHI and thus to some extent redundant.
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Figure 5.7: Histogram of the hourly HHI values for primary balancing power in winter week
(left) and summer week (right)
erators own power plants. This is for example the case for lignite power plants that
are owned by Vattenfall and RWE. When demand is low and lignite power plants are
marginal in their production, they can provide balancing power at lowest cost. Since
this effect only depends on one single demand period in the hourly provision case
instead of multiple demand periods in the weekly design, the modeled market con-
centration increases in some hours. In addition, market concentration is higher in
the summer because of lower demand levels and therefore less conventional power
plants that are operating. The baseload power plants that are still operating are
owned by fewer operators which increases market concentration.
There is no clear trend observable to conclude whether shorter provision duration
structurally mitigates or favors market concentration. The RSI−1, however, that can
be seen in Figure 5.8 decreases in average with shorter provision duration especially
in the winter week. This means that the average market concentration is reduced
because there is more active capacity that could provide balancing power. Neverthe-
less, there are some hours when the RSI−1 indicates a slightly higher concentration
compared to the weekly provision. In the winter, the hourly market design leads to
RSI−1 values below the threshold in most hours. In the summer, however, the RSI−1
can only be decreased below the threshold in some hours. Based on the model re-
sults, the primary balancing power market seems to be highly concentrated such
that even in the case with an hourly balancing power provision the average market
concentration in the summer is still modeled as critically high.
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Figure 5.8: Histogram of the hourly concentration index RSI−1 for primary balancing power
in winter week (left) and summer week (right)
Market Concentration for Positive Secondary Balancing Power Provision
Whereas primary balancing power is mostly provided by baseload power plants that
are able to increase and decrease their generation, secondary balancing power is
divided into positive and negative balancing power. In the case of positive balanc-
ing power, power plants provide the ability to increase their generation when being
called. For the winter we see the respective technology and operator mix in Fig-
ure 5.6. The result for the summer week is similar which is the reason why it is not
shown additionally. The main difference between the summer and the winter week
is that more lignite power plants provide balancing power in the summer week in-
stead of CCGTs in the winter week. Especially the high provision of balancing power
from lignite power plants leads to a high market share by RWE and Vattenfall.
The market concentration indices in Figure 5.9 show a high market concentra-
tion based on the HHI. Here, again, concentration seems to be higher in the sum-
mer compared to the winter. Nevertheless, the story is a bit different compared to
the provision of primary balancing power because in the case of positive secondary
balancing power there is a larger proportion of active power plants that could po-
tentially provide balancing power. The respective RSI−1 indicates that the market is
not too concentrated because the providing power plants could be replaced by the
provision from power plants that are currently not delivering balancing power (the
histogram for the RSI−1 can be found in the Appendix). Therefore, the market can
be considered as not as concentrated compared to the primary balancing power mar-
ket. When the provision duration is lowered to an hourly level, the average modeled
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market concentration based on the RSI−1 is further reduced. In the case of the HHI,
there is, however, no clear evidence for a reduction in average market concentration
by reducing provision durations. There are single hours with very high modeled
market concentrations in the hourly case.
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Figure 5.9: Histogram of the hourly HHI values for positive secondary balancing power in
winter week (left) and summer week (right)
Market Concentration for Secondary Negative Balancing Power Provision
The HHI values for secondary negative balancing power that can be seen in Fig-
ure 5.10 have similar characteristics as the values for the positive secondary bal-
ancing power. Nevertheless, in the negative secondary balancing power market, we
would expect no abuse of market power even with a high market concentration. The
rationale for this is as follows: As to Section 5.2, the costs for capacity bids for bal-
ancing power are driven by opportunity cost compared to the spot market. Thus, for
one hour, all operating power plants have zero costs for offering negative balancing
power. For a longer provision duration, the costs would increase if the power plant
would not be inframarginal all the time. However, due to pooling effects, operators
can choose power plants which are operating in a specific situation. Therefore, the
opportunity costs for each provider can be assumed to be (almost) zero. Many fringe
operators can potentially participate in the auction since e.g. wind producers could
also provide negative balancing power. This means that the resulting supply curve
for negative balancing power is very flat. If operators would try to withhold quanti-
ties in an attempt to increase prices, fringe operators with similar small costs would
provide the balancing power. Hence, prices of (almost) zero for negative balancing
117
5 Tender Frequency and Market Concentration in Balancing Power Markets
power should be the consequence. Note that in reality, there is uncertainty (e.g.
power plant outages) which leads to slightly positive capacity bids. With our model,
we can find the cost minimal provision of balancing power but we would expect
fierce competition. Therefore, even high shares of market concentration that can
be observed in the model results should not lead to the abuse of market power be-
cause all providers face the same low level of opportunity costs. This argumentation
is supported by the results on the RSI concentration index for negative balancing
power (cf. Appendix 5.6.4, Figure 5.18), where most situations point to sufficient
available active capacities to mitigate market concentration.
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Figure 5.10: Histogram of the hourly HHI values for negative secondary balancing power in
winter week (left) and summer week (right)
5.4.4 Influence of additional Demand Response on the Market
Concentration
A shortened provision duration relaxes the provision duration constraint and poten-
tially leads to dynamic market entries, e.g. by demand response technologies. The
participation of demand response in US real-time balancing markets is well inves-
tigated, see for instance Heffner (2008), Vlachos and Biskas (2013) or Wang et al.
(2015). In order to gain insights into the role of additional demand response tech-
nologies in our case, we model a sensitivity with additional 2.000 MW of pump
storage. In the model rationale, pump storage capacity has the same features as
flexible demand response processes or local storage applications. We model the
capacity belonging to the fringe operators which reflects the assumption of compet-
itively acting small operators. As expected, the average market concentration in the
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hourly market design is reduced in the sensitivity compared to the corresponding
case without the additional capacity. However, the main observation of the market
concentration analysis is found in the sensitivity as well, i.e. that there are hours with
higher market concentration in the hourly market design compared to the weekly
market design. This holds true for primary balancing power as well as for secondary
balancing power.
5.5 Conclusion
Currently, the German primary and secondary balancing power markets have a weekly
tender frequency. In a weekly market design, large power plant operators make use
of pooling within their portfolio in order to provide balancing power. Fringe opera-
tors, however, do not have pooling options and need to withhold the capacity of their
plants from the spot market for a whole week to provide balancing power which can
lead to inefficiencies. Hence, fringe operators could potentially benefit from a short-
ened provision duration. The analysis at hand focuses on (1) efficiency gains from a
shorter provision duration in primary and secondary balancing power markets, and
(2) market concentration in market designs with different provision duration. Since
it is known from the literature that simultaneous equilibria in spot and balancing
power markets are efficient and unique (Richter, 2012), our methodology is based
on a cost minimizing unit-commitment model for the electricity market in which we
account for the ownership of power plants.
We quantify the efficiency gain from allowing pooling in a weekly market design
to be EUR 1.033m in a winter week and EUR 0.319m in a summer week. Compared
to this, the further efficiency gains that can be realized by shortening the provision
duration from a week to an hour are small. An hourly market design would lower
the costs of balancing power provision by EUR 222k in a winter week and EUR 96k
in a summer week. Relative to the total simulated cost of balancing power provision
in the weekly market design with pooling, the efficiency gain is 17% in the winter
week, and 14% in the summer week.
Besides the efficiency gains, we identify effects on the market concentration. Here,
we investigate the HHI and RSI−1 indices, which are based on the market share
and the residual supply, respectively. According to the model results, we see the
potential for high market concentration in the primary balancing power market due
to the technical requirements power plants need to fulfill in order to participate
in this market. In the market for positive secondary balancing power, the model
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results indicate less concentration because there is more available capacity that could
potentially replace the providing power plants. For the negative secondary balancing
power, our results are quantitatively similar to the other products. However, we
consider concentration in the market for negative balancing power not to be an issue
due to the low opportunity costs for providing negative balancing power. Based on
the model results, we find a higher market concentration in the summer than in the
winter in all considered markets. The higher market concentration in the summer is
driven by a lower level of demand, which reduces the number of active power plants
and also the number of operators that are providing balancing power.
Our results reveal a tendency towards decreasing average market concentration by
shortening the provision duration. However, the market concentration indices take
on a broader range of values in the case of a shorter provision duration depending
on the residual demand level and its volatility. There are single provision periods
with a very high market concentration in the hourly market design that could favor
the potential for market power abuse.
Although market concentration can be an indicator for market power, it does not
necessarily identify market power. The characteristics of the supply curve for balanc-
ing power determine the potential for market power abuse. If high market concen-
tration is found in a flat segment of the supply curve, prices cannot be raised signifi-
cantly. The goal of further research should be to comprehensively understand market
imperfections in balancing power markets which is a prerequisite for conducting a
comprehensive cost-benefit analysis for changes in market design like shortening of
provision periods. Besides market concentration, aspects like e.g. strategic bidding
between capacity and energy bid and uncertainty about the renewable feed-in or
demand should be considered.
As a policy implication, we recommend to monitor market concentration and price
levels carefully after a change of the market design in the balancing power market.
In specific situations, single operators may have a cost advantage compared to their
competitors.
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5.6.1 Input Data for Modeling
Since we model the year 2014, we are able to use realistic data according to publicly
available sources. Assumptions that are made are in line with typical assumptions
for modeling the electricity market in Germany. The installed power plant capacities
of different fuel types are shown in Table 5.4 and are based on Bundesnetzagentur
(2015).26 Additionally, Table 5.4 shows the assumed fuel costs and the CO2 emission
coefficients by fuel. We assume those costs to be static over the whole year. The CO2
emission certificates are assumed to have a price of 6.2 EUR/t CO2. The fuel costs
of pumped storage are based on opportunity costs.
Table 5.4: Model inputs: Installed capacity in Germany for 2014, fuel costs, costs for CO2
emissions certificates, and CO2 emission coefficients
Capacity Fuel Costs CO2 Emission Coefficient
[GW] [EUR/MWhtherm] [t CO2 / MWhtherm]
Nuclear 12.1 3.6 0
Lignite 21.3 1.5 0.404
Coal 25.5 13.2 0.399
Gas 26.9 22.8 0.202
Oil 2.4 49.4 0.281
Pumped Storage 6.4 (opportunity costs) 0
Others 1 22.8 0.202
PV 32.7 0 0
Wind onshore 31.4 0 0
Wind offshore 0.4 0 0
Biomass 7.5 31.8 0
Hydro 4.4 0 0
Table 5.5 shows the assumed technical power plant parameters (particularly de-
pendent on the year of construction).
26The actual input of installed capacities is further separated as to the year of construction: This gives
further technical characteristics and parameters like full load and part load efficiency. The newer
a power plant, the better are its technical parameters.
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Table 5.5: Techno-economic parameters for conventional power plants
Net efficiency
full-load
Fixed operating
and maintenance costs
Availability
Start-up
time
Minimum
part-load
[%] [EUR/kW/a] [%] [h] [%]
Coal 37 - 46 36 - 54 84 4 - 7 27 -40
Lignite 32 - 47 43 - 65 86 7 - 11 30 - 60
CCGT 40 - 60 28 86 2 - 3 40 - 70
OCGT 28 - 40 17 86 0.25 40 - 50
Nuclear 33 97 92 24 45
Biomass 30 165 85 1 30
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5.6.2 Robustness Checks
As a robustness check, a model run is considered in which the values of renewable
feed-in is doubled. Table 5.6 gives an overview of the total system costs, and Fig-
ure 5.11 illustrated the costs for providing primary and secondary balancing power
compared to a model run without balancing power provision.
Table 5.6: Total system cost in scenario with doubled renewable feed-in in million Euros
in mio. Euro no provision hourly daily weekly weekly (no pooling)
Winter 131.6 132.8 132.9 133.0 134.1
Summer 102.4 103.5 103.5 103.6 104.3
weekly (no 
 pooling allowed)
weekly daily hourly
0.0
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1.0
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2.0
2.5
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ill
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Figure 5.11: Costs of primary and secondary balancing power (compared to no provision)
in scenario with doubled renewable feed-in
123
5 Tender Frequency and Market Concentration in Balancing Power Markets
5.6.3 Balancing Power Provision by Technologies and Operators
The following diagrams are the illustrations analogous to Figure 5.6 for the pri-
mary balancing power in the summer and winter week, positive secondary balanc-
ing power in the summer week and negative balancing power in the summer and
winter week.
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
[M
W
]
weekly
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
[M
W
]
daily
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160
Hour
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
[M
W
]
hourly
Nuclear
Lignite
Coal
CCGT
Hydro Storage
(i) Provision by technology
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
[M
W
]
weekly
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
[M
W
]
daily
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160
Hour
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
[M
W
]
hourly
ENB
EON
RWE
STE
VAT
FRI
(ii) Provision by operator
Figure 5.12: Comparison of the technologies (left) and operators (right) providing primary
balancing power for the weekly, daily and hourly provision duration in the sum-
mer week (model results)
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Figure 5.13: Comparison of the technologies (left) and operators (right) providing primary
balancing power for the weekly, daily and hourly provision duration in the win-
ter week (model results)
0
500
1000
1500
2000
[M
W
]
weekly
0
500
1000
1500
2000
[M
W
]
daily
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160
Hour
0
500
1000
1500
2000
[M
W
]
hourly
Nuclear
Lignite
Coal
CCGT
Hydro Storage
(i) Provision by technology
0
500
1000
1500
2000
[M
W
]
weekly
0
500
1000
1500
2000
[M
W
]
daily
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160
Hour
0
500
1000
1500
2000
[M
W
]
hourly
ENB
EON
RWE
STE
VAT
FRI
(ii) Provision by operator
Figure 5.14: Comparison of the technologies (left) and operators (right) providing positive
secondary balancing power for the weekly, daily and hourly provision duration
in the summer week (model results)
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Figure 5.15: Comparison of the technologies (left) and operators (right) providing negative
secondary balancing power for the weekly, daily and hourly provision duration
in the summer week (model results)
0
500
1000
1500
2000
[M
W
]
weekly
0
500
1000
1500
2000
[M
W
]
daily
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160
Hour
0
500
1000
1500
2000
[M
W
]
hourly
Nuclear
Lignite
Coal
CCGT
Hydro Storage
(i) Provision by technology
0
500
1000
1500
2000
[M
W
]
weekly
0
500
1000
1500
2000
[M
W
]
daily
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160
Hour
0
500
1000
1500
2000
[M
W
]
hourly
ENB
EON
RWE
STE
VAT
FRI
(ii) Provision by operator
Figure 5.16: Comparison of the technologies (left) and operators (right) providing negative
secondary balancing power for the weekly, daily and hourly provision duration
in the winter week (model results)
126
5.6 Appendix
5.6.4 RSI Concentration Index for Secondary Balancing Power
Figure 5.17 and 5.18 show the RSI−1 market concentration indices for secondary
balancing power (positive and negative, respectively). Values above the threshold
of 1.1 point to high market concentration situations in which one supplier might
be pivotal. It becomes obvious that in most situations, enough (active) capacity is
available. The situation is more critical in the modeled summer than winter week.
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Figure 5.17: Histogram of the hourly concentration index RSI−1 for positive secondary bal-
ancing power in winter week (left) and summer week (right)
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Figure 5.18: Histogram of the hourly concentration index RSI−1 for negative secondary bal-
ancing power in winter week (left) and summer week (right)
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